



Daily Report

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["International Observers Roundtable" program with Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer; political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, All-Union Radio commentator]

[Text] [Levin] We shall begin our discussion with the results of the visit to the United States by our Foreign Affairs Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze. You are aware that Comrade Shevardnadze held detailed talks there with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. Eduard Amvrosiyevich met U.S. President Bush. Well, since the purpose of the visit was to prepare for a summit meeting, I think that its main achievement, from the political point of view at least, was the agreement on a precise date for the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, which will be held from 30 May to 3 June.

[Shishlin] As always, the agenda is an all-embracing one. It includes all the key questions with the development of Soviet-U.S. relations and the development of the international situation as such. This is all the more important in that we are living through quite a complicated and complex time in international affairs. The agenda is virtually bursting with very important questions. On the one hand, good prospects would appear to be opening up for hammering out reasonable compromises. On the other hand, one should underestimate the complex questions which exist, whether one is talking of the problems of curtailing the arms race, further efforts to overcome conflicts, or bilateral relations, too. Not everything is smooth, even and cloud-free.

[Bovin] And the main thing is that the problem of the Baltic Republics has reared its head. It has to be said that the cloud-free, even progress of the talks between Baker, for example, and our minister was upset. Well, before you always knew the range of questions. It was outlined quite precisely. Now Lithuania has pushed its way actively, so to speak, into these questions, pushing all other problems aside in a very serious manner. So the first thing that was discussed in Washington was, of course, the question of Lithuania. A very great deal is being written about this. Every day there are dozens of articles on the subject of Lithuania and the role of Lithuania in Soviet-U.S. relations.

There are quite a few people in the United States who are trying all the time to get Bush to take a harder line, on Lithuania for example, and to discourage the further normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations. They want him to put pressure, so to speak, on Gorbachev, so that the latter removes all those formal obstacles as soon as possible and allows Lithuania to sail ahead unhindered.

On the other hand, I think, one gets the general impression that the administration plainly does not want to adopt such a course, one which would be a tiny bit

reckless, albeit somewhat superficially perhaps, and done for effect only. Nevertheless, Bush and his administration—Baker in particular—have adopted a principled position. They have never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic countries, the Baltic Republics, in our country. Naturally, therefore, they cannot adopt any other position. They favor Lithuania's independence. At the same time they are stressing, in all manner of ways, that this is a problem which must be solved in a constitutional way, in the Soviet Union. They are not insisting that the flames be fuelled or salt added to the wound from outside.

So, this is quite a complex problem because Bush is being asked to turn in different ways, to bend this way and that. And we, for our part, should consider the U.S. side. The main thing is that Soviet-U.S. relations should not mark time. They must advance, above all in the field of disarmament.

[Shishlin] This is precisely where one problem occurs, the problem of priorities. What is most important, most essential for us—the preservation of the Soviet Union's integrity and the implementation of the program of restructuring our unitarian state and turning it into a real federation, or the calm development of international relations and the enrichment and enhancement of Soviet-U.S. relations?

And one discovers that the answer to this question is not all that easy to find. It transpires that both are equally important. These two problems need to be reconciled in some way.

In the light of this it seems to me that the progress made toward a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, in particular the prospects which are opening up for resolving the questions which will be discussed during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to the United States, are also stimulating the search for the political solutions required by the situation now created as a result of the Lithuanian events—and not just the Lithuanian events. I would indeed add to this the situation in all the Baltic republics.

In other words, again and again we are seeing that work to draw up a new Union treaty, to establish a real federation and a real democratic model for our country's social system, determines in a most direct and intimate way the progress we make toward the goals which we have set ourselves in foreign policy.

[Levin] But I think that, on the whole, the results of Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze's visit to the United States give grounds to conclude that in the White House, at least—I would not risk talking about the Capitol at the moment, because on the Capitol they have, as you know, voted very clearly for the earliest possible normalization, as they put it, of relations between the United States and Lithuania. [incomplete sentence as heard]

[Bovin] The vote was 416 for and 3 against.

[Levin] Yes, the vote spoke very clearly for itself. And this also needs to be borne in mind, as a factor in international politics.

[Bovin] Unquestionably, unquestionably.

[Levin] So, in general, Washington is prepared to help us resolve our questions on the basis of our constitution. But it is quite obvious that they need to be resolved as quickly as possible.

[Shishlin] But, Viktor Nikolayevich, let us say one other thing straight out. In the West, politicians very often succumb to the temptation to become the teachers of Soviet politicians and to suggest that the Soviet Union adopt solutions borrowed from their experience. Well, the desire to give the Soviet Union a few tips is praiseworthy. But I still think that Soviet leaders, Soviet politicians and Soviet political forces must base their policies on Soviet realities. In this instance, despite all the links between internal and international problems, one needs to see that international problems have, of course, their own specific features.

As it happens, the problem of the unification of the two German states was also discussed in Washington in quite some detail, as you know. That is also a very weighty question today, as we try to forecast what is going to happen tomorrow in international relations.

[Levin] Yes, several very interesting statements about that were also made there. Some analysts have even hastened already to draw the conclusion—I am judging by the West German press—that, as they put it, we are opposing the inclusion of a united Germany in NATO simply in order to play for time. They are quoting a remark said to have been made by Comrade Shevardnadze's spokesman, the head of the USSR Foreign Ministry information department, Gerasimov, that currently we do not have an alternative proposal to make. Therefore, let us jointly put forward—seek new ideas. But it seems to me that there is no contradiction here. We are against the inclusion of a united Germany in NATO. But we do not rule out a search for any solutions which might correspond to the interests of both sides. It's a mistake, I think, to regard this position purely as a way of playing for time. Here there are fundamental questions.

[Bovin] In my view the fundamental question here is not whether Germany will belong to NATO or not. The important thing is that there should be the strongest possible guarantees that Germany will be a peace-loving state, a 100 percent guarantee if that is humanly possible. That is the essence of the problem. We have an obligation to ourselves, to our children and grandchildren, to be able to say that, as a result of our common endeavors, through a system of cross-guarantees involving the whole of Europe, the United States, Canada and, if you like, China and anybody else you care to mention, that we have managed to ensure that a united Germany will really be a peace-loving state. That is the most important thing. That is the goal.

The only other question is the choice of method: How is this to be done? By a peace treaty, let us say, and, I repeat, cross-guarantees, an undertaking not to possess nuclear weapons and undertakings involving, if not demilitarization, then at least some restrictions on armaments. And there absolutely have to be some undertakings about the borders. That is the choice we have to opt for—the main choice, in my view. Otherwise, all we have to do is to approach the whole question more calmly. The one thing we have to avoid is war. Germany must be a peace-loving state.

[Levin] It so happens that Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze's visit to Washington was preceded by one by Genscher, the FRG foreign minister. He also held detailed talks there. Naturally, his discussions there were virtually monopolized by the problems of German unification.

It is also worth noting that the talks between Baker and Genscher on questions connected to German unification were singled out at a news conference held by State Department spokesman Fitzwater [as heard]. In this connection, Fitzwater said that 35 countries, including both the Warsaw Treaty countries and the Western states, are taking part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This conference is a good forum for the discussion of many problems. I think that was a very valuable remark, because we also consider the processes of German unification should be harnessed to the all-European process. If they take place within the framework of all-European processes, the anxieties and apprehensions can probably be allayed.

Genscher said once again that "our undertaking never to possess chemical, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons will indisputably remain in force."

[Bovin] Incidentally, Genscher also declared that the borders between the new Germany which is to be born, and Poland, would be inviolable.

[Levin] Yes. It seems to me that his formula of "a united Germany in the borders of 1990," in other words, the presently existing borders of the two German states, is a fine one.

[Shishlin] His remark that there must be a European Germany and not a German Europe was also a good one.

[Levin] In other words, all these pronouncements indicate that there are realistically minded people among the most important political leaders of the FRG, who are very well aware that not only are there things to discuss, but quite obviously, things to agree on as well.

However, at the same time, I cannot pass over the remarks of Dregger, a representative of the right wing. Although he does not belong to the government, he certainly cannot be discounted because he represents certain political interests. Speaking in Hungary he said: How good it is that Soviet troops are leaving Hungary. We hope that they will also leave Germany sometime in

the near future. This statement worries me because Herr Dregger is obviously confusing the nature of the Soviet troops' stay in Hungary and their presence on the territory of the GDR. These are completely different things.

[Bovin] They are also different in law, so to speak. Unquestionably....

[Levin, interrupting] Their legal basis is also different, of course.

[Bovin] Neither should one forget our poor soldiers who are stationed here, there, and everywhere. The sooner they come home, the better, I think. I am looking at it from a purely human angle, honestly. I don't know how many hundreds of thousands of them there are, but why should they be stationed there? What difference will it make? Is it really going to make the difference between whether there is war or not? We have to look at things realistically. We have, I think, hemmed ourselves in with rituals and myths over and over again. Times have changed out of all recognition. Everything has changed. There is no need for us to start counting yet again how many troops we have, 5,500 soldiers here, 4,500 there. Why they do it astounds me.

[Levin] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, in principle I agree with the way you put the question. I myself am firmly convinced that our troops will not hang about for along time on German soil. But, nevertheless, I would not like to leave the solution of this question to Dregger. I would not like that.

[Bovin] No, but that is a different question. We know who Dregger is, of course. He simply cannot talk any other way.

[Levin] I'd now like to return to the results of Comrade Shevardnadze's talks, in Washington. We've already noted that a specific date for the visit has been set, and that is very important, especially in present conditions. What, then, will the sides be bringing to that visit? True, as soon as he arrived in Washington, Eduard Amvrosiyevich expressed the view that another meeting of ministers will be needed. The timetable is very tight, but there are already some tangible results of that meeting, too.

[Shishlin] Well, you now, Viktor Nikolayevich, as I understand it the group of experts is now at work on the whole range of problems which will be on the table during the negotiations at the summit meeting. So it's a little early to say, but in the first place, the meeting took place in a good and frank atmosphere. And the gist of the problems was indeed addressed. This is true above all of disarmament problems: the complex of problems to do with a 50 percent reduction of strategic arms, abolition of chemical weapons, and a sharp cut in conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. All this is pretty much to the point.

[Levin] Of course there are still not a few difficulties in the way of preparing the Soviet-U.S. documents. Let one

example suffice: According to information received from Washington, there is no agreement yet on air-based cruise missiles. The Americans are insisting that the number of strategic offensive arms should include only missiles with a range of more than 1,000 km. We, the Soviet Union, consider that a range of 600 km is entirely adequate. And I want to stress here that we're talking about air-based cruise missiles; they are delivered by aircraft, and then fly independently. There are some very serious military questions here, and of course solving them is not such a simple matter. But let us see what all this is leading to. One thing is clear: We are moving forward.

[Shishlin] And then, say what you will, but some completely new motifs are being heard in the discussion of how to overcome regional conflicts. And in this case, the example of Namibia, say—to say nothing of other examples—in itself obliges us to redouble Soviet-U.S. efforts to bring a lasting political settlement to other restless parts of the world. I don't know about you, but for example, after certain apparent glimmers of hope in the development of the Near East situation, things there have again taken a sharp turn for the worse, with a spate of hotheaded statements both from the Arabs and from Israel. Yet in the end this is not a problem that can be frozen by being put in some sort of political refrigerator. And it seems to me that in itself increasing awareness of responsibility, mutual responsibility, on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as other states, for seeing to it that these regional conflicts are not forgotten, for using imagination and looking for ways of overcoming these regional conflicts, and a political solution of the problems which have arisen, this is in itself also of value. Well, and of course we mustn't forget, either, that in the course of that meeting, issues of Soviet-U.S. cooperation were discussed as well. What we want—and here much depends on the position of the present U.S. Administration—is to turn over a whole chapter in the development of Soviet-U.S. relations, and indeed open an era of cooperation—of which there are signs, and which is possible. But in itself the era of cooperation will remain an empty sound unless filled out by practical steps, practical actions, practical moves to redouble really mutual efforts, not just in the political sphere, but in the economic and intellectual spheres, too.

[Bovin] Yes, you're right of course, because actually the material of cooperation itself goes beyond disarmament efforts—negative...[changes thought] good, we've—but what is the task? [sentence as heard] What's needed now is a positive accumulation. And here too I have to say that there are a good few difficulties—and difficulties not just because we have, well, as it were, an inadequate picture perhaps of the interests of economic—economic partners by virtue of the features of our economy, but also because here the Americans are also (?twisting and trying to have it both ways), by retaining all their strategic limitations under Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls]....

[Shishlin interrupting] They're reduced them just a little.

[Bovin] Just a little. But most of them remain, and this of course is getting in the way of what we need. We don't need axle grease or nails, though no doubt we're short of them, too. But what we need is other things. And those other things they are doing all they can to withhold through Cocom. Then their own domestic policy—the Jackson-Vannik Amendment: How much talk has there been about this, saying first one thing then another, and that it should be repealed—they've talked about it a thousand times, but no: Every time there's some hitch, then six months later they want to come back to it again, bring it up in parliament again, and so it drags on. So that's another specific factor, perhaps. And here, well, I don't know whether to call it tactics, or strategy. It very often happens that at the level of generalities, at the levels of assurances etc, it's all very nice, all very good, it's all so beautifully written that you want to sign it twice. But as soon as it comes to actually doing something about it, the matter bristles with difficulties. Political life is like that. So no particular euphoria is called for here. Yes, things seem to be improving, and we'll continue on that way—but while still preserving a realistic view of things, seeing difficulties where they exist, and reacting to them in one way or another, for our part.

[Levin] Another event that can't be passed over happened this week, namely the visit of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, to India. This seems to me to be a very important event for two reasons. The first is that it's his first trip abroad as chairman of the Supreme Soviet. And the second is that this trip has been to India, a friendly country, a great country. And incidentally, I noticed that Anatoliy Ivanovich has said that India is a country with a very interesting democracy which has a lot to teach us. This desire to learn—to borrow what is most useful from the parliamentary experience of all states, including India—seems to me to be inspiring respect. And this is proof of the seriousness of our intentions, that our parliamentarianism, which has its own basis and already some principles of its own, is striving to enrich its practical activities from all sides.

[Bovin] There's also a broader approach. Consider: The Cold War's over unless some situation of emergency arises, of course. Confrontation will recede into the past and the general climate of international confrontation will make way for something else. There will be a gradual development of the military-political blocs into political-military blocs, and everything will begin to change for the better. In such a situation the sharp corners that now exist in world politics will become more and more blunt. And thereby....

[Levin, interrupting] They'll be smoothed out.

[Bovin] Yes, they'll be smoothed out, and thereby, shall we say, the problem of choice for countries such as India, Indonesia, or Brazil—who's side are you on? Are you with the East, or are you with the West? Are you with America?, which has been a real question and quite a relevant one—will be smoothed out, too. And, let us say,

well, the Americans have naturally always been displeased that India, as they see it, has been inclined toward the Soviet Union. Well, and in general, that has objectively been the case, for a number of reasons. Of course our relations with India have been far warmer than India's relations with the United States, thank God. But, now a different situation is evolving, and these various political leanings of various countries, not just India, will even themselves out as a result of the development of international politics. And here we shall have to conduct ourselves more flexibly, more intelligently, more subtly. And work with various political flanks, as it were, and work both with Gandhi's party, say, and with other Indian political strata. And again, this applies not just to India, but to other countries, too. And I think this visit by Comrade Lukyanov is one of our first actions in this changing world, a world which demands rather more sophisticated political and diplomatic work than we sometimes thought, especially in countries such as India which are close to us. Friends, well, friends we have. And you have to deal differently with friends than with enemies.

[Shishlin] Going back to the thoughts that you have expressed, I want to remark that it's interesting how the political scene in India is one in which the decor changes fairly often, even though there's the stable influence of the Indian National Congress. This is not the first time that the Janata Party has come to power. But, what is stable in India is the fact that on the whole friendly relations with the Soviet Union are preserved despite changes of government. And in this connection it seems to me that the visit has been both timely and fruitful, and very useful. And on the other hand, of course, it's absolutely correct that foreign policy can't be built just like that. There is an objective and there's a direct line to that objective. It really does require a dialogue with a great variety of different political forces within particular countries and with countries as such. And I should like to think about the fact that this visit to India begins to open, to some extent, a new and active phase of Soviet foreign policy as far as Asia is concerned. And in this area we have, after all, not only a capital which we have acquired, but also debts.

[Bovin] There has been a bit of a pause, the reason's understandable. We've been immersed in our own affairs—perestroika, German reunification—our interest has been diverted to these things. Yet Asia exists, Japan exists, China exists.

[Levin] The 21st century is the century of the Asian and Pacific region.

[Bovin] Yes, and the arrival soon of the Chinese prime minister will enable us to talk over these questions too, at least as a first approximation, and see how they look at the present time. That's also a very important situation.

[Levin] Yes, the good thing about the modern world is probably that there simply are no unimportant situations anywhere any more. Whereas at one time it was possible

to decide questions, well, among two, three or five great powers and everyone then had to adjust accordingly, now that is going. This is also a very important factor. The independence of each state is becoming, well, I'd say more pronounced. And this is something that shouldn't frighten us; in my view it's only encouraging.

[Shishlin] As yet we still have in front of us—in front of our country, our society—a vast and complex political and diplomatic row to hoe if the seeds which have been planted in the previous years of perestroika, the previous years of the assertion of the new political thinking, are to produce a harvest. It seems to me that it will be some time before we can bring in that harvest in. Now is the time to cultivate the area we've sown. And in the sense of cultivating the crop which has been sown, it is important, of course, what attitude we take to the changes in Eastern Europe, and how we approach the prospect of reunification of the two German states. And we shouldn't put down too many nitrates. That's very important.

[Levin] That's quite true. But what do we mean by nitrates? Perhaps by nitrates we mean arms? [words indistinct as all speak at once]

[Shishlin] Concept of security.

[Bovin] Yes, yes, yes. It's a complex question, but somewhere there are nitrates that...

[Shishlin, interrupting] Yes, and in that sense of course the visit of Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, and the results of that visit to the United States, are very important. Well, and actually so is what our society is doing at home.

[Bovin] Well, there perhaps we have an ever greater need of consensus than in the external arena.

[Levin] At least the insistent nature of the need is felt particularly keenly. Well, there we end our broadcast for today. Thank you for listening, esteemed comrades. All the best.

Foreign Ministry Official on Lithuania, SS-23's

AU0904120190 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 6 Apr 90 pp 1,4

[Interview with Boris Krasulin, first deputy head of "International Organizations" Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Senior Lieutenant Krasimir Uzunov, NARODNA ARMIYA reporter; place and date not identified: "We Must Take Stock of Our Thinking"]

[Excerpts] Boris Krasulin, first deputy chairman of the "International Organizations" Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was born in 1931 in Moscow. He is a graduate of the State Institute on International Relations. In addition, he has studied at the U.S. George Washington University. During the second part of the 1950's and the beginning of the

1960's, and from 1965 to 1972, he worked at the USSR mission at the United Nations. He deals with issues related to the United Nations and disarmament. [passage omitted]

[Uzunov] You closely follow the development of USSR-U.S. relations. Will they be influenced by the situation in Lithuania?

[Krasulin] This is a complex question. Recently I have been rather busy with the Lithuanian issue. I think that the United Nations is assuming a correct position on this issue. We can say the same about the leaders of the West European states and the United States. Bush, Mitterrand, and Thatcher take a restrained position. Even in the United States the majority in the Congress did not support the resolution on Lithuania that was proposed. Naturally, questions do exist. The situation in Lithuania was also discussed during the Windhoek meeting between Shevardnadze and Baker, and there also was a message to President Bush. Now Shevardnadze's visit to Washington has begun. A pleasant tone and good intentions prevail in the talks. The West understands Moscow's position well. Moscow does not oppose Lithuania's right to secede from the USSR, but only the procedure related to this move. Ask yourself what would happen in any other federative state if some of its republics or provinces decide to secede. How will the issue be resolved? [passage omitted]

[Uzunov] Boris Petrovich, recently articles have appeared in the Western mass media accusing the USSR of not implementing the INF Treaty conscientiously. Those articles mention the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria as countries on whose territory SS-23 missiles have been concealed?

[Krasulin] Such missiles were in fact deployed in those countries, but this was before 1987. If I recall correctly, I think that this happened in 1985-86, and they are the property of each of the three states. The missiles were legally deployed in accordance with the military alliance obligations, and they are no longer Soviet missiles. The 1987 INF Treaty applies only to Soviet and U.S. missiles and by no means affects these missiles, which are not in violation of the treaty, as certain Western media have tried to present. The State Department officials have never doubted our conscientious implementation of our contractual obligations.

Gremitskikh Remarks on Middle East Cited

PM0904131590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Our correspondent G. Charodeyev report: "Soviet Initiatives Still in Force. From Our Correspondent at USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] Yu. Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, has addressed a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. He said that there have recently been

alarming reports from the Near East which indicate that an arms race capable of embracing every conceivable sphere—missile weapons, ABM defenses, nuclear and chemical devices—is continuing there. The fact that this region of the world is so oversaturated with lethal weapons—only NATO and the Warsaw Pact have more weapons—is also increasing concern.

"The Soviet Union's principled attitude toward the need for missile, nuclear, and chemical disarmament is well known and does not need repeating," the spokesman stressed. "Our stance does not envisage any geographical exclusions."

"Moreover, for this reason I would like to draw general attention—particularly, that of the Near East states—to USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze's appeals during his tour of this area in February 1989 for efforts to be stepped up with a view to transforming the Near East into a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons. Our proposals are still valid and the time itself underlines the urgency of this problem and the need to set about resolving it most speedily, in conjunction with a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, of course."

A correspondent from the United Arab Emirates asked how the Soviet Union regards the proposals to repeal UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, which identifies Zionism with racism.

"This resolution," the Foreign Ministry spokesman replied, "was adopted by the General Assembly under specific historical conditions. We believe that extremely undesirable consequences would ensue if the question of repealing it were raised. There have been no instances in UN practice of previous resolutions being deemed invalid. A situation may arise where the world community is involved in the lengthy process of rewriting UN history."

IAEA Delegation Visits Chernobyl Affected Areas

*LD0604180190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
0830 GMT 5 Apr 90*

[From the "Vremya" program; video report on visit of IAEA delegation to Ukraine, Belorussia by A. Gugli and V. Belyayev—not further identified]

[Text] The USSR Government has addressed an official request to the IAEA for it to conduct an independent international examination of the conception and effectiveness of measures being taken by our country to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station], and to protect the health of the population that was exposed to the effects of radiation. Here is a report by A. Gugli and V. Belyayev:

[Gugli] Over the course of a week, an international group of IAEA experts comprising well-known scientists and specialists in radiation safety from the United States,

Austria, Japan, Great Britain, and other countries, representatives of the United Nations, the WHO, and also a large group of Soviet specialists and USSR people's deputies, visited regions of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Russian Federation that were subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power station. [video: group of people near parked coach, individuals shaking hands; group walking away from a building; indoor meetings]

The experts completed their work in areas in Bryansk Oblast, where the levels of radiation are particularly high. Dr. Maurice Rozen, leader of the group and director of the IAEA Nuclear Safety Department, defines the aim of the visit in the following way:

[Begin Rozen recording in vernacular with superimposed Russian translation] This visit is part of the general program which is being implemented at the request of the USSR Government. We have visited three places that are contaminated with radioactive elements. They are areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and your region here in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. [end recording]

[Belyayev] The entire project of the IAEA's participation in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, in Mr. Rozen's words, consists of three stages. The first is familiarization. In the second, an international consultative committee will be formed composed of 20 of the best specialists of world renown in the sphere of radiation medicine and safety, the chairman of which will be Dr. Shikomadz, leader of the international scientific center for radiation consequences. This work will be starting in May and June. Specialists will be visiting hospitals, carrying out tests on patients, and collecting and processing scientific data. Finally, in the last stage, probably at the end of the summer, the commission will prepare an account with scientific conclusions and specific recommendations. This account will be handed over to the USSR Government. The group of experts is also planning, when all the work has ended, to hold an open one to two-day meeting with representatives of the public, the press, and government. [video: more views of meetings; group of people outdoors]

Historian Examines European Military Balance

*PM0604132690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 13, 1 Apr 90 p 3*

[Sergey Karaganov article: "Life Without Fear"]

[Text] Satisfaction over the triumph of democracy in East Europe has so far overshadowed any serious change in international security measures. The more vigorously we renounce the cold war heritage, the more redundant becomes the security system dooming the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies to balance the military capacity of the opposition, which of course commands significant economic superiority.

It is sufficiently obvious that the changes going on in East European countries, primarily the inevitable disbandment of the National People's Army of the GDR, that country's possible withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organization and that organization's probable further weakening, will bring about a marked change in the balance of military forces.

Many of our fellow-citizens, who have absorbed fear of the external threat together with their mother's milk, react most painfully to such changes. Their apprehensions over what they see as our country's military weakness may even be aggravated when and if the USSR concluded the Vienna accords, by which it will have to destroy many more armaments than the other side—more because it has stockpiled more. Can we afford such reductions in the new conditions? Before trying to answer this question, a few thoughts about the unthinkable—i.e., how things would stand if we were threatened with an armed attack.

There are many ways of estimating the balance of conventional forces and armaments. On the other hand, as far as we know, none of them ensures an accurate estimate of the state of equilibrium. Many influential factors cannot be measured. For instance, some qualitative characteristics of armaments, the level of troops' combat training, the unity of the friendly and opposing coalitions in the conduct of offensive and defensive operations, their morale and discipline, the art of command personnel, geographic factors, and so on.

The agreements drawing to a close in Vienna are based on the attainment of numerical parity in the main categories of conventional armaments. This is a straightforward, but artificial criterion, if we consider at least the factors enumerated above.

On the whole the balance agreed by the Vienna accords prior to developments in East Europe could be characterized as follows. Given an approximately similar quantity of armaments and armed forces, the Warsaw Treaty Organization had an advantage in geography, whereas NATO had a rather narrow area of defence in Europe, with reinforcements having to be transported by sea. For their part, the NATO countries possessed a different advantage as far as we know from Western and other sources, that is the quality of many types of armaments.

In the long term the changes in East Europe will evidently tip this balance in the West's favour. Although there will be no major change the more so since the territory of East European countries, irrespective of the Warsaw Treaty's future destiny, remains in the hands of our ally.

These new advantages of the West, as in our case, will not be transferred into military dividends, they can't be used for bringing political pressure to bear.

This intransferability of advantages is linked not only to the political intentions of the two sides and to the general situation, but also to the USSR's immense nuclear potential, making any threat practically improbable, even given considerable superiority in conventional forces.

The likely anxiety caused by the disappearance of the habitual "reserve" in the sphere of conventional forces, the changes in Europe, and the reunification of Germany, should probably be neutralized by a definite temporary increase of psychological—certainly not military—reliance on the nuclear factor in ensuring our security. Due to the calls for abolishing nuclear weapons this factor has been patiently underestimated. We have "forgotten" that we still retain a giant nuclear potential.

Moreover, the temporary increase in reliance on nuclear weapons must not be accompanied either by renouncing the long-term objective of their elimination in the context of building a non-violent world or even by renouncing their further reductions.

On the other hand, one feels anxious that the planned reductions are not properly linked to the necessary reform of the armed forces which must in principle prepare them for neutralizing threats to security at the close of the century. As before, there is no concept of the reform.

But it is not the Soviet side alone that must display calm and farsightedness. No small responsibility devolves on the West, as well. People over there keep asking: In what way can we help perestroika? Today the answer is sufficiently obvious. With meeting concessions at Vienna, with large-scale reductions of the Bundeswehr or the future army of a united Germany, whatever it may be called. And lastly, with finding a more rational solution than a united Germany's entry into NATO and especially into its military organization. Irrespective of the intellectual attractiveness of some of the arguments in favour of such a solution, a major shift in the assessment of military-political might would occur at least psychologically. And this—against the background of a difficult internal situation in our country. It would be worthwhile for the West to heed Woodrow Wilson's advice and stop insisting on the creation of a system which would generate the "constantly reviving feeling of injustice". Wilson spoke about the Versailles system. There is a need to guard against history repeating itself.

United States & Canada

Shevardnadze Interviewed, Assesses U.S. Talks

PM0904154790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze by S. Dardynkin: "After the Talks in Washington: USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze Answers Questions from IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent"—date, place not specified]

[Text] Washington, Moscow—[Dardynkin] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, until now all your talks like those that have finished in Washington, and all your contacts with the U.S. secretary of state have invariably signaled a concrete change in the development of Soviet-U.S. dialogue, including on disarmament problems. Sometimes the change has been less noticeable, sometimes it has been equivalent to a real breakthrough. Has there been a change equivalent to a breakthrough this time too, leaving aside, of course, the accord on the precise date of the Soviet-U.S. summit?

[Shevardnadze] It is too soon to talk about breakthroughs in the disarmament sphere, but I think they are emerging. If everything works out, if the agreement on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive armaments is initiated, I think this will be the main breakthrough in the most important area in the disarmament sphere. That is the first point.

Second, a very interesting prospect has appeared—that of accelerating the process of preparing a convention on banning chemical weapons. Since we are talking about breakthroughs I would particularly like to highlight bilateral relations. Around 10 agreements are now being worked on. In my opinion we will be able to finish that work before the summit and sign those agreements. Such a thing has never happened before, at least not in the practice of bilateral relations in recent decades. I have in mind, for example, the agreement on trade. Perhaps it will be possible to complete work on agreements on investments, cultural centers, cooperation in the peaceful exploration of space, and the peaceful use of nuclear power.

[Dardynkin] Let me continue that theme now—the theme of the results of your talks in Washington—"back to front," so to speak. What did you not achieve this time, what accords that the sides could have expected were not actually achieved?

[Shevardnadze] We didn't reach an agreement on air-launched missiles or sea-launched missiles—the two most important elements of the agreement on strategic offensive armaments. It was in these areas that readiness was unsatisfactory. Serious outstanding problems remain. What are they? I do not want to go into precise details now because there is still much hard work to do, several more options to work out. The normal process of negotiations is under way, but I must say we are worried.

Unless the two sides make a great effort, it may be that we will not be able to get everything ready in time for the summit. That fear exists.

[Dardynkin] Does that not place the summit in jeopardy?

[Shevardnadze] No, that question is resolved, the meeting will go ahead. However, it is desirable, and I think even necessary, that the meeting be weighty and culminate in concrete important results. The beginning of the dialogue on Malta marked the conceptual discussion of questions of security and cooperation and the definition of the main directions in the security sphere and the whole negotiations process. Now concrete decisions are needed. It will be very annoying if we fail to achieve this. Nevertheless, I hope that we will be able to find a compromise solution.

[Dardynkin] Does this apply to any specific elements of the agreement on strategic offensive armaments?

[Shevardnadze] You know of the expression "a package solution." We propose, and the Americans agree with this, that we try to reach consensus on all elements of the "package." There are elements on which we have already reached agreement, but there are also those on which there is still no consensus.

[Dardynkin] At his press conference after yours in Washington Secretary of State Baker described the Soviet Union's position on the strategic offensive arms agreement as "unattractive," meaning individual elements of the future accord. Clearly, for us the position taken by the Americans looks equally uninviting. Can a compromise be found in these conditions?

[Shevardnadze] Here I can agree with the secretary of state that since we failed to reach agreement, our approach is not attractive to the Americans. And vice versa: If the U.S. position does not please us, then it is unattractive to us. However, I do not know whether the term attractive is appropriate, is it?

But the potential for compromise consists in the sides' readiness to move toward compromise. For the Americans, for example, the problem of sea-launched missiles and in general everything connected with naval forces is a very sensitive one.

[Dardynkin] They have an incontestable advantage in this sphere.

[Shevardnadze] The advantage exists, and, I would say, there is a definite psychological factor, too. They react very sensitively when we propose a system of all-embracing verification and on-site inspection. They willingly agree to such decisions when it is question of ground- and air-launched nuclear weapons. But when the talk turns to sea-launched missiles, things proceed with very great difficulty. In fact they do not proceed at all. The U.S. side believes that inspections on ships and submarines are inadmissible. But we believe that the two sides have now reached a stage in the disarmament sphere where the question of trust is taking center stage.

Principles of trust cannot be established if there is no system of all-embracing verification.

[Dardykin] Especially as the psychological preconditions for mutual trust already exist.

[Shevardnadze] The psychological preconditions exist and many decisions have been adopted in the technical regard. In general I would like to say that compromises, mutual concessions, and give-and-take within the "package" that I have already mentioned are what is needed. I believe that we will achieve this, at any rate we will try to.

[Dardykin] Isn't it likely that the Americans will try to pressure us in order to obtain unilateral concessions in view of our internal difficulties?

[Shevardnadze] I think that they realize that the Soviet leadership will not adopt decisions contrary to our national interests, the interests of the country's security. But in general it is perfectly normal for each side to try to secure a decision that suits it.

[Dardykin] One should probably not be particularly surprised that your present talks in Washington were seen by many people in the United States in the light of events in Lithuania. One was particularly conscious of this during the first few days from the tone of newspaper and television commentaries and from the questions raised at briefings. Some people did not conceal their fears, while some, on the contrary, did not conceal their hopes that there might be a reverse in Soviet-U.S. relations. Then the passions abated in intensity. How can you explain this?

[Shevardnadze] In my opinion, this can be attributed to the fact that we nonetheless succeeded in telling the whole truth about what is in fact happening. It proved possible to speak out about our principled approaches to this problem and ways to resolve it. We said that we are not heading for confrontation but are seeking dialogue. We want to find by means of dialogue, honest dialogue, as I said, a solution taking into account both the interests of all Soviet peoples and the whole union and, certainly, the interests of the Lithuanian people.

[Dardykin] There is obviously another explanation: People in the United States realize that all too much is at stake?

[Shevardnadze] I think that you are right. Both President Bush and Secretary of State Baker, along with all other realistic politicians, are interested in the success of perestroika, in the modernization and renewal of all Soviet society. They stressed repeatedly that they supported and still support Gorbachev's policy. They even asked whether there is any serious danger to Gorbachev. This was not my first meeting with the President and the secretary of state, and I think that they are sincerely concerned about the fate of perestroika and the processes taking place in our country. They are naturally concerned—and we must understand this—about the

question of Lithuania. It is a difficult question, just as it is for us. But we did not perceive any hints of gloating, you know how it used to be: "The worse things are in the Soviet Union, the better for us." I even sensed a sincere interest in ensuring that we succeed in finding the most reasonable solution.

I do not know whether you noticed this: Everything went very amicably when I met—and this was a spontaneous meeting—with a huge group of journalists in the White House, and later at the official news conference. For instance, I was not conscious of a desire to hold my words against me. There was an atmosphere of benevolence and spontaneity, I would have said. This was not the first time, either—these are simply the kind of relations we now have.

[Dardykin] These relations work, despite the difficult situation that has taken shape in our country.

[Shevardnadze] I will put it very briefly: A vigil for perestroika is under way. Journalists, politicians, and ordinary people sympathize with the perestroika processes. People well understand that it is a question not just of the Soviet Union. They understand that a very great deal in the world—the fate of the world and its stability—depends on the stability and situation in our country.

[Dardykin] Does this mean that the improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations is now irreversible? That we have accumulated a sufficient margin of strength in these relations even in the face of such difficult situations as these? Or could we still find ourselves slipping back?

[Shevardnadze] That danger does exist. I mentioned the importance of the meeting in Malta. That meeting charted directions in the development of bilateral relations that will help to build these relations on solid foundations. That is what we must realize: the accords reached between the two presidents in Malta. At the moment we cannot be completely certain that our relations will not be prone to some serious waverings and deviations. We should not be surprised at this. This all began in 1985, not a great deal of time has passed since then, and there is a great deal that we simply have not had time to do, but the process is under way.

[Dardykin] At present this process is not very strongly underpinned by economic ties...

[Shevardnadze] That is why I stress the special importance of bilateral relations, including contacts between people. For example, take just one agreement on which we have an almost finished document: on broadening student exchanges. The prospects are very interesting. We must ensure that young people have as much contact with each other as possible. There is also another very interesting idea: a joint Soviet-U.S. university. The most famous Soviet scientists would deliver lectures in those fields of knowledge where we have the most outstanding achievements. At Washington University, say, on a

permanent basis. U.S. scientists would deliver lectures in our country. There are very many ideas like these.

[Dardykin] Another subject constantly mentioned these days in Washington is the status of the future united Germany. It seems that the Western side firmly intends to see it become a member of NATO and is hoping that we will eventually make concessions.

[Shevardnadze] Naturally the West is seeking a solution that would suit it. They would be more at ease if they had greater confidence and more security guarantees from their standpoint, but that does not suit us. That is why I said at the news conference that we must look for some different solution, some compromise, so that a united Germany can really be a factor of stability in Europe. I think this is generally possible. We must just look. There are ideas. I do not want to talk about them now, but they do exist. Both we and our partners have them.

[Dardykin] One possible idea is to synchronize the two processes: the unification of the two Germanys and the formation of all-European security structures. Is that realistic? The process of German integration is moving very fast but all-European structures are still in the planning stages.

[Shevardnadze] You say that the process of German unification is moving very fast. I do not rule out the possibility of this process slowing down. The GDR is putting together its own parliament and its own legislative body, as well as its own government. Talks are about to begin, including on economic issues. Certain difficulties have already arisen. So perhaps everything will not happen as quickly as some now predict or as some now want. It is an extremely complex process. So I believe that the question of synchronization is a realistic task if we manage to speed up the formation of all-European structures.

[Dardykin] Returning to the key point in the Soviet-U.S. dialogue—the problems of disarmament and arms control—I would like to ask you two last questions. The first is about prospects.

[Shevardnadze] We are already considering the prospects. I hope we will be able to agree on a joint draft statement of intent. The question is what to do next if we succeed in signing an agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. There is a good mutual understanding with the Americans that at the next summit meeting we must define the main prospects and directions of work to reduce arms and armed forces and overcome military confrontation between our two countries.

[Dardykin] And my second question, which is related to the first. One gets the impression that disarmament talks are lagging behind life, as it were. People are not now so concerned by nuclear weapons and confrontation in Europe. All this has receded into the background in many people's minds, just as the antinuclear movements of the beginning and middle of the eighties have dropped

out of political life. Just how justified—or, conversely, just how misplaced—is this impression?

[Shevardnadze] I agree with you. People have become calmer about this. This is not a bad thing; it is dictated by reality, because, with the signing of the agreement on intermediate-range missiles in Europe, mutually very dangerous weapons have been removed. Certain progress has been made at the conventional arms talks. Arms reduction is in progress. There is a real prospect of signing an agreement on 50 percent cuts in strategic offensive weapons, and so on, and so forth. We have said time and again—not without reason—that the "cold war" has ended and a peaceful period in mankind's development has begun. But it is one thing to calm people. That is a positive phenomenon and one to which we have aspired: Namely, that people should not live in conditions of fear and constant threat but in an atmosphere of calm. But complacency is another matter. I believe that there are still so many weapons in the world that there are no grounds for complacency.

Cheney on U.S. Defense Cuts, Military Strength

LD1004082790 Moscow TASS in English 0759 GMT
10 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Stanislav Lunev]

[Text] Washington April 10 TASS—United States Defence Secretary Richard Cheney hailed changes in the international situation on Monday, stressing that Soviet actions are of great importance for international stability. However, speaking at a conference in Colorado Springs organised by the U.S. Space Research Association, Cheney accused the USSR of modernising its strategic weapons and emphasised that the United States needed to retain its military muscle.

Cheney recalled democratic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, unilateral reductions of armed forces and arms, declared by President Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1988, agreements to pull out Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary by mid-1991, reductions in Soviet defence spending and the Soviet Union's striving to put an end to decades of hostility, and said that the U.S. response would be to cut arms spending.

President Bush has ordered the Pentagon to prepare for military budget reductions by 231 billion U.S. dollars in five years.

It is planned that spending on defence will make up 21 per cent of the federal spending, or up to 4 per cent of the gross national product (GNP) of the country by 1995, Cheney said, compared to 27 per cent of the federal spending and 6 per cent of GNP during Ronald Reagan's presidency, and 57 per cent of federal spending and 11 per cent of GNP during the Korean War.

Currently, the U.S. Armed Forces are in the process of structural reduction, Cheney said. The number of U.S.

warships is around 500, instead of 600 as was planned earlier. The U.S. Air Force might be reduced by two divisions in 1991, he said.

The Pentagon is also reassessing its requests for money for the B-2 strategic bomber, modern tactical fighter aircraft, C-17 transport aircraft, assault-aircraft A-12, Seawolf-type nuclear submarines and destroyers.

Cheney called for the continuation of work on the "Strategic Defence Initiative" programme, especially the "Brilliant Pebbles" project.

Stakes High in U.S. Reaction to Lithuania

PM0904134390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Observer Manki Ponomarev article under the rubric "World Today: Problems and Opinions": "Stakes Higher Than Ever"]

[Text] A curious picture is emerging. I believe that just three or four years ago people in Washington and the capitals of other Western states would not have failed to hurriedly recognize the "independent Lithuanian government" and support its attempts to sever the republic's ties with Moscow overnight. The irresponsible and illegal actions of Lithuania's present leadership would have received all kinds of support with a view to weakening the Soviet Union and working toward its collapse. But what is happening today?

Today the steps taken by the Lithuanian leadership have been greeted with no special exultation in the West. On the contrary, they are viewed as undesirable and untimely. Here, for example, is the opinion of British Foreign Secretary Hurd: "It is not in our interests for the Soviet Union to break up... We want to see a Soviet Union with sufficient confidence in itself." And President Bush, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, is trying to steer a cautious course between the historical policy of U.S. nonrecognition of Lithuania's incorporation in the USSR and the desire not to create additional difficulties for Soviet President Gorbachev. For the United States is afraid that, if restraint is not shown, all the positive steps that the Soviet Union has taken both inside the country and, particularly, in the international arena will come to nothing.

This viewpoint is also shared by London's THE SUNDAY CORRESPONDENT. If the Lithuanian leadership headed by Landsbergis refuses to compromise on the question of the unilateral declaration of independence, all the successes scored in East-West relations over the past six months will be under threat of failure. In that case, the newspaper writes, "the stakes are unimaginably high."

In statements by statesmen of various countries and in the pages of the world's press it is possible to encounter resolute condemnation of the steps of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and "Sajudis." "It long ago became

obvious," Finland's SUOMENMAA writes, in particular, "that the exacerbation of the situation in Lithuania has been caused not by the desire for independence itself but by the associated operating style of 'Lithuania's present leadership.'" Landsbergis, the newspaper points out, "during his brief tenure as 'head of state' has managed to criticize the attitude of the foreign policy leadership at least of such countries as the United States, Sweden, and Finland toward the decisions adopted by Lithuania's parliament."

Does all that has been said mean that the "soft line," as they call it, of the Western countries' ruling circles meets with full approval and support there? No, it would be sinning against the truth to claim that. Thus there has been strong pressure in the United States from advocates of a "tougher line" in relations with the USSR and of "firmer support" for Lithuania's demands for independence. For this is just what the resolution recently adopted in the U.S. Congress sounds like. You read about this and think: Is the aim of this resolution's authors not to undermine the efforts aimed at final deliverance from the "cold war"? The categorical tone and the attempts to point out to the Soviet Union what it must do and how and when it must do it in order to resolve its internal problems are inadmissible. Such interference in the USSR's internal affairs is contrary to the principles and norms of international law.

People even in the administration itself will occasionally return to a double standard: They measure their own actions with one yardstick but other people's actions, even in those people's own country, with another yardstick, express "concern," "warn," and "admonish." And this at a time when the Soviet leadership is displaying firm adherence to the policy of perestroika and democratization and is seeking to resolve by means of peaceful, constructive dialogue the questions that are arising around Lithuania. I believe that people who live by double standards should constantly remember that what has been achieved in Soviet-U.S. relations in recent years is on such a scale and is so significant that both sides should treat this with care and show wisdom and restraint.

People in America fear, not without reason, that the crisis in Lithuania, if people are guided in their assessments of it not by common sense but by their emotions, could undermine the efforts aimed at reaching agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and at bringing the U.S. military budget into line with today's realities.

During the years of Reagan's presidency a gigantic military machine was created in the United States at a total cost of \$3 (three!) trillion! Even though U.S. military spending has fallen somewhat recently, it still reaches more than \$300 billion annually.

It is obvious to everyone now that this spending is excessive and quite unjustified. The administration itself proposed reducing it first by more than \$3 billion and now even by \$11-12 billion. To judge by the situation in

Congress, such reductions are perfectly probable in the military budget for fiscal 1991. True, on one condition: If military confrontation continues to lessen and if events like the Lithuanian ones are not used to create crises in Soviet-U.S. relations and in East-West relations in general.

However, there is much that is contradictory here. In my view France's *LA CROIX L'EVENEMENT* put it well. It speaks of the complex situation in which America's ruling class finds itself. "Out of habit it still continues to sit on the roof of its fortress, pressing binoculars to its eyes and gazing into the distance in search of an enemy. But there is no longer an enemy."

There is no enemy, but the Pentagon chief does not tire of repeating that it would be wrong and dangerous to base a policy on the assumption that the Soviet Union "will never again pose a substantial military threat." And on these "grounds" he tries to prove that there can be no security for the United States without B-2 Stealth bombers, MX and Midgetman mobile missiles, submarines of the Trident and Sea Wolf system, and also long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.

All this cannot fail to leave its mark on Soviet-U.S. relations and does not tie in very well with both sides' declared aims of securing a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, achieving an appreciable reduction in conventional armed forces and arms in Europe, and rejecting the very possibility of waging offensive operations against each other. For the world is unified and integral. What one country does in one sphere inevitably affects the position and actions of the other side. It does not matter what is at issue in this case—the Lithuanian problem, the Pentagon's military budget, or something else.

Despite all the complexities and difficulties in the way of the further development of fruitful Soviet-U.S. relations, both the USSR and, apparently, the United States have made their choice. This is borne out by the results of Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze's just-ended visit to the United States, his talks with J. Baker, and his meetings with G. Bush. The entire spectrum of relations between our countries was reviewed, and there was a thorough exchange of information on the internal political situation in the USSR and the United States, particularly insofar as this influences their relations and cooperation.

The dialogue on various aspects of arms limitation was intensive. The state of affairs regarding the elaboration of a treaty on radical reductions of strategic offensive arms and subsequent steps in this sphere was analyzed. Solutions were sought for the as yet unresolved questions of reducing conventional armed forces in Europe, prohibiting and destroying chemical weapons, and elaborating an "open skies" regime. The "German question" and many other problems were discussed.

The fact that a very important accord was reached to the effect that USSR President M.S. Gorbachev will visit the

United States from 30 May through 3 June should be singled out in particular. This accord attests to the consistent development of Soviet-U.S. dialogue and the continuation of a course resistant to the fluctuations caused by the rapidly changing world situation.

Major decisions are being prepared for this visit. Not only must they be a new step in improving Soviet-U.S. relations but they will also signify the two powers' important contribution to consolidating positive trends in world politics. "We are counting," the Soviet president said in conversation with U.S. Admiral W. Crowe, "on balanced decisions which can make 1990 a historic year. The stakes are very great, and we are preparing for very great deeds."

Yes, the stakes undoubtedly are very high. Not only the future of perestroika in the USSR, of Soviet-U.S. relations, and of stabilization in Europe and the settling of conflicts in various parts of the world are at stake. The future of the whole planet and of all of human civilization depends on what decisions are adopted during these spring days.

'Unrealistic Approach' of U.S. Press Viewed

PM0904205790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent Vitaliy Gan dispatch: "From the Wrong Standpoint"]

[Text] Washington, 9 Apr—If we are to judge by the U.S. newspaper headlines, a virtually precrisis situation has developed in Soviet-U.S. relations. The recent talks here between Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and President Bush and Secretary of State Baker have put many in a melancholic frame of mind. They are saying and writing that relations between our two countries, which until recently appeared to be developing in a dynamic, constructive fashion, have entered a phase of acute contradictions.

Sensationalism, whether positive or negative, is the "golden rule" of the U.S. press. It seems that on this occasion, too, it is being given priority over sober analysis of the present situation. At the Soviet minister's meetings in Washington, the sides agreed on a date for holding a summit meeting between the Soviet and U.S. presidents, and encouraging process was made on various major issues of Soviet-U.S. cooperation.

All this is indeed so. Obviously, there can be no room for euphoria regarding the problem-free nature of our relations: The process of normalizing communications between the two great powers has been started but is difficult and at times not without its failures and disappointments. But what has been achieved in the joint quest for an optimum balance of interests should not be denied, either.

What, then, is the explanation for the pessimism one sometimes finds in Washington these days? I do not wish

to sin against the truth, but even before E.A. Shevardnadze's visit I got the impression that there was a certain preordained element in local press material. Before the Soviet minister had even set foot on U.S. soil, all the leading newspapers began carrying predictions that his meetings would essentially be "single-topic talks." It was easy to single out the topic: the separatist actions of the Lithuanian leadership and Moscow's stand on the matter.

Whereas the White House had, until recently, demonstrated a more or less circumspect approach, endeavoring to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric, legislators have literally lost patience. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have adopted provocative resolutions whose objective comes down to attempts to interfere in the Soviet Union's internal affairs and to influence the nature of the current processes of settling the constitutional differences between the central Soviet Government and the Lithuanian leadership. One noteworthy point is this: All this rending the air, all these appeals and threats have been based—and indeed are based—not on real facts but on... suppositions and expectations of the worst, i.e. bloodshed in this Baltic republic.

As E.A. Shevardnadze himself publicly informed journalists, the "Lithuanian question" was discussed during his Washington meetings. The Soviet position was clearly presented to the leaders of the administration, and its determination to follow a path of dialogue was confirmed.

Nevertheless, the results of the Soviet-U.S. discussions are invariably presented from one standpoint alone. Even differences of opinion on arms control which came to light during the talks and which, at any other time, could have been seen as natural, are being presented in the "Lithuanian" context. Once again, the old concept of "linkage"—when the solution of highly important questions of peace and security is made dependent on what are the strictly internal affairs of the other side—is back in circulation. Under pressure from Congress, both Bush and his spokesmen are openly saying that "the Lithuanian crisis is jeopardizing" Soviet-U.S. relations in general.

Could all this be called an unrealistic approach? I believe it could. The meeting between the Soviet and U.S. presidents set for the end of the May appears all the more relevant and important in this connection.

China

Li Peng News Conference Remarks Viewed

PM0604151990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Savenkov dispatch: "China's Government Confident in Future"]

[Text] Beijing—China is willing to develop relations with the Soviet Union in the political, economic, cultural, and scientific spheres on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Good-neighborly relations between China and the Soviet Union are not only in the interests of the two peoples but also promote peace in Asia and throughout the world.

Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, said this at a news conference for Chinese and foreign journalists immediately following the 16-day session of the Chinese National People's Congress [NPC].

Developing his idea, Li Peng voiced a high opinion of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to China last year, which resulted in normalization, put an end to the past, and opened a new chapter in bilateral relations. The premier expressed the hope that his impending visit to the Soviet Union will be successful.

At its plenary sitting the Chinese parliament adopted the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which will come into force 1 July 1997 (2,660 and 16 voted for and against, respectively, and there were 29 abstentions). In addition three documents were ratified—on the formation of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the methods for financing the future region's first government and the first legislative council (the NPC will set up a preparatory committee in 1996 to deal with this), and the formation of a special committee under the auspices of the NPC Standing Committee to study questions arising in the course of the basic law's fulfillment. Thus the impending restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong is assuming legal outlines.

A series of addenda and changes to the Law on Mixed Enterprises founded on Chinese and foreign capital which should provide incentives for future foreign investments was also approved. The most substantial changes being, probably, the following: The state will not nationalize or requisition any joint enterprises, and foreigners rather than just PRC citizens (as was formerly the case) can head the council of directors.

The session also ratified a whole series of other documents, including a report on the work of the government, which was described as "realistic."

Questions raised at the news conference included those regarding the situation within the leadership, the prospects for reform, the political and economic aspects of development, including steps to revive the market, and problems of relations between continental China and Taiwan.

The premier described the incumbent leadership as "united and strong" and "enjoying widespread support among the people." Li Peng stressed that Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, is the "heart of the leadership." In the premier's view, his election at the session as chairman of the PRC Central Military Council provides a guarantee that the army is

under total party control, which has always been the main principle of army building.

In response to a question regarding the future of former general secretary Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng said that the latter is a free man and is living in his home in Beijing. The government has provided him with good living conditions and he has no health problems. Li Peng recalled that Zhao Ziyang made serious mistakes (he supported the disturbances and the split within the party when the fate of party and state were at stake last year); he has been stripped of all leadership posts within the party and his case is undergoing investigation.

Li Peng once again confirmed that China will implement a policy of reforms and openness. In particular, while supporting small and medium enterprises involving foreign capital, China is counting on setting up larger projects of this kind and will create a favorable environment for them. It is intended to experiment with the development of whole areas which will be opened up by foreign investors. Li Peng stressed that "China will retain sovereignty in these areas and Chinese laws will be in force there."

The government intends to help private and individual enterprises so that they can play a role in the national economy, which is based on public ownership. The premier said that the State Council is considering the question of allowing individual enterprises to engage in wholesale as well as retail trade.

Northeast Asia

'First-Ever' MPRP Extraordinary Congress Opens

Party Congress Previewed

LD0904104190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0630 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Report from Ulaanbaatar by correspondent Vladimir Korolev on the upcoming 10 April Extraordinary Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, date not given—recorded]

[Text] Elections of delegates to the congress have already been completed. They were held in a different atmosphere than previously. Most party organizations put forward several candidates for election. Reports from local areas say that preference was given to people with bold ideas, capable of making a contribution to the cause of party renewal. The forthcoming forum of Mongolian Communists will be attended by 927 delegates, including people of varying professions and ages.

The decision to convene an extraordinary congress was adopted in the tense atmosphere of meetings and demonstrations held by the Mongolian Democratic Union and other political forces, as well as a hunger strike by unofficial campaigners on the capital's central square, in support of demands for the resignation of the Politburo of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP]

Central Committee. There was also pressure from reformist forces within the MPRP itself. There is unanimous agreement that this situation was brought about by the dilatoriness of the party leadership in implementing the restructuring policy which itself proclaimed.

It is being stressed here that the forthcoming extraordinary congress must make a profound and fundamental analysis of the present political situation in the country, and tackle the important task of bringing about fundamental renewal within the MPRP, so that, in accordance with the declarations of its leadership, it can remain competitive under the conditions of the multiparty system that has developed and received de facto recognition in Mongolia.

On the eve of the extraordinary congress, the local press published an interview given by Gombojabyn Ochirbat, the general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, to a correspondent of the West German Television company, ARD-1. Answering questions, Ochirbat stressed that although the MPRP has renounced constitutional clauses guaranteeing its leading and guiding role in society, it certainly has not abandoned the struggle for the right to be the ruling party. Ochirbat declared that, in the interests of the country's development and progress, the MPRP would cooperate with all political forces that respect the fundamental interests of their people and national unity.

Speaking of the MPRP's foreign policy course, Ochirbat noted that Mongolia's economic ties and cooperation with the Soviet Union were continuing to play a decisive role in the country's development. Mongolian-Soviet relations must continue to develop on the basis of equal rights and mutual benefit and be enriched with new content and forms, he said.

Congress Opens 10 Apr

LD1004071590 Moscow TASS in English 0658 GMT
10 Apr 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar April 10 TASS—The first-ever Extraordinary Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party opened in the government house here today.

The forum is being attended by 926 delegates, who were for the first time elected in electoral districts on an alternative basis. The delegates represent 94,000 party members.

The Congress will outline tasks to deepen the restructuring and self-renovation of the party, adopt its platform and rules and elect its central governing bodies.

General Secretary of the party Central Committee Gombojavyn Orchibat will deliver a report "On the nearest tasks to deepen the restructuring and renovation of the party."

The Congress will last for three days.

Ochirbat Addresses Congress

*LD1004084390 Moscow TASS in English 0813 GMT
10 Apr 90*

[Text] Ulaanbaatar April 10 TASS—The consolidation of Mongolia's independence and stability by political means and the increase of its international authority remain the major goal of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] party leader Gombojavyn Orchibat told an extraordinary party congress here today.

The party prioritises comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and China in the sphere of foreign relations. Under the restructuring, the sides are seeking ways to boost prosperity and the enhanced efficiency of interaction on the basis of equality and mutual advantage, Orchibat stressed.

Speaking about friendship and cooperation between the Mongolian and Soviet people's, he noted that they will remain a significant factor of Mongolian development.

MPRP Routine Central Committee Plenum Held

*LD0804193590 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1544 GMT 8 Apr 90*

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 8 Apr (TASS)—A routine plenum of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee ended here today. Participants discussed matters relating to the extraordinary congress, the first in the history of the party, which opens on 10 April this year. The Central Committee report at the upcoming forum, the draft renewed MPRP rules, and the procedure for electing the leading bodies at the extraordinary congress were discussed. The plenum instructed G. Ochirbat, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee to give a report at the extraordinary Congress "On the Immediate Tasks in Deepening the Restructuring and Renewal of the MPRP."

Mongolian Democratic Party Holds First Congress

*LD0904094390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0910 GMT 9 Apr 90*

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 9 April (TASS)—The first congress of the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP) has ended its work with the adoption of a program of action and a statute. The introduction of democratic principles in all structures of public life, the reform of the political system, the development of diverse forms of ownership, raising the material standards of the working people—such are the MDP's main targets for the next few years, the party platform states.

A petition sent by the congress to the People's Great Hural expresses demands for an interim People's Hural to be set up with the participation of all democratic forces, and for a law on the press and a number of other documents to be drawn up.

The congress also adopted an appeal to the people, and elected leading bodies; a party conference of 88 members, and a political consultative council of 15 members headed by chief coordinator E. bat-Uul.

Moscow Radio on Political Situation in Mongolia

*LD1004105490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0330 GMT 10 Apr 90*

[Text] [Announcer] I am far from making a direct parallel here, but I do think that to some extent the echo of the explosion of democracy in the countries of Eastern Europe has also been heard in Asia. That includes Mongolia, incidentally. I would suggest that the 90,000 Mongolian communists would hardly call the congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP], which is to start Tuesday, historic. Here too, attempts are being made to get away from high-sounding words. Nevertheless there is no doubt that this congress will be significant event. Here is what our correspondent Vladimir Korolev reported from Ulaanbaatar on the eve of the congress:

[Korolev] There is particular political activity in Mongolia in these days leading up to the congress. Pere-stroyka has brought Mongolian society out of stagnation. Standpoints and opinions are being polarized right in front of us. Two concrete examples: The local press has harshly criticized the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. It has just held an extraordinary congress. Gambaald, reelected leader of the Revolutionary League, stressed that the league's positions are the same as those of the MPRP. This cannot be said of another political association which appeared recently—the Mongolian Democratic Party. It is clearly in opposition to the MPRP. Its leaders lay all the blame for the situation that has come into being in the country and the negative features of it on the MPRP and accuse its leadership of incompetence. Statements have been made which criticize the results of Soviet-Mongolian cooperation which is alleged to have worsened the current economic situation in Mongolia. Then there is this diametrically opposed view evaluating Soviet-Mongolian relations: Ochirbat, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, replying to questions from a correspondent for the NHK radio and television corporation of Japan, stressed the value of comprehensive ties with the USSR for Mongolia.

A report has recently been published that a session of the People's Great Hural, the Mongolian parliament, will be convened on 5 May. It will examine addenda to the country's Constitution and the draft law on political parties. Judging from reports in the local media, the Hural will declare the multiparty system in Mongolia legal. Even now, people are writing and saying that in the elections to the People's Great Hural, to be held in new conditions in July, the MPRP will be opposed by the four main forces that have recently emerged in the country's political arena. They include in particular the Mongolian Democratic Party. An analysis of the letters

being received by the MPRP Central Committee during preparations for its extraordinary congress demonstrates that the party has the support of broad masses of the public. A plenum of the party Central Committee was held on 8 April. It decided to submit a report on the immediately tasks of deepening perestroika and renewing the MPRP to the session of the extraordinary congress. Also on the congress agenda are the draft party rules. Other matters will also be discussed.

UNEN Editor Views Mongolian Restructuring

PM0604144190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Undated interview in Ulaanbaatar with L. Tudev, member of the MPRP Central Committee Politburo and chief editor of the newspaper UNEN, by correspondent V. Sapov: "Problems Accumulated Over the Years..."; first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Political events are sometimes unpredictable. Thus, only yesterday Mongolia seemed a model of stability and oriental tranquillity. And suddenly an explosion of political events. The emergence of informal organizations on the public scene. Rallies in squares. The resignation of the entire MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee Politburo and changes in the People's Great Hural Presidium and the Government of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic].

In conversation with V. Sapov, PRAVDA's correspondent in the MPR, L. Tudev, well-known writer and chief editor of the newspaper UNEN, who was recently elected a member of the MPRP Central Committee Politburo, reflects on the causes and the deep-seated origins of what has happened and on the future of the country, the people, and the MPRP.

"Problems accumulated over the years," L. Tudev began the conversation, "but there were delays over resolving them, and words were at variance with deeds. The main trouble was that the party, having proclaimed restructuring, was unable to accelerate it, and the MPRP Central Committee could not break with the obsolete practice of apparatus work and did not reach the outlying districts with its ideas.

"Of course, not only the upper echelons were to blame for that. Mongolia is a country with a large territory but a small population and an underdeveloped infrastructure. And it is not so easy to convey ideas to the broad masses without relying on the aktiv. And the aktiv, unfortunately, was not prepared to accept cardinal changes. It did not care about herdsmen or workers, nor about ordinary communists. They worked honestly and selflessly. But an impenetrable layer of bureaucracy had formed between them and the center. It served as a 'buffer.' And however hard communists endeavored to breach it, their efforts got bogged down in the old habits characteristic of the administrative edict system.

"The essence of that system has now been explained quite fully. A freeloading mentality and lack of initiative were propagated for years.

"I will say more: The official apparatus crushes the leader's personality. Responsibility for the assigned task has grown weak in our provinces. Hurals of people's deputies are operating at half strength, and executive discipline is unsatisfactory. Many leaders have used the party's authority as a cover and become increasingly removed from the people. And when children hide behind their father's back, as we say, they cannot help undermining his authority.

"On the other hand, our party was increasingly supplanting state organs, without being aware of this itself. It assumed economic functions. But under the weight of an all-embracing load it was unable to implement its policy and work in various strata of society. A type of worker 'crystallized out' who undertakes everything with enviable ease but answers for nothing in full.

"In short, the party found itself in the position of a pack camel, as it were. It 'carries' both the economy and culture—everything that is loaded onto it. If the plan has not been fulfilled in some aymag, messengers are sent to the outlying district from the central apparatus. They urge them on. But in fact the party itself found itself running errands for the executors.

"This style is the disease of our society. It arose out of the party's false status. Until recently its word was taken by the majority as the ultimate truth. Many party workers were perfectly satisfied with monoculture thinking.

"Once again about authority. The party was involved in all spheres. Everything good and bad was tied directly to the party's authority—hence the problems. It was necessary to abandon all this and hand over the harness to those who must lead the cart—which resulted in the party leadership's resignation."

[Sapov] Some people are inclined to believe that the MPRP Central Committee Politburo faltered beneath the onslaught from the "informals." Is this so? What is the role of party organizations and the Central Committee in renewing the party and society as a whole?

[Tudev] I would say that the Politburo was replaced painlessly. It finally realized its responsibility to the party and the people. The Eighth MPRP Central Committee Plenum was essentially a kind of mirror of Mongolian restructuring. It was addressed by almost all the Central Committee members. It was unequalled in terms of the intensity of passions and its self-critical nature. We realized the errors and omissions and the demands of the times. The resignation was accepted unanimously.

As for the "informals," they are a child of restructuring. And, in criticizing them, we must not throw the baby out with the bath water.

Some people believe that there are "informal" movements only in the republic's capital. They are mistaken.

This is not only a national but also an international phenomenon. I would compare your perestroika with the second wave of the Great October Socialist Revolution. And, as in previous times, its purifying wave has reached us too.

Restructuring in Mongolia is not a foreign body. It is a product of reality, of our forward movement. Not everything is proceeding smoothly. Including in relations with the "informals." And this is understandable. The new public organizations do not yet have a clear-cut political persona.

The party has recognized the multiparty system. This is a new phenomenon for Mongolia. A draft law "On Political Parties" is now being prepared.

Dissatisfaction with the situation that has come about has been expressed not only by the "informals" but also by communists and nonparty people. The party was moving in the same direction as the public movements, but too slowly and unhurriedly.

The situation in the country is now under the control of the whole people. Many people condemn the "informals" for extreme measures and for resorting to a hunger strike, for example. Haste, running ahead, and strong-arm pressure really are to be observed in their actions. There are elements of maximalism—which is characteristic of young people. There is also "froth." But it is not extremism that determines restructuring. There are sufficient healthy political forces in the country to conduct a skillful dialogue and to make real progress on the path of national concord.

[Sapov] An extraordinary MPRP congress will be held in April. What tasks does it have to resolve?

[Tudev] We have not held extraordinary congresses before. This is an important political event for the republic. There is just one task—to renew the Central Committee's composition and strengthen its leadership. It has also been decided to discuss the party's provisional statutes without waiting for the regular congress. Reports and elections are now taking place in party organizations. Primary organizations are electing congress delegates. There will be 927 of them in all. This is a new approach. There has never before been such broad representation.

[Sapov] What questions do you tackle in the Politburo?

[Tudev] I remain in my editorial post. My chief concern is the party press. My load has now doubled. The tasks facing the newspaper have become more complex. There will be an acute political struggle under conditions of a multiparty system. The party must win the people's confidence with ideas and strong policies.

There is an intention to publish an independent government newspaper in addition to UNEN. This is along the lines of the separation of party and state power.

It has to be said that the MPR mass media have become a genuine platform for the expression and shaping of public opinion. This does not mean that there are no shortcomings in them. There is a shortage of criticism in our press. And we must assert its healthy principles in every possible way. It is always easier to criticize. But life-asserting tones are also needed.

[Sapov] How do you see the spiritual renewal of society?

[Tudev] Moral rebirth is one of the chief topics in the Mongolian press. And, once again, the omission here is on the conscience of the party or, rather, of those leaders who led society toward stagnation.

The residual principle of the allocation of funds for the development of culture and science tells. The old method of pressuring the intelligentsia and attaching labels continued for 30 years. This affected the theaters' repertoire, musical life, and the creativity of writers. Today we must abandon obsolete traditions. But not the tradition of our peoples' friendship. This obliges us to make a critical assessment of the effectiveness of cooperation. But our love for Russia and its peoples, who were the first to extend to us the hand of assistance, remains immutable.

We favor the continuing development of political, economic, and cultural ties with the country of Lenin. The tree of friendship is growing. It is yielding fruit. It provides moisture and coolness. And its roots are alive, nourishing the crown.

NEW TIMES Examines Mongolian Developments

PM0604150690 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 13, 27 Mar-2 Apr 90 pp 16-17

[Aleksandr Didusenko dispatch: "A Stalemate"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar—Against the background of mighty political changes in Eastern Europe and the dramatic peripeteias of perestroika in the U.S.S.R., recent developments in the Mongolian People's Republic might seem a little belated. Nonetheless, they show the following. The Stalinist and post-Stalinist models of "real socialism" have utterly exhausted their resources, hinder social development, and must leave the scene of history not only in the U.S.S.R. and other European socialist countries, but also in Central Asia.

The roots of discontent

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), at which the former party leaders had resigned, was the logical conclusion of an important stage in the current political struggle. The struggle in Mongolia has had its ebbs and tides over the past few months. Various meetings, rallies and sessions pass resolutions and issue statements. New political organizations advance their programmes. New political leaders come to the fore. In the meantime, the population grows more dissatisfied with the inconsistent economic and political reforms,

their low salaries, the shortage of food products and goods, and the long queues for them.

In the middle of February, active members of the unofficial Mongolian Social Democratic Movement conducted an opinion poll in Ulaanbaator. The questions were the following. Were the people content with their living standard? Did they think that the leader of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party could successfully carry out reforms? Does Mongolia need a multiparty system? Is it still necessary to limit the number of livestock possessed by citizens? Are the principles of equality and justice applied in Mongolia? Are Mongolian laws responsive to the general human rights?

Out of 1,150 pollees, 1,064 were dissatisfied with their living standard, about 67 per cent doubted the competence of Mongolian political leaders, and 73 per cent were for a multiparty system. More than 90 per cent were of the opinion that in Mongolia the right to the personal possession of livestock should be as unquestioned and unlimited as the right of peasants to possess land in other countries. More than three quarters of the pollees believed that principles of equality and justice were not realized in Mongolia, and that the laws in action often failed to correspond to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

"The results of the poll rather candidly reflect the mood of the entire Mongolian people," said one of the most popular people in that country today, the main coordinator of an alternative organization the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU), S. Zorig. "One can clearly see today that we have failed to build socialism as a system which gives man the maximum of social justice and confidence, a high living standard, and the maximum of human rights and freedoms. The MPRP has not coped with this task. We are to adhere to the revolutionary ideals of Sukhe Bator and his comrades-in-arms and to bring the democratic revolution from which the successors of the first generation of revolutionaries departed to completion. In their native country the Mongolian people have the right to live well and to be free."

"What should be done to achieve this?" I asked him.

"The current MPRP leadership should resign and the party should give up the monopoly of power. An opportunity for a normal democratic development of the country in the conditions of a multiparty system and political pluralism should be recognized. We need a new constitution, a new parliament elected on a democratic basis, and a new government which will uphold the real interests of the people and not the purity of ideological principles."

This conversation was conducted at one of the departments of the Mongolian State University. In a neighbouring room some MDU activists worked on the next issue of their newspaper, *Shine Uye* (New Generation). Increasing numbers of people joined our conversation.

"Well, suppose everything turns out the way you see it," I said. "There will be a new leadership and a multiparty system. However, that will not bring oranges to shops, more meat to the population, or higher earnings to workers."

"We have calculated," the students said, "that it is possible to raise the average salary to 1,200 or 2,000 tugriks (300 to 500 rubles) a month."

"What will help to do that?"

"Foreign trade. Today Mongolia trades inequitably on the foreign market. We are simply robbed."

It is time to put things in order.

Whenever foreign economic problems are discussed in Mongolia, Mongolian-Soviet relations are the necessary centre of attention. On more than one occasion I was told that Mongolian-Soviet relations, accounting for nine tenths of Mongolian foreign trade turnover, arouse great criticism.

The Mongolian people are most of all agitated and indignant over the fact that their debt to the U.S.S.R. has turned out to reach the enormous sum of 10,000 million rubles, or 40,000 million tugriks. It means approximately 20,000 per each of the 2,000,000 inhabitants of Mongolia.

"None of us has 20,000 tugriks," said the University students. "We have never seen them. What was this money spent on?"

"As early as 1926," said journalist D. Ninch, also a member of the MDU, "A. Amar who was our minister then, wrote to Soviet People's Commissar Chicherin that we sold raw materials to the U.S.S.R. at low prices, and bought goods at high prices. Unfortunately, nothing has changed. The situation has even grown worse. You can see for yourself."

D. Ninch quoted an article by economist D. Surenjav, published in the January issue of "Economic Questions"—the magazine of the MPRP Central Committee. "During 66 years of cooperation," D. Surenjav wrote, "only once, in 1925, did Mongolia have a balance of trade with the U.S.S.R.. Of course, the unwise trade policy of the Mongolian leaders is to blame. The system of prices is not quite up to mark either. For instance, between 1946 and 1966 Mongolia supplied the U.S.S.R. with approximately 3,000,000 bull calves and cows at 38 rubles per head, and 35,000,000 sheep and goats at 6 rubles per head. In the seventies and eighties major mining and dressing enterprises were built. Today, they export their output to the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic. After their construction, indebtedness started to grow at a truly disastrous rate. Raw materials are cheap, while mining equipment is expensive."

"If we solve the problem of foreign trade," Said S. Zorig, "we shall acquire the means to markedly raise the standard of living."

"People from the MDU are biased," I was told in the Soviet Embassy in Mongolia. "They do not want to see that the U.S.S.R. could profit much more by selling its goods in countries other than in Mongolia." "There is such confusion over prices in our socialist markets today, that it is very difficult to fix the real price of goods and to determine who is the debtor of whom," experts in Moscow told me.

One thing is clear to everybody though, it is time to put everything in order. Otherwise friends, allies, and mutual respect can be lost.

One cannot help subscribing to this opinion.

Lending an attentive ear

The MDU's populist slogans naturally attract those people who, as they note themselves, have been afraid to voice their opinion since 1937. At the same time, many people distrust "unofficial groups" because they claim too easily that they can establish the general social welfare on a sound basis.

"These are mere words so far," workers of the Wilhelm Pieck carpet-weaving mill told me. "It is easy to make promises when you are not responsible for anything. We have already heard many fine words, and they have no effect on us."

"Whom are you going to support, the MDU or the MPRP?" I asked.

"None so far. We shall wait and see how things develop."

Perhaps no one in Mongolia today would venture to predict how things will develop further. But it is clear to everyone that by cleverly using the opportunities of street democracy and the sluggishness and clumsiness of official authorities, the opposition has managed to consolidate its positions. The MDU, the Union of Students, the New Progressive Alliance, the Democratic Socialist Movement and other organizations, set up of late, have increased their influence among the masses of people, have formed organizational structures, and have formulated attractive, even if not well-considered programmes. The MPRP has resolutely begun an internal reorganization. It is trying to make up for the lost time by outlying the opposition.

The plenary meeting of the MPRP Central Committee approved the resignation of former party leaders. It resolved to convene an extraordinary congress on April 10. It suggested that the paragraphs on the MPRP's exclusive right to the leading role in the country should be withdrawn from the Constitution. It also suggested that elections to the People's Great Hural should be transferred from 1991 to 1990, and that the work on a new constitution should be hastened. The MPRP stated

that, with due consideration for Mongolia's special features, it was ready to cooperate with all political forces who are interested in establishing a legal, humane, and democratic socialist state.

In this way, the Mongolian Communists have lent an ear to the demands of the democratic opposition. Undoubtedly, it took political courage, a sense of responsibility, and an ability to critically appraise and reappraise their own work and positions for the Mongolian Communists to do this.

Will the opposition respond adequately to this move, or will it further follow the road of street democracy? Time alone will tell whether vague illusions to a happy future of prosperity, merely a step away, yield to a sensible view of how, when and who will take Mongolia out of its current impasse. Meanwhile the situation is stalemate. Neither side will succeed in solving its problems on its own.

Over the many ages of its existence, bourgeois democracy has had the opportunity to work out its brilliant system for the changing leaders at the helm of state. Ruling parties, presidents, prime ministers and other leading figures usually succeed one another without a major political and economic upheaval, without affecting people's earnings, food and commodity supply, or services. Unfortunately, socialist democracy has not created such a system. So, the Mongolian people will have, no doubt, perceptible difficulties.

"We are ready to overcome difficulties," D. Ninch told me in this context. "But we hope that having gone through them, we shall be able to establish such a social system in which democracy will need no epithets like 'bourgeois' or 'socialist'. Democracy will be as it should be, a form of government of free people in a free country.

A great deal remains to be done.

Soviet Troop Pullout From Mongolia on Schedule

PM0604153190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA
ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Strictly According to Schedule"]

[Text] Questions connected with preparing for the next stage in the Soviet troop withdrawal from Mongolian territory were discussed yesterday at a working conference in Ulaanbaatar.

V.I. Sitnikov, Soviet ambassador to Mongolia, Lieutenant General L.S. Mayorov, commander of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Mongolia, and representatives of the Mongolian People's Army command took part.

It was noted that all measures connected with the Soviet troop withdrawal—planned for 15 May—are going according to schedule. When this stage has been completed, 75 percent of the Soviet military personnel here will have been withdrawn from Mongolian territory. All

that will remain is the technical and maintenance services responsible for servicing the complex engineering communication lines and training national cadres. Military camps, economic installations, and housing built to meet the needs of the Soviet troops are being given gratis to Mongolia.

During the conference the Mongolian side stressed that the Soviet servicemen in the republic under the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance have honestly fulfilled their international duty and earned the people's love and respect.

Soviet Official Says Ties With ROK 'Not Urgent'

*SK0904115990 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 7 Apr 90*

[Text] In answering a question by reporters regarding Pyongyang's response to contacts between the Soviet Union and the ROK, a representative of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in Moscow that the DPRK understands that it is beneficial and necessary for the Soviet Union to have contacts with the ROK to a certain extent. Referring to the possibility of developing in-depth relations with Seoul, the representative of the Soviet Foreign Ministry said that, at the same time, the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea is not urgent [words indistinct].

Phased U.S. Withdrawal From South Korea Viewed

*SK1004064890 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 6 Apr 90*

[Talk from the "Focus on Asia" program"]

[Text] The South Korean Defense Ministry announced that Seoul and Washington have reached an agreement on a one-step reduction of the U.S. troops deployed in South Korea.

Aleksey Nikolayev, commentator of this radio station, writes as follows: The necessity for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea is clear. The withdrawal of U.S. troops will contribute not only to removing the basic obstacle to North-South dialogue and to making the prospect for the peaceful reunification of the country more realistic but also undoubtedly to the course of realizing regional detente demanded by most of the Asian countries.

Washington and Seoul cannot now recklessly reject such a demand. Besides, the U.S. military (?occupation) of South Korea has become a great burden of the United States itself and to its allies from the financial point of view.

In short, such (?occupation) makes a certain degree of amendment inevitable. What is the (?status) of 43,000 U.S. troops now stationed in South Korea? Of them, about 7,000 troops will be withdrawn from South Korea

during the period from 1991 to 1993 according to the agreement between the United States and South Korea. This is the first step.

The South Korean Defense Ministry said that the second and third stages are the period from 1994 to 1995 and the period after 1996 respectively. The number of troops that will leave South Korea during these periods has not been revealed.

According to reports, the number of troops to leave during these periods will be decided based on a reevaluation of the situation in this region after the first-step withdrawal is completed. Thus, the issue as to whether or not the military occupation of South Korea by the United States will come to an end remains an unsolved question.

The reduction of troops in the long run is included in the plan. However, this demands certain (?preconditions).

Aleksey Nikolayev, commentator of this radio station, stressed that based on these (?preconditions), the issue of military occupation of South Korea by the United States will keep progress at a standstill.

U.S. Plan To Turn Over Arms to Seoul Criticized

*SK0904120190 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 1 Apr 90*

[From the "Asian News" program under the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The DPRK expressed its increased concern with the U.S. plan to turn over military hardware to South Korea. If conventional weapons are reduced in Europe, such a plan may be implemented.

As reported by THE NEW YORK TIMES, Seoul will receive 120 fighter-bombers. NODONG SINMUN has pointed out that this is a hide-and-seek game with weapons. The paper stressed that the conventional weapons should not be transferred from one place to the other but should be (?liquidated).

The paper expressed its view that if such weapons are turned over to South Korea, the situation on the Korean peninsula will be further strained.

More Criticism of ROK Participation in 'Rimpac'

*SK0704094890 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 31 Mar 90*

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The Pacific is being used as a place for a big show of naval force by the United States and its allies.

On this subject, our station's military commentator (Viktor Vinogradov) has this to say:

[(Vinogradov) commentary read by announcer] I will comment on "Rimpac," a multinational naval exercise.

This military exercise has been staged every other year for nearly for 20 years. This time, the military exercise will be kicked off on 2 April and will last until 21 May. The area of the exercise encompasses a vast Pacific region from California to the Hawaiian Islands. In addition to the U.S. Navy, the Canadian, Australian, and Japanese naval forces will participate.

Until recently, Tokyo was indecisive on whether it should send its naval vessels and aircraft to the naval exercise. This was because of its financial problems. However, the Japanese Government has recently allocated one billion yen in response to the request of the Japan Defense Agency. Considering the peace clause of the Constitution of Japan which bans Japan's participation in any group defense, the law has been ignored this time.

[Passage indistinct] The ROK will participate in the "Rimpac" naval exercise for the first time. In the past, the ROK had refrained from participating in the exercise. [passage indistinct]

Two ROK frigates will participate in the military exercise. With the carrier task force of the U.S. Third Fleet as a main force, some 50 naval vessels, 250 aircraft, and nearly 50,000 men and officers will participate in the exercise from the five countries.

The nature of the operations to be carried out in the course of the exercise is offensive. On the imaginary front, (?cruisers), submarines, aviation units will be mobilized, and marines will stage a landing exercise.

The attempt conspicuously intended to maintain high military readiness is another sign that runs counter to contributions to confidence-building in the region. This is even more true, because the "Rimpac" naval exercise will begin even before the conclusion of the U.S.-ROK "Team Spirit" joint military exercise.

This can never be compatible with the desire of the people of the Asian countries in trying to keep the Pacific truly pacific.

There is another thing I would like to mention. The United States is desperate to maintain its military presence in the Asian and Pacific region. It is trying to mobilize its allies which are linked with Washington by a bilateral military treaty.

As we see, the U.S. military circles are not desirous of making their Asian and Pacific policy compatible with improving the overall international situation. The Pentagon is placing emphasis on a policy of strength.

ROK To Increase Trade With Eastern Bloc

90UF0021A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 5

[TASS report: "Seoul Intends To Cooperate"]

[Text] Tokyo, 27 March—By the end of the 20th century South Korea's exports to the socialist countries are to have grown almost tenfold. Such is the goal set by the South Korean Government, which has announced the formation of a special working group on an expansion of business relations with the USSR, China, and the East European states. The new body is made up of representatives of the ministries of economic planning, finance, and trade and industry.

"We have to prepare measures to expand exports to the socialist countries by way of a stimulation of direct and indirect supplies and the creation of joint ventures," Li Ki-chu, aide to the foreign minister on economic issues, who is head of the group, said. The realization of 38 economic projects with the participation of South Korea and various socialist countries has even begun at the present time.

Since Seoul's proclamation at the end of 1987 of "northern diplomacy" aimed at the establishment of relations with the socialist states, South Korea's commodity turnover with these countries has doubled, amounting last year, according to Foreign Ministry figures, to \$4.2 billion. If the program being drawn up at the present time is implemented, the socialist countries' share of South Korean exports by 2000 will have amounted to approximately 10 percent—three times more than in 1989.

As Han Sung-su, minister of trade and industry, declared at a press conference in Seoul recently, "the expansion of export supplies to states of the socialist camp will lend new impetus to the development of the South Korean economy, which is currently experiencing a certain recession."

President of ROK's Samsung Company Arrives

LD0804103890 Moscow TASS in English 0619 GMT
8 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Konstantin Voitsekhovich]

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS—Prospects for the development of trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and South Korea have considerably improved as a result of positive changes in the international arena and current reforms in the Soviet Union, believes Yi Pil-kon, president of the South Korean company Samsung.

He arrived in Moscow today on a seven-day working visit.

"The Soviet and South Korean economies can do much for mutual benefit," Pil-Gon Rhee told TASS. "If businessmen of our countries exert adequate efforts, we shall achieve considerable progress in developing bilateral economic interaction."

Under these circumstances, Samsung, a major South Korean industrial company, may become a pioneer in establishing efficient cooperation.

Yi Pil-kon expressed opinion that the development of economic ties and contacts in the mass media can help improve relations between the two countries in other spheres.

Favoring the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and South Korea in future, he noted that this would take some time.

It is expected that during the visit the Samsung president will meet representatives of several Soviet ministries and departments as well as top executives of the mass media.

Near East & South Asia

Terrorism, Shootings in Afghanistan Reported

LD0704223890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] In the Herat Province of Afghanistan, an unknown person opened fire during a ceremony to mark national reconciliation between a number of armed opposition groups and the lawful government of the country. Several people were killed and wounded. Khaliqyar, head of the northwestern zone of Afghanistan, was among the wounded. Our correspondent Vladimir Pasko witnessed what happened. Here is his report:

[Pasko] Khaliqyar and those who accompanied him were met with honor: 4,000 men made an armed guard of honor for the arrival by air of the high-ranking guests. Submachinegun bursts came quite unexpectedly, when the guests and hosts had almost completed their inspection of the guard of honor. The man who fired was standing in a column. He fired at point-blank range, from the hip. For a brief moment the assembled people could not understand what had happened. Realization of what had happened came when they saw bodies falling. People, initially petrified, rushed away in all directions with cries of horror. Later, in Kabul, Afghanistan said that the terrorist had killed six and wounded seven people. Who he was is not clear. Some say that he was sent by Hikmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e Eslami of Afghanistan; others say that he was sent by Rabbani, the leader of another opposition grouping of irreconcilables, the Islamic Society of Afghanistan [Jam'yate-e Eslami Afghanistan].

In principle, this is not of particular significance. Both groups rule out reconciliation with the present republican regime. Hikmatyar even swore to punish those who would dare to deviate from this position. It is quite obvious that it has been a major provocation, the aim of which was to provoke the government forces to open fire at the people, who came to the ceremony of reconciliation, and to turn reconciliation into battle. There was no battle. Those who had gathered there, saw how everything happened. Together they tended those who suffered, carried wounded to helicopters, without dividing them into ours and theirs. The intentions of the instigators obviously went wrong.

Commentary on Egypt's Halt to Afghan Rebel Aid

TA0604175390 Moscow in Dari to Afghanistan
1500 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Sergey Viktorov commentary from "The World Today" program]

[Text] Dear listeners: According to an AP report from Cairo, the Egyptian Government has stopped delivery of weapons, including rockets, to the armed Afghan opposition. Our commentator Sergey Viktorov writes:

Dear Afghan friends, greetings. The AP news agency, while disseminating the report on the Egyptian Government's decision to cease arms delivery to the Afghan rebels, notes that this change in a policy pursued for a long time, since Anwar al-Sadat's era, is not being widely commented upon. As is common knowledge, previously a large quantity of weapons and ammunition used by the Afghan rebels arrived from Egypt. These included, above all, Kalashnikov rifles manufactured in Cairo. At the same time, in the beginning, when the Afghan rebels used to show these Kalashnikovs to foreign correspondents, they tried to claim that these weapons were seized from the country's armed forces.

In the opinion of some people, former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's stance of widespread support for the Afghan opposition was aimed at reducing the anti-Egyptian sentiments in the Islamic world, which stemmed from the peace treaty with Israel signed in Camp David. Apparently, now Egypt has decided to stop the supply of its arms to the Afghan rebels.

At present, it is difficult for one to say to what extent the report on the decision by the Egyptian authorities is (?accurate), since so far no official position has been announced by Egypt. As AP reported, the Egyptian foreign ministry spokesman made a statement on the Afghan people's right to self-determination and [words indistinct]. Observers are trying to guess the reasons and motives which prompted Egypt to pursue such a course. Some persons believe that by this means Egyptian President Husni Mubarak is seeking to improve his country's relations with the Soviet Union. They also say that, since fundamentalist elements in Egypt are considerably escalating their activities, assistance by this country's government to the same fundamentalists in Afghanistan is not without danger to the Egyptian Government itself.

But let us not indulge in speculation. The near future will show to what extent reports on the halt of Egyptian aid to the Afghan rebels are accurate. If these reports prove true, skepticism will increase in the world, especially in countries which traditionally have aided the Afghan opposition regarding this support as a necessity.

Islamic Conference Appeal on Soviet Jews Noted

PM1004124390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by own correspondent A. Portanskiy: "Islamic Conference's Appeal"]

[Text] Algiers—The Committee on Jerusalem, created by the Islamic Conference Organization, has made an appeal to the USSR, the United States, and the EEC countries on settling the problem of the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union.

Representatives of 15 Arab states gathered in Morocco have asked the USSR to "ban the mass emigration of Soviet Jews" which, in their opinion, "presents a danger to the peace process in the region" and "encourages" Israel to "continue its policy of expansion and aggression."

The committee appealed to the United States to lift its restrictions on the entry of Jewish immigrants and also to "halt aid to the Israeli Government in implementing projects for settling the occupied territories."

As for the EEC, the Committee on Jerusalem has formulated a request that emigres be allowed to settle in the EEC countries, which would accord with the spirit of Helsinki, and to this end to reopen the European transit centers, which would enable them to select their future country of residence.

It was decided to form an Arab delegation under the chairmanship of King Hassan II of Morocco which will visit the countries which are permanent members of the UN Security Council in order to explain "the scale of the danger of the resettlement of Soviet Jews on the occupied Arab territories and to activate the peace process in the Near East." A proposal has been addressed to the UN Security Council on the creation of an international commission for supervision and control with a view to preventing the settlement of emigres from the USSR in Palestine, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

Advocating the speediest convening of an international conference on the Near East under the auspices of the United Nations, the Committee on Jerusalem warned that there will be neither peace nor stability in the Near East region until a fair and universal solution to the Palestinian problem is found.

Iranian Reaction to Jammu, Kashmir Incidents

NC0704113090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress
in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] The Indian Foreign Ministry official spokesman has condemned the recent provocative remarks by Iranian leaders on the incidents in Jammu and Kashmir. Stressing that India has always taken a (?respectful) approach toward sensitive issues likely to cause concern among the Iranians and other nations, he said: We are surprised at Iran's remarks and its attitude toward us.

Our commentator writes on this: Clearly, the efforts by Iran's fundamentalists to portray the tension in the two Indian states as a so-called outcome of India's policy of massacre of Muslims have roused the anger of the

Indians. Everyone is well aware of what is really happening in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman pointed out that extremists, Islamic fundamentalists, and terrorists are operating here with foreign support and that they are sparking off violent massacres and spreading the seeds of terror. As you know, among the foreign forces that are fomenting violence in Jammu and Kashmir, the most active are the Pakistani militarists. Terrorists have been learning mischief and corruption in camps based in Pakistan for a long time now. Pakistan is the place where they find arms too. After carrying out criminal operations on Indian territory, they flee from the Indian police to Pakistan where they hide. Many are the incidents of shooting at Indian border guards without any reason and of other aggressive acts by the Pakistani forces.

After seeing such realities, which are undoubtedly clear to the Iranian leadership too, can one still disseminate reports about massacres in India that are mere figments of the imagination? Such acts by some of the Iranian personages are surprising, especially since India's love and respect for the philosophy of non-violence is well known among the Iranian people, and great significance is attached to India's role as leader of the Nonaligned Movement. But when one takes into consideration the fact that recently military and political relations between Pakistan and Iran have been actively progressing, then such acts do not seem so surprising. Recently a Pakistani military delegation headed by Yastur-al-Haq Malik, commander of the Pakistani Navy, visited Iran. This was followed by a visit to Pakistan by Brigadier General 'Ali Shahbazi, chief of the joint staff of the Iranian Armed Forces. The two parties are coordinating their military-political programs under the slogan of Islamic solidarity. It is under this same slogan that Islamabad is trying to draw Tehran into its [word indistinct] adventurism. It seems that these efforts have not been in vain.

The Pakistani militarists are counting even more on the fundamentalists in Iran. Fundamentalist dignitaries are always ready, under the slogan of defending the Muslims, to interfere in the domestic affairs of sovereign countries. They are trying to start a commotion about an imaginary threat against Islam and thus to strengthen their political positions inside the country—positions that have [word indistinct] and destabilized in the first decade since the emergence of Iran's religious regime. They want to use commotion of this kind to strengthen their claims of leading the world of Islam.

Specific circles are exploiting the ambitious intentions of the Iranian fundamentalists for their own objectives. Meanwhile, Islamic solidarity with Pakistan is inflicting great harm on Iran. The official spokesman for the Indian Foreign Ministry pointed out that the spiteful remarks by the Iranian leadership, which are based on a wrong assessment of the incidents in Jammu and Kashmir, are harming relations between India and Iran.

East Europe

'Temporary' Closure of Poland-Lithuania Border

LD0604123290 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1200 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] The Polish ambassador in Moscow has been informed that the decision concerning the closure of the only border crossing between Poland and Lithuania is of a temporary nature. It affects all those crossing the border and not just Poles. The Foreign Ministry will continue talks aimed at reducing this temporary period of the closure of the border to a minimum.

Poland's Jaruzelski Views European Security

LD0904092290 Moscow TASS in English 0903 GMT
9 Apr 90

[Text] Warsaw April 9 TASS—"Poland is eager to take part in a search for solutions to ensure stability on the European Continent and contribute to the creation of a system of collective security," President Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland notes in an article published in the latest issue of the POLITYKA weekly.

"The idea of an all-European home, advanced by President Gorbachev, Francois Mitterrand's suggestion to set up a European confederation, which runs in the same vein, and in general the concept of a federative alliance have been received with interest in Poland as promising initiatives. The achievement of this goal calls for bold, but patient and cautious steps.

"Only a rapprochement of West and East European countries, distinguished today by differing levels of economic and technological development, can ensure reliable and mutually profitable relations. It may also contribute to the creation of an economic and ecological system of security on our continent.

"The changes in Europe," the president notes, "must proceed in such a way that each phase of the process would ensure security for all its participants. This is linked with military and political equilibrium, which should be maintained at steadily decreasing levels and should rapidly become defensive.

"It was rightly believed throughout the post-war period that European security and stability were guaranteed by Soviet and American troops, deployed on the territory of the former German reich in keeping with the Potsdam Agreements. Now the possibility of cutting them drastically and eventually even withdrawing them is being discussed. The suggested idea of a European federative alliance depends directly on the simultaneous creation of a system of collective security and, consequently, on the radical demilitarisation of all European states, primarily a united Germany."

Jaruzelski said that German reunification should proceed stage-by-stage and should be integral part of the process of European unification in the broad sense of the

word. The two states must be united and one of them should not be allowed to swallow up the other. Various legal ploys, delays and ambiguities in the question of Germany's eastern border interfere with the promotion of complete confidence," the president stressed.

Changes, Developments in Polish Press Reported

PM0904090990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by L. Toporkov: "Poland: 'They Want To Close Our Mouths'"]

[Text] Warsaw—Our newspaper has maintained friendly ties with the Katowice newspaper TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA for many years. We exchanged journalists on a noncurrency basis and helped each other on creative trips. This time, too, my long-standing Polish friend from the workers' newspaper intended to visit the Soviet Union on an intereditorial exchange.

But the matter came to a standstill. The workers' editorial cooperative Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch (PKR), where the newspaper was published, has been abolished by a Sejm decision. The same fate now awaits TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA, only yesterday one of Poland's biggest newspapers, and dozens of other publications under the wing of the PKR—in fact a large concern which used to publish 85 percent of Poland's newspapers and operated under the auspices of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] and brought it considerable revenue. The PZPR has disappeared and a frontal attack has been launched against the PKR, which is actually being called a "moloch" and a "monopolist." It has become the Carthage which must be destroyed.

We talked with Leszek Miller, general secretary of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP] Central Executive Committee, and PKR chairman Slawomir Tabkowski about the fate of the property left behind after the self-dissolution of the PZPR and passed on by right of inheritance to the SdRP. The meeting took place in the "white house"—the previously renowned building of the PZPR Central Committee now empty and resonant because of the absence of people. The SdRP, which has 50,000 members, is naturally unable to maintain it. So far there has been talk of passing the house on to Warsaw University, but now it is being said that it is more convenient to hand it over—a sign of the times!—to businessmen: Each month this colossal building with fine telephone communications with the whole country and with the world could bring in an estimated revenue of \$400,000.

It is curious to note, our interlocutors stated, that the government and the Sejm are perturbed primarily by the fate of the publishing base of the former PZPR. The authorities have traveled along the path of strong-arm pressure, a well tested path in postwar Poland. After all, they could have decided the problem of the PKR by resorting to existing laws. If they consider that the PKR had a monopoly in newspaper publishing, there is a law

on this score on opposing monopolist practice. Moreover, there is a law on cooperatives by which they should have been guided in this case: After all the PKR is a cooperative enterprise. The law defends the right of cooperative ownership. Nor was there any consideration of the fact that recently the PKR has been satisfying the requirements of various ideological trends and public movements. Incidentally, its printing houses also published "Solidarity" publications, for instance GAZETA WYBORCZA.

During the discussion of the draft law on the elimination of the PKR the deputies did not want to heed the opinion of its leadership. Professor B. Geremek, chairman of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club, compared the act of elimination with the fall of the Bastille. To which S. Wiatr, a deputy from the left-wing forces club, reminded him that it was after the fall of the Bastille that the scaffolds appeared. Deputy I. Sierakowska accused the authorities of "bolshevik practice": In the struggle against the PKR monopoly the government monopoly is strengthening, and now has no opponents. The transfer of the newspaper publishing business to a privatization footing will promote that. The PKR's property will come under the hammer and it will be bought by those for whom the authorities will create most-favored conditions.

Not so long ago, L. Miller, general secretary of the SdRP Central Executive Committee, said at the "roundtable," we agreed that the principle of pluralism should become the main one in the Poland which will emerge after the parliamentary elections. It is a pity that the accords have remained in the past as starry-eyed intentions. We are now essentially being spoken to from a position of strength. The new authorities have introduced a new order. And we view the reprisal against the PKR as a dangerous precedent. They want to close our mouths.

Warsaw's TRYBUNA, the only remaining important newspaper of the left-wing forces, wrote recently: "Unemployment has come to journalism. Today journalists are being presented with the bill for the past—both real and imagined. The situation of our colleagues approaching pension age is particularly dramatic. Will one of them really be able to justify his own business? Money is needed for that. Journalists have never had money. The drama of individual people has a broader aspect, however: The opportunity for public dialogue, the exchange of opinions, and interconnection in society will disappear. Will that bring Poland closer to the civilized democratic countries?"

Following the Sejm, the senate also voted for the new law on the elimination of the PKR. President W. Jaruzelski has the final say. The SdRP intends to appeal against the actions of the government and legislators in the Constitutional Tribunal.

Bulgaria's Mladenov Wins Presidential Election

PM0504114790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 4 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Bulgaria: P. Mladenov Elected President"]

[Text] Petur Mladenov has been elected president of the PRB [People's Republic of Bulgaria]. Deputies of the PRB National Assembly unanimously advocated his election to this post at the session of the Bulgarian parliament which ended in Sofia yesterday.

P. Mladenov swore an oath on taking up the post of PRB president and delivered a program statement.

As a people and as a nation, P. Mladenov emphasized, we must preserve the historical traditions of friendship and cooperation with Russia, the Russian people, and the Soviet Union, enriching and developing them at the contemporary level in accordance with mutual interests.

At the session the Bulgarian parliamentary deputies adopted a number of important legislative acts which create a platform for the formation of a democratic rule-of-law state in Bulgaria. A law on amendments and additions to the PRB Constitution was approved. In particular, it describes the PRB as a "democratic, parliamentary, and rule-of-law state." Its economic system is based on free economic initiative and competition, with all forms of ownership enjoying equal rights. The PRB State Council has been abolished, and the institution of head of state has been introduced.

The people's representatives also adopted a law on political parties. It grants the country's citizens the right to unite freely in political parties but bans those whose activity is aimed at forcibly changing the constitutional system, violating the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and fanning racial, national, ethnic, and religious enmity. It points to the need to rule out the parties' interference in the activities of state establishments, the army, the militia, law-enforcement organs, the mass media, and economic organizations, as well as the creation of party structures and the pursuit of organized political activity in work places.

The National Assembly then adopted a decision on the early termination of its powers. Parliament as presently composed will continue to perform its functions until the elections to the Grand National Assembly, which are due in June.

BCP Changes Name, Remains Committed to Marxism

PM0504131990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent L. Zhmyrev dispatch: "Toward a Party of a New Type"]

[Text] Sofia—The processes of renewal in Bulgaria are proceeding dynamically. An impressive rally took place in 9 September Square in the center of the Bulgarian

capital Tuesday evening. Participating in it were people who only the previous day had been members of the Communist Party but who on 3 April became members of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. The renaming decision had only just been adopted at a session of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Higher Party Council.

The final results of the all-party referendum on changing the party's name were read out at the session. As of 1 January 1990, the BCP had 983,899 members. Precisely 893,738 people had already been enrolled in the basic party organizations. Some 726,000 people, or more than 81 percent of those enrolled in the basic party organizations, participated in the referendum. Precisely 629,522 people, or 86.7 percent of those who voted, voted for the new name—the BSP.

A. Lilov, the party's leader, who delivered the report, declared that the process of the party's radical rethinking of its theoretical and practical aims is beginning along with the change of name. Without lapsing into utopias, he said, we are building a society of democratic socialism. We renounce the monopoly on truth and intolerance of dissidence, which is alien to Marxism. At the same time we have no wish to present ourselves as a party without a past. By taking the name "socialist" our party is continuing the cause of D. Blagoev and his comrades, who created the first Marxist party in Bulgaria, and the cause of G. Dimitrov—the Communist who inflicted the first moral and political defeat on fascism at the time of the Leipzig trial. In changing its name, our party must become a Marxist party of a new type and be turned into a modern political party, A. Lilov pointed out.

The Higher Party Council adopted a decision to consider the BCP the BSP as of 3 April.

The new name and the new concept of the BSP's press organ—the newspaper DUMA—were approved at the session. In connection with P. Mladenov's election to the post of president he withdrew from the Higher Party Council and its Presidium. Stanko Todorov and Lyuben Gotsev were elected new members of the Higher Party Council Presidium.

Bulgarian Socialist Party Election Program Cited

PM0604153390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Apr 90 First Edition p5

[Unattributed report: "Faced With a Choice"]

[Text] Bulgaria's traditional ties with Russia and the USSR represent an enormous national, cultural, and economic asset. The Bulgarian Socialist Party wants to preserve and develop political, economic, and spiritual ties with the Soviet Union.

This is stated in the Bulgarian Socialist Party platform published for the upcoming elections to the Great National Assembly. The document sets out the details of

the present stand taken by the party, which has changed its name from the Bulgarian Communist Party to the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and outlines ways to solve the country's complex problems.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party is in favor of a rapid transition to a market economy and equal competition between cooperative, state, municipal, joint-stock, and private forms of ownership. However, it is opposed to the opposition's proposed "shock treatment" to "heal" the national economy, because it cannot allow the people to pay this enormous price by being confronted with massive unemployment and a sharp rise in prices. There will not be any easy, painless changes, but the party wants to fairly distribute the burden of the crisis and ease the position of socially weak strata of the population.

Bulgaria has the choice of two paths. One is the path of violence and confrontation. The other is the path of dialogue, stability, national accord, compromise, and partnership. The Bulgarian Socialist Party wants a peaceful transition. It warns of the danger of confrontation that could jeopardize peace in the country.

PRAVDA's Frolov Receives Bulgarian Envoy

PM0904153590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[A. Krushinkiy report: "PRAVDA Cooperates With DUMA"]

[Text] The dynamics of the changes and specifics of the political situation in the USSR and Bulgaria were the main theme of the conversation between I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, and G. Pankov, Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR, at our editorial office 6 April.

During the meeting, I.T. Frolov gave a detailed account of the course of preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress, the discussions within the party and society, economic difficulties, and the principles of the party press' work in the new conditions. Links between the Soviet Union and the CPSU and the countries of Eastern Europe and parties whose ideological positions are close to ours will continue to be developed, but on new bases and without paternalism. I.T. Frolov advocated the deepening of cooperation between PRAVDA and DUMA (we have already reported that RABOTNICHESKO DELO was recently renamed DUMA).

G. Pankov in turn reported on the situation in Bulgaria.

Illegal Soviet Dealers in Prague Reported

PM0604132590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent L. Kornilov: "Eastern Bazaar in Central Prague: About Our Compatriots Who Ostentatiously Bypass the Law"]

[Text] Prague—Next to the "Prague market" tram stop is a stone wall. And if beyond the wall there is indeed a market where the people of Prague buy vegetables, fruit, and flowers, on the street side there is a veritable bazaar. An Eastern bazaar in central Europe, there is nothing else you can call it.

I came here at 1000 hours. The street was overflowing with tradesmen. Dozens, if not hundreds, of sellers had spread out their goods on the ledges of the brick wall. They were selling brandy, caviar, cameras, Soviet perfume and cologne, imported toothpaste, drills, hand drills, sets of knives and spoons, instant coffee, headscarves, nylon bags, house slippers, sheets, tape recorders, clocks, and much else. Compatriots of ours, men and women by no means poorly dressed, were trading.

The goods were brought in tirelessly: The "stores," that is the piles of suitcases, bags, and bales, were on the opposite side of the street, on the bank of the Vltava. They were guarded by groups of black-moustached and black-browed "storemen" who were having a meal right there on the grass, obstructing the approach to the river with paper, empty bottles and cans and remains of food.

On the stone wall were announcements in Russian, Polish, and Vietnamese: "Trading here is strictly forbidden." But it is futile: They do trade. Incidentally, I saw no Poles here but I did see a very great many Vietnamese. At one time there were virtually none, but the bad example is obviously contagious. Incidentally, recently the Czechoslovak press paid no attention to this phenomenon, there were evidently more urgent topics, but now it is writing of the "Vietnamese, Poles, and Russians" behaving outrageously in Prague and other cities... And after all you cannot object: It is all correct, the only incorrect point is the use of the word "Russians," since there are no Russians among the dealers, it would be more correct to write: people from the Transcaucasus. But that does not make it any easier for us citizens of the USSR. A shameful spot falls on our entire country.

And here is what P.K. Kostikov, USSR consul general in Bratislava, says:

"Spontaneous bazaars with 50-100 dealers are forming on the territory of Slovakia. People from the Transcaucasus predominate among them. They behave impertinently, aggressively, and react rudely to comments from the militia. This gives rise to a keenly negative reaction among the Slovak population."

"But what can we do," a militia lieutenant of my acquaintance said to me. "If the dealer does not manage to hide and we arrest him, we must deliver him to the region national committee (rayon soviet—L.K.) and fill out a deposition and so forth. That takes 1 and ½ to two hours. In addition, the person arrested usually has no passport: It is 'at home.' That means you have to go somewhere else for the passport... The whole day will go

like that. And during this time the goods market continues to operate. And it only appears that they are dealing in trifles. There may be a suitcase full of bottles of Soviet and French perfume and when everything has been bought up the stocks are immediately replenished."

In Prague there are several such bazaars today. One at the entrance to the Jiri z Podbrad subway station... Two women sat at different ends of a bench with their goods between them. I observed them: The "trail" led to one and the same apartment on the first floor of the block opposite. Old inhabitants told me that the "sellers" live there all year round, some go, others arrive, it is just like a hotel. Tactful people of Prague! What kind of hotel?

Yet organizationally it is all very simple. There are Czechoslovak citizens who, having grasped the point, have begun to sell personal invitations designed for their "friends" from the USSR to whoever wants them. The price of the service is 500-700 korunas. There are cases of one such "hospitable" person issuing 70-80 invitations. The "friends" arrive and most often do not live with the person who has invited them but elsewhere, sometimes at stations, which for the Czechs and Slovaks is utterly preposterous. They do their business and, having taken invitations for the next consignment of "friends," they leave. In the Soviet Union an official invitation of this kind goes for R300-R500. Some people travel on such an invitation to Czechoslovakia two or three times a year: After all, the invitation abroad is not invalidated when you leave the USSR.

These phony "envoys of the people"—the Armenian, Georgian, and to a lesser extent Azerbaijani people—take with them to Czechoslovakia suitcases of money (with no exaggeration, the customs officers often take several tens of thousands of rubles from some people) and suitcases of goods, which can later be seen at these bazaars. They take gold, silver, and precious stones.

They return home heavily laden with Czechoslovak goods. And this despite the existing ban on the export of many things from there. To purchase them in such quantities they need considerable sums in korunas. They are acquired for rubles. But at what an exchange rate! It has always been thus here: 10 korunas for one ruble. Some time ago the Czechoslovak Government revised this correlation: It is now one to eight. But outside the "Golden Goose" hotel on Saint Wenceslas Square they were giving a ruble for two korunas and outside the chandelier shop 200 meters from the "Goose" R1,000 were being changed for 1,000 korunas... It is clear that for the heroes of these currency operations the ruble is worth nothing, it is simply a piece of paper. Incidentally, does this "exchange rate" not influence the mentality of the Czechoslovak side with respect to our national currency, in whatever lamentable state it may be?!

Considerable sums of money also go into the pockets of our phony tourists through entirely official channels. Here is one of many authorizations for the exchange of currency shown me by L.G. Tolstograyev, chief of the

USSR Embassy consular section. It was issued to citizen G.A. Oganessian by the Yerevan city administration of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity for the sum of 10,000 korunas. Why? After all, you can exchange your rubles for no more than 2,500 korunas. That's very simple: under the stamp "not transferrable" were the handwritten words: "For four people." So one person goes but takes money for four. And this at a time when no money at all is exchanged for tourist groups traveling there. The quota is exhausted, there is no money," the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity has stated. And where could it get such sums if they are being issued to "unorganized tourists" as generously as they are in Yerevan!

The conclusions are obvious. And here is the first. Why is it precisely now, when feelings of hostility toward everything Russian, everything Soviet, are, alas, at large among some circles of the population and are being supported (or fuelled) by some press publications, that we are having Soviet people judged by these sharp dealers, by their shamelessness and importunity? Why do we need the newspaper RUDE PRAVO to publish a photograph showing a mass of boxes, bags, and parcels with three women with tousled hair fussing over them all and a man in a sheepskin coat and white boots standing nearby counting money in a wallet. The caption reads: "Tourists or suppliers?"

IZVESTIYA once published an article entitled "Abroad instead of the 'Berezka'" (No. 331 for 1988). There were "merchants" even then. They played their part in Czechoslovakia's adoption of its notorious customs restrictions. The situation has eased slightly but now it has been aggravated again with new and, it must be admitted, unprecedented force. The editorial office at the time received dozens of letters and comments, many people supported the article, others accused the author of supporting administrative measures. Actually, the former and the latter agreed on one thing—the empty shelves in the stores in the fatherland were to blame for everything. We should struggle against the "merchants" by economic means, creating a sufficiency in our own home. Who would argue? But for all that there are after all specific people who are breaking the laws of our country and of the state where they travel for a time. And to all appearances it is nonetheless administrative measures which would be most appropriate for struggling against them. Which administrative measures?

Let's begin at least by "suppressing" invitations to cross the border. By getting our hands on the "bankers" from the Transcaucasus who, at the expense of tourists, scoop up currency quotas for phony tourists. By placing in the foreign travel passports of offenders a stamp stating the undesirability of these people's further entry to Czechoslovakia (this practice is already used here with regard to foreigners who break the law but for some reason does not affect our citizens). By organizing joint bilateral customs control points.

What can the journalist's imagination not dream up?! But I shall finish with a little scene which is far from imaginary, it has been taken from life.

The border station of Cierna-nad-Tisou. The customs control is proceeding along the Prague-Moscow train. As required, all the compartment doors are opened wide. Except for two. The customs officers knock. Silence. The customs officers knock loudly and announce their presence. Silence. Another knock...

One of the doors opens a fraction. A very attractive man in an Adidas tracksuit looks out and, without saying a word, extends a thick wad of money into the corridor...

In just nine months last year goods worth 16.5 million korunas were confiscated from Soviet tourists and returned for sale to the CSSR trade network. This substantial sum is not solely the result of our violations of Czechoslovak customs rules, esteemed and honest fellow citizens. A "surplus" pair of boots for your son or a warm jacket for your mother will not produce a lot... This sum is mainly the result of the unprecedented scope of speculation and forbidden trade deals by our compatriots who go abroad, ostentatiously bypassing the law.

Civic Forum Leader's Past as Camp Guard Exposed

PM0904132590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA
ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading "Eastern Europe": "Inopportune Expose: Prague"]

[Text] Czechoslovak society, which is again reassessing many aspects of its recent history, is undergoing a cleansing by truth. This reassessment affects not only former leaders but sometimes new people who have recently assumed high rank in the hierarchy of society.

The specific case of Oldrich Hromadka, a figure in the sociopolitical movement "Civic Forum," made public in recent days may serve as an example. The CSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs has handed archive material to CTK which sheds light on the existence of the "Crane" special concentration camp in the city of Jachymov, where people convicted of a "hostile attitude toward socialism" were kept under difficult conditions in the late forties and early fifties.

Oldrich Hromadka, a state security staffer, was chief of concentration camp security. An anonymous statement drawing attention to the fact that O. Hromadka is now a leader of a "Civic Forum" commission was recently received by the republic prosecutor's office.

Hromadka has also made a statement. He said that he feels no guilt at having served in the concentration camp security service. He was unable to rebut specific facts from his past but asserted that he was being slandered in order to discredit him as chairman of a "Civic Forum" commission and because he is carrying out a cleanup among Internal Affairs Ministry staffers.

One can only imagine the kind of campaign that would be launched if someone with his "service" record were found in the ranks of the Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership even at district level, let alone in its upper echelons. But, alas, it is quite a different matter when officials from the new sociopolitical circles are involved.

Changes to Czechoslovak Army Service Viewed

PM0604133990 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Colonel P. Chernenko report:
"Czechoslovakia: Army Outside of Politics?"]

[Text] So the changes in the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, which have given rise to so much discussion, have now acquired the force of law. The 24th session of both chambers of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly adopted two new laws—"On Defense" and "On Civic Service." As had been proposed, the word "People's" has been removed from the name "Czechoslovak People's Army." The period of Army service has been reduced to 18 months, and to 9 months for graduates from higher educational establishments. During their stay in the Army soldiers are entitled to two 15-day furloughs—one in the first half of their service, and the other in the second half. All draftees are guaranteed freedom of speech and worship, including participation in religious services. To this end, clergymen are permitted to visit military garrisons. If soldiers and junior commanders are members of any party, their membership is suspended for the duration of their service.

The law "On Defense" restricts the Armed Forces' role in maintaining law and order and the opportunities for servicemen to be employed on national economic work.

The law "On Civic Service" envisages alternative civilian service for those who—for religious or moral reasons—do not wish to serve in the Army. Czechoslovak citizens aged between 19 and 38 are permitted to do such services at health care institutions, in the environmental protection sphere, in various disaster relief operations, and so forth. And civic service is half as long again as service in the Army.

During their Army service the membership of any party is also suspended for officers and warrant officers. Any political activity on the territory of military garrisons is prohibited. The previous visual propaganda, including banners about the threat posed by imperialism and NATO, is being removed from military camps.

The other day a new text of the oath was adopted. It is considerably shorter than the old version. It says nothing about loyalty to the working class, socialist power, or the Communist Party, and makes no mention of international duty.

West Europe

Reportage on Visit to Moscow by UK's Hurd

Arrives in Moscow

LD0904180590 Moscow TASS in English 1754 GMT
9 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 9 TASS—British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd arrived here for an official visit today at the invitation of the Soviet Government. He was welcomed at Vnukovo airport by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

During the visit, which will last until April 12, Hurd will have talks with Eduard Shevardnadze. The agenda also envisages a meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Anglo-Soviet talks will be held at Moscow's Soviet Foreign Ministry mansion, beginning on Tuesday at 10.30 a.m.

The sides are expected to review a wide range of important issues in European and world politics, including German reunification, disarmament, settlement of regional conflicts and bilateral relations.

Hurd's visit to the Soviet Union will help prepare for the Anglo-Soviet summit that is to be held in the Soviet Union this June.

Shevardnadze, Hurd Hold Talks

LD1004084190 Moscow TASS in English 0825 GMT
10 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—Anglo-Soviet talks began here today. Delegations of the two countries are led by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Douglas Hurd, British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, who arrived in the USSR for an official visit on Monday at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Before the beginning of the talks, Shevardnadze and Hurd had a *tete-a-tete* conversation, which lasted for about 40 minutes. On Hurd's suggestion, the talks started with the discussion of European security issues. The sides are expected to discuss a wide range of topical problems of European and world politics, specifically, the reunification of Germany, disarmament, the settlement of regional conflicts and bilateral relations.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is expected to receive Douglas Hurd this afternoon.

Nuclear, Cultural Pacts Signed

LD1004112190 Moscow TASS in English 1059 GMT
10 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 10 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his British counterpart Douglas Hurd signed two intergovernmental agreements at the end of their first round of talks here today. Hurd arrived in the Soviet Union on Monday for a three-day visit.

One agreement provides for the prompt notification of nuclear accidents and exchanges of information about the use and control of nuclear installations, and the other covers cooperation in culture, education and science.

Gorbachev Receives Hurd

LD1004131990 Moscow TASS in English 1315 GMT
10 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev received British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in his Kremlin office this afternoon.

Hurd is here on a three-day official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Before the meeting, he expressed satisfaction with the results of his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, which he said had covered practically half of the world.

Gorbachev congratulated Hurd on being appointed to the post.

Speaking about the state of Anglo-Soviet relations, the president emphasised that these relations "are progressing in principle, which makes it possible to find new possibilities for discussing various problems."

More on Genscher Statement on White House Talks

PM0604105590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent A. Fedyashin dispatch: "Bonn's Position"]

[Text] Washington, 5 Apr—FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher, who is on a working visit here, has stated that Germany does not intend to make any territorial claims against Poland or any other European country either now or in the future. The minister was speaking to journalists immediately following his talks with U.S. President G. Bush in the White House. Earlier H.-D. Genscher met with U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker.

As M. Fitzwater, the presidential press secretary, stated here, the White House meeting discussed questions of preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, various aspects of the German unification process, and the related talks on the basis of the "two plus four" formula.

H.-D. Genscher stressed: "We want German unification to be a contribution to stability in Europe, and in the light of that we consider it important to examine the question of NATO membership for a united Germany. A neutral Germany would increase instability in Europe."

The West German minister stressed that the FRG advocates the speediest completion of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe. H.-D. Genscher also stated that his government is prepared for discussions with the new GDR Government, which could be formed next week, on the problems of setting up an economic, currency, and social union.

FRG's Kohl Discusses Unification, Soviet Ties

PM0904112190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with Federal Chancellor H. Kohl of the FRG by IZVESTIYA special correspondents Yevgeniy Bovkun and Stanislav Kondrashov: "Helmut Kohl: Only Peace From German Soil. Interview With the FRG Chancellor for IZVESTIYA"; place of interview not specified; first three paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] FRG Chancellor H. Kohl received IZVESTIYA's representatives, special correspondents Yevgeniy Bovkun and Stanislav Kondrashov 2 April. He gave them the text of his answers to questions he had been sent in advance and during an hour-long conversation answered several verbal questions and shared his views of the future of German-Soviet relations and the role of a united Germany in a united Europe.

The next day Helmut Kohl celebrated his 60th birthday and was gratified and amused to receive a bottle of Soviet champagne as a gift.

The text of the interview follows below.

[Correspondents] Mr. Federal Chancellor, as far as we are aware, this is the first interview that you have given to Soviet journalists since the question of German unification assumed its current acuteness and momentum and took center stage in European and world politics. You obviously have considerable grounds for gratification since the unification process is developing under the auspices of the FRG, since the Christian Democratic Union, which is related to your party, won the greatest success in the GDR elections, and, lastly, since this also coincides with your personal jubilee now. So, here is our first question: Toward the end of the century Europeans are experiencing revolutionary events which are also affecting other areas of the world. Does Europe now bear special additional responsibility?

[Kohl] The appearance of Europe is changing. In the Soviet Union and the states of central and southeastern Europe we can now observe a democratic upsurge with far-reaching political and economic reforms.

President Gorbachev himself is constantly talking about a revolution.

The 12 EEC member states are preparing to create an internal European market by the end of 1992 and speed up the formation of economic, currency, and political union.

At the same time the new thinking in Soviet policy has revealed chances and opportunities for us to overcome the split in Europe, eliminate East-West conflict, and make cooperation between all Europeans more intensive. The momentum attained by the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process is a tangible result of this new all-European policy. The attempt to overcome German division is built into historical process in accordance with the logic of general European development.

That is why President Gorbachev and I stressed in our joint statement of 13 June 1989 that Europe, which suffered the most from the two world wars, must set an example in maintaining stable peace, good-neighborliness, and constructive cooperation and that European states themselves can and must live together without fear, in peaceful competition. We have urged all parties to the CSCE to cooperate in building a new Europe which guarantees all Europeans peace and security.

It is important to seek ways to cooperate in order to jointly resolve urgent questions, above all in the sphere of guarantees of human rights and democracy, economic cooperation, and also environmental protection.

This also includes our joint global responsibility for political, economic, and social stability. I think that the way toward greater cooperation in Europe vests us with this responsibility, particularly with regard to the states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

[Correspondents] The new shape of Europe is linked with the reform process in the East and in the last few months with the progressive rapprochement of the two German states, preparing for unification. Could you outline the sequence of stages for reunification and single out the priorities at this time? What is more important for the Germans now—the pace or the quality of unification?

[Kohl] The first free elections in the GDR in the last 58 years on 18 March this year were an important stage on the road to German unity. The GDR Germans' decision represents a mandate for German unity. With their voting papers they voted in favor of living with the Germans in the Federal Republic in one fatherland, with a common constitutional order which defends freedom and human dignity, guarantees human rights, and accomplishes the social tasks of a rule-of-law state. They indicated unequivocally that they want a social market economy—as quickly as possible, moreover.

As soon as a new democratically empowered GDR Government is formed, we will rapidly conclude our talks on setting up currency, economic, and social union. That is the only chance we have of rapidly stabilizing the GDR economically and halting the flood of migrants. Only then will the GDR also be able to continue to fulfill its economic commitments to the Soviet Union.

It goes without saying that our path toward unity will remain within the mainstream of overcoming the general division of Europe. This is specifically manifested in the "two plus four" talks, where the external security aspects of German unity are to be discussed.

We are not exerting any pressure for unification to be speeded up. In President Gorbachev's opinion, rather history itself has begun to work more rapidly. I agree with what the president said.

[Correspondents] The marrying of economic and social structures will obviously be painful not only for the GDR population. Will the FRG have to make certain social and economic sacrifices?

[Kohl] In a world with increasingly close economic links, a structural union is nothing out of the ordinary, it is a normal—even necessary—measure, as illustrated by the FRG economy's 40-year history. Its success has been brought about by the need to constantly accommodate existing structures to greater investments, rationalization, and innovations.

That is why I see no reason why we should regard the economic unification of Germany with any misgivings. Of course, a number of difficult tasks have to be accomplished in the initial stages. I am referring to the modernization of the GDR infrastructure, environmental protection—which has not been paid the requisite attention there for a long time—or the need to build an effective social security system. They could not get by without "initial help" from us, of course. But to speak of sacrifices in this connection would be equivalent to underestimating the effectiveness and dynamism of the social market economy. Our achievements over the last 40 years inspire us with optimism. What we achieved in 1948 (Footnote) (The foundations of the social market economy were effectively laid before the FRG was formed; the relevant legislative acts were mainly adopted in West Germany's Laender in 1948.—Editorial Office) and after may be accomplished in precisely the same way now, especially since the initial conditions are incomparably more favorable now. It is a question of investing in a joint future that holds considerable economic and social opportunities for everyone. This does not only apply to Germans, but also to our neighbors.

[Correspondents] Will Germans' social consciousness change as a result of unification?

[Kohl] During the peaceful demonstrations and the free elections GDR Germans spoke out in favor of our common goal—state unity for Germans in conditions of freedom. Our fellow countrymen in the GDR want

Germans to be free within a united Europe, as we do. They want a social market economy, they want a chance of prosperity, social security, and personal happiness. Germans' general consciousness is founded on their devotion to freedom, democracy, a rule-of-law state, the social market economy, peaceful neighborliness [sosedstvo] in a united Europe, and European security structures which replace military confrontation with trust and cooperation.

[Correspondents] How do you regard Europeans' fears about a united Germany? What, in your opinion, gives rise to them? Won't they affect the nature of relations between a future Germany and its neighbors?

[Kohl] There are historical pressures, of course. Nazi Germany's ruthless genocidal war of annihilation reduced all Europe to the depths of disaster. Who would dare to deny that the personal misfortunes and torments experienced during World War II still haunt many people's memories and continue to influence their notions of the Germans. But I consider the current fears about a united Germany to be unfounded. Facts speak clearly. In the last 45 years the Germans have proved that they advocate peace and freedom. For more than 40 years the FRG has proved itself to be a stable, free, democratic, social rule-of-law state. In its foreign policy it has proved itself to be a predictable and reliable partner. From the very outset it has viewed its national concerns within the broader European framework. It has always resolutely supported European unity and, what is more, advocates consistent steps in the sphere of disarmament and arms control.

A united Germany will be a partner worthy of trust when building a peaceful European order and a common European home. It is because our World War II scars have still not healed that we have abandoned once and for all thinking in terms of force and spheres of influence and narrowminded nationalism. We have learned history's lesson and are guided by it.

We do not want to go it alone, we do not want any special paths, we do not want to change the correlation of forces in Europe to the detriment of any of our partners. We want to help to strengthen the positive trends in international politics today so as to finally eliminate a source of instability in the heart of Europe—German division.

[Correspondents] How can German unification affect the change in European security structures and the role of the military blocs? You and G. Bush's administration submit that a united Germany should join NATO. The Soviet leadership flatly objects to that prospect. In your opinion, can a way out of these disagreements—which are not in your interests or ours—be found?

[Kohl] Our joint aim is to ensure not less but greater security for every individual state in Europe with the help of German unity. We Germans respect the legitimate security interests of all countries, including the Soviet Union. We do not want security for one state at another's expense—that would be the "old thinking."

We want joint security and that is why within the framework of the Helsinki process and the talks on disarmament and arms control we advocate new all-embracing security structures. By way of first possible steps I have proposed setting up a European Center for the Prevention of Conflicts and a Center for the Verification of Arms Control Agreements.

A neutral Germany would conflict with the logic of this concept and the entire process of all-European unity. It is not in the interests of Europeans—and it is not in the Soviet Union's interests—for a united Germany to be left to its own devices from the viewpoint of security policy. The history of our century has shown that no one damages European stability as much as a Germany oscillating between East and West.

That is why I cleave to the opinion shared by our neighbors in East and West that a united Germany should not be neutral but should remain within the Western alliance. I would like to explain here that: in particular, the results of the Vienna conventional arms talks will substantially reduce the alliances' military significance; NATO must adapt its strategy and its military structures to the political changes in Europe and the results of the disarmament process; in accordance with this our alliance must concentrate on its political role; and there will be no movement of troop formations and military equipment onto the territory of the current GDR.

[Correspondents] What would the Federal Government's proposed concept of a political alliance mean for Europe? How far does it take the interests of Eastern Europe into consideration?

[Kohl] In the statement adopted at the Council of Europe sitting which I chaired in Stuttgart in 1983, the heads of the European Community states and governments confirmed their desire to transform the community of their states' relations into a European union.

Now that substantial success has been achieved on the road toward a single internal market and an intergovernmental conference to prepare a European economic and currency union lies ahead, the time has come to reinforce the community's political dimension. That is why, at an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Europe 28 April 1990, I will propose that a second intergovernmental conference be convened—to prepare political union—at the same time as the intergovernmental conference preparing an economic and currency union. It is my profound conviction that it should strengthen the European Parliament, improve the work of European establishments, and ensure closer cooperation in foreign policy and the security sphere. The European community will become more effective as it moves toward political union. The past has shown that this will benefit the interests of all states in Europe.

[Correspondents] During the postwar decades the existence of two German states bore the mark of the four

powers' joint responsibility for all Germany. Can this legal problem be resolved by the conclusion of a peace treaty?

[Kohl] The FRG Government and the GDR Government will hold talks with the governments of the four powers that have special rights and responsibility in respect of Berlin and Germany as a whole. During the "two plus four" talks everyone will strive to bring the union of both German states into line with the external aspects and security aspects. Our aim is to submit the results of these meetings to the participants in the CSCE meeting this fall.

I do not think that a peace treaty in the usual sense 45 years after the war has ended corresponds with the current level of the relations between the two German states and the four powers. The current Germans are friends and partners. This is borne out by the nature of the coordinated procedural approach.

[Correspondents] Won't the regularization of German unity in international law as proposed by Bonn mean the revision of former East-West international agreements?

[Kohl] I am confident that the best way to a united Germany is for the GDR to adhere to our Fundamental Law. This step must be an act of free will on the part of the GDR.

Our constitution guarantees freedom, democracy, and a state system based on the rule of law, and also—which has a direct bearing on your question—guarantees legal security within the country and in international relations. None of our partners in East or West must suffer from German unity. On the contrary, in addition to the prize of political stability in the heart of Europe, there will also be impetus for economic growth. This will ensure the fulfillment of the GDR's treaty commitments, particularly in the sphere of trade and cooperation.

But treaty commitments must also retain their force in the sphere of security. Thus it is my firm political intention that a united Germany will: adhere to its avowed renunciation 35 years ago of possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; observe the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and submit to all the appropriate verification measures; and be prepared for extensive cooperation and verification in the sphere of arms control as soon as the appropriate international agreements are signed.

The treaties concluded between the FRG and the Soviet Union and the states of Central and Eastern Europe will, of course, remain in force. This also applies to the joint statement which President Gorbachev and I signed 13 June 1989.

It is in our own interests not to burden the way to unity with border problems. The German Bundestag proposed 8 March that both freely elected German parliaments and governments issue identical statements—soon after the GDR elections if possible—the essence of which is as

follows: The Polish people must be aware that their right to live within secure borders will not be questioned now or in the future by us Germans or by territorial claims. A future united Germany will regulate this question once and for all in a binding form in international law, by a treaty with the Republic of Poland.

[Correspondents] Will there be a change in the nature of German-Soviet relations, including economic relations, after reunification? How will they develop?

[Kohl] Our relations with the Soviet Union have a promising future. We want to develop them consistently on the basis of the joint statement of 13 June last year in all areas. Our aim is to maintain reliable good-neighborliness in the long term based on the good traditions of our age-old history.

During my conversations with President Gorbachev in early February we concluded that what we have achieved—not only in the economic sphere—must not only be preserved by a united Germany but also receive new impetus. The surge in growth that we expect from German unity and from European integration also reveals favorable prospects for our European partners. If we also overcome the economic division of our continent, we will thus open the doors to more extensive division of labor in the world economy.

Our aim here is to achieve economic partnership not only between a united Germany and the Soviet Union but also throughout the continent. This economic partnership must be organized on a long-term basis and imbued with life. I am thinking about extending the conference on economic cooperation in Europe, broadening the agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community and the Soviet Union, and also the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, revising of bilateral controls on the export of commodities, improvements in communications and transport, and cooperation on questions crucial to mankind, environmental protection, and climatic change.

Economic cooperation also has a political dimension. It traditionally promotes the formation of trust between our states. If we link our states' economic and scientific forces and technical resources, this will not only benefit our peoples but also the whole of Europe.

[Correspondents] Regions (Laender in the FRG and republics in USSR) are playing an increasing role in the process of European unity; however, their interests do not always totally coincide with general state interests. Can European integration promote the resolution of regional problems?

[Kohl] Yes. European unity and the strengthening of the regions are not contradictory, they are interdependent and interconnected. So we Germans with our developed regions and old federal traditions want the kind of Europe in which every person is subject at the same time

to commitments to the place where he lives, in the narrow sense of the word, to his region, to his country, and to Europe as a whole.

[Correspondents] What delights and concerns you personally when you think about the future?

[Kohl] The events of the last few months have confirmed what I have always said: We Germans are one people! I am glad that I can experience this historic turnaround. We are indebted to everyone who has promoted this, including the Soviet Union under the leadership of Gorbachev, who has put the policy of new thinking into effect.

I hope that the German people and the peoples of the Soviet Union will in the future put the shadow of the past behind them once and for all and hold out their hands to one another. It is primarily to people in the Soviet Union that my following words apply: "Only peace is to emanate from German soil in the future!"

[Correspondents] Mr. Federal Chancellor, thank you for this conversation.

French Harbor Mixed Emotions on Germany

90UF0017A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 3

[TASS correspondent S. Batyrev comment for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: "What Is Meant by 'Bonne Chance'"]

[Text] Speaking at a dinner in honor of a visit by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, President Francois Mitterrand, speaking about German unification, used an expression which observers spotted immediately.

"Bonne chance a l'Allemand," the president said, which could be translated as "I wish Germany success." However, this expression chosen by Mitterrand to describe in brief France's attitude toward the process of the rapprochement of the two German states could, as meticulous commentators noted right away, have a double meaning: it expresses simultaneously both sincere joy and at the same time a hint of irritation in connection with the fact that something not all that desirable is happening, which the speaker is not, however, in a position to prevent.

It is precisely such a gamut of feelings, evidently, that Paris is experiencing at this time. The results of the elections in the GDR were the bounds that conclusively confirmed the French leadership in the position to which its recent statements testify. "France is declaring, seemingly, that it has finally recognized that German unification will now proceed at an accelerated pace," the newspaper LA LIBERATION concludes. But commenting on the results of the elections, the same Francois Mitterrand declared the following day: "The process of unification of the two German states yesterday entered a decisive stage. It is part of the logic of history." A similar

appraisal was also made by Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, who declared in an interview with Radio Europe 1: "In principle this problem (German unification—author) is already now behind us."

The evaluation of the situation has been made, but the question arises: what tactics to choose? R. Dumas answers this question as follows: "It is essential now to display concern for European building." While declaring now for all to hear that the unification of Germany is "a great event, which should be received joyfully by its neighbors," President F. Mitterrand simultaneously emphasizes that it is now essential "to speed up" the integration of the European Community.

The logic of Paris' arguments here is as follows: France hopes that Chancellor Kohl, "released" to some extent from "intra-German election preoccupations," which had absorbed his attention entirely and made a pronounced mark on all his actions, will now display a greater aspiration to cooperation "in the European plane," so to speak, that which is continually the chief concern of France.

It is significant that in order to finally dispel the perception that had arisen recently of a certain "cooling" which had emerged in relations between Bonn and Paris, and which had been particularly noticeable, for example, at the height of the argument concerning Poland's western border, France declared here its agreement with Bonn's positions on such a most important issue for Kohl as the method of Germany's unification employing Article 23 of the basic law of the FRG, that is, virtually by way of the Federal Republic's absorption of GDR territory. Such a key was sustained recently in a television interview by R. Dumas, who substantiated such a position once again from the standpoint of the "logic of European integration": otherwise, he explained, the European Community would have to accept the GDR as a new, 13th, member, but this way... "things would proceed far more rapidly, more simply, and by a far straighter path."

Now, when the question of Germany's unification appears to Paris as a matter that has been decided in principle, albeit, perhaps, not entirely in the way that might have been wished here, it is being suggested that all attention be paid to the building of a united Europe. However, this path does not appear all that smooth as yet, and the "German question" is once again in danger of giving notice of its presence here. For example, a most important stage en route to the integration of the European Community in the form in which France sees it—the creation of currency and economic union—does not "tie in" all that well as yet with the plan put forward by Chancellor Kohl without coordination with his community partners for a different currency union—between the FRG and the GDR. France would like to speed up the creation of the first, for which Paris is proposing that the date of the intergovernmental conference of Community countries devoted to this problem and scheduled as yet for the end of this year be brought forward. Bonn's

position, however, Paris' *LA LIBERATION* complains, appears to be as follows: "Yes to European integration, but without haste."

Generally, France is increasingly coming to recognize that the problem of German unification is becoming a key issue for the entire continued progress of European integration.

While welcoming the rapprochement of the two German states, there are concerns here, however, primarily that it may complicate progress toward the main goal—the rapprochement of the 12 states of the European Community.

Deputy Visiting Geneva Appeals for Chernobyl Aid

*LD0604132990 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1130 GMT 6 Apr 90*

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] According to REUTER, Supreme Soviet deputy Yuriy Shcherbak, spoke in Geneva. He is on a visit there now. Shcherbak appealed for international assistance to us in the struggle against the consequences of Chernobyl. It is the deputy's view that four million people still live in regions which to varying degrees pose a danger to health.

Latin America & Caribbean

Central American Presidents' Forum Reported

*PM0604110590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by APN correspondent A. Korzin for IZVESTIYA: "Central America: Complex Path to Conciliation"]

[Excerpts] Managua—[passage omitted] An earthquake—and quite a powerful one—was perhaps the only unpleasant surprise at the seventh meeting of the presidents of the Central American countries held at the Pacific Ocean resort of Montelimar 60 km from Managua. [passage omitted]

The meeting was held a little over a month after the general elections in Nicaragua, which were one of the key elements in a regional settlement. All D. Ortega's Central American colleagues were satisfied with the results of the first truly democratic elections in the entire 169-year history of independent Nicaragua. This helped to create an atmosphere which enabled journalists and observers to call the Montelimar talks the "most peaceful" of all those which have taken place within the framework of the Esquipulas process.

The extensive and quite unspecific agenda for the meeting provided opportunities for considerable "leeway" in the forecasts. But few people, however, expected epoch-making accords from it. Instead the regional press notes that the talks in Montelimar ended the 1,000-day Esquipulas stage, the long path from

confrontation to dialogue and conciliation. The results of the meeting make it possible to hope that this road will not be traveled in the opposite direction.

One of the key paragraphs of the "Montelimar declaration" concerns the problem of the Contras. The presidents stressed the need for their immediate disarmament no later than 25 April—the date the newly elected Nicaraguan president, V. Barrios de Chamorro, assumes office. The declaration notes that weapons should be surrendered by the contras to the group of UN observers in Central America and destroyed by the group on the spot. The presidents appealed to the U.S. Administration to continue to support the demobilization of the "Nicaraguan resistance."

The document provides for the involvement of the rebel forces in peaceful political life as a very important condition for consolidating democracy in the region. It expresses satisfaction at the recently resumed dialogue between the government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and at the agreements achieved in Oslo by representatives of the Guatemala national conciliation commission and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. The Central American presidents resolutely denounce terror and demand the immediate liberation of all people kidnapped by terrorists.

The turn toward peace is also reflected in the document's clauses concerning the model agenda for the next summit meeting. It will be predominantly devoted to an analysis of questions of Central American economic integration and the search for possible solutions to the foreign debt problem.

Upcoming Bush Tour of Latin America Viewed

*PY1004001590 Moscow in Portuguese to Brazil
2200 GMT 6 Apr 90*

[Commentary by Leonid Levchenko]

[Text] It has been announced in Washington that President George Bush will visit some Latin American countries. The White House spokesman reported that the U.S. President will visit Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, and Uruguay. Here is what our commentator Leonid Levchenko has to say about this tour:

[Begin Levchenko recording] As the saying goes, the choice of the itinerary to a large extent determines the success of any trip. [passage indistinct] the future trip of the U.S. President. The countries Bush will visit [words indistinct] their economic and political potential. Moreover, all these countries are experiencing a period of democratic renewal. This includes Chile, where a democratically elected president has come to power after many years of military dictatorship.

Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina still clearly remember other times, when generals occupied presidential palaces and shamelessly disregarded principles of democracy

and human rights. Naturally, Washington was in full agreement with these governments and clearly stated its opposition to any social changes [words indistinct] the right of each country to determine its own path of development. Washington acted against any government that chose to do something different, as it did with Grenada in 1983 [passage indistinct].

Today the situation is different. The armed invasion of Panama caused a political and psychological shock in Latin America. The condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Panama was practically unanimous throughout the continent. Panama's situation was well understood in Latin America. Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez expressed this concept quite clearly. We do not seek confrontation, but Washington should maintain a different type of relationship with Latin American countries.

Latin America, like any world community, has entered a new era where there is no room for confrontation or plans to use force. It is extremely important now for all countries, without exception, to contribute to positive development by practicing serious and responsible policies.

In these circumstances, Latin American countries have unenthusiastically accepted the course followed by the current U.S. Administration. The foreign ministers of the countries belonging to the Group of Eight, at a meeting in Mexico in March, called on the United States to revive its full respect for international law, particularly regarding the sovereignty of other states and the principle of noninterference. The ministers strongly rejected any unilateral action that might put at risk their [words indistinct].

I believe it is unnecessary to say to whom those words were directed. It is said that U.S. President George Bush is planning to make this tour to create a new image of the United States [words indistinct]. U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle visited several countries in the region with the same objective, but failed. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Official on El Salvador Talks

LD0604090890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 5 Apr 90

[TASS diplomatic correspondent report]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Apr (TASS)—A meeting of representatives of the government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of El Salvador, with the participation of UN General Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar, ended last Wednesday in Geneva. The main

purpose of the participants was to agree on the conditions and a location for holding official talks on problems connected with stopping the armed confrontation and establishing peace in this Central American country.

Judging by reports from Geneva, in principle it proved possible to carry out this task. The participants of the meeting approved of the plan proposed by the UN general secretary. It consists of seven points and envisages, in a very short time, ending the military conflict in El Salvador, achieving a political settlement to the internal conflict and holding continuous talks until the agreed objectives are achieved.

A TASS diplomatic correspondent asked Yan Burlyay, deputy head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate of Latin American countries, to comment on this development of events on a political settlement to the situation in El Salvador. "At the moment, of course, it is difficult to give a final assessment to this meeting," the high ranking Soviet diplomat said. "Its real significance will be determined by the degree of conscientiousness and consistency with which the sides pursue the course set out in Geneva."

Nevertheless, according to Yan Burlyay, "in itself, holding a meeting and having the participants admit to the need to solve the existing problems by peaceful political means testifies to important positive changes in the moods of wide public circles in El Salvador."

"This enables one to hope for a successful end to the talks, which will be one more contribution to the cause of finally unblocking the crisis situation in Central America," the diplomat said.

Komplektov Visits Nicaragua for Consultations

LD1004060990 Moscow TASS in English 0558 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] Managua April 10 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. Komplektov arrived here on Monday for political consultations.

He later met President Daniel Ortega to discuss Nicaraguan political developments after the recent general elections and progress on a Central American settlement in the light of the Montelimar regional summit.

The Soviet side reaffirmed its support for the Sandinista leadership's efforts to democratise the country, provide for a normal handover of power to the new government and solve the rebel problem.

The meeting was attended by Sandinista leaders Ortega and Ruiz, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto and Soviet Ambassador to Nicaragua V. Nikolayenko.

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries 9 Apr Supreme Soviet Session

Lukyanov Chairs Session

LD0904171190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 9 April begins carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 9 April at the Kremlin in Moscow.

The session is chaired by Anatoliy Lukyanov. Lukyanov greets the deputies and asks them to register: 408 are present at this joint sitting of the two chambers. Lukyanov says that there has been examination in the chambers of important draft laws in the 11-day period since the last joint sitting. The system of discussing draft laws in commissions and committees is proving fruitful, he says. Five draft laws are to be discussed today and tomorrow at joint sittings. The chambers will meet individually on Wednesday, 11 April, and the committees and commissions will meet on Thursday and Friday, 12 and 13 April. The same schedule will apply next week. The draft law on conditions for working mothers will be examined tomorrow.

At 1507 GMT Lukyanov says that the first issue on today's agenda is the draft law on state youth policy. Because the draft law is in its first reading, the deputies should attempt to finish discussion today. V.I. Mironenko is invited to report on this issue.

At 1508 GMT Mironenko in his 25-minute report notes that the Komsomol initiated the draft law on state youth policy. He recalls the poor attitude toward the country's young people in the past. Now times have changed and young people must be encouraged to take a more active part in society. Many young people are discouraged with society's attitude toward them, and this is reflected in increased crime. Young people need more opportunity to display their potential. A contribution to the draft law on youth was made by a broad cross-section of young people nationwide, says Mironenko. Mironenko goes on to say that Western experience in youth policy can be applied in the USSR. He cites the examples of Spain and Belgium. The draft law on youth policy merits discussion in tandem with other major social measures. The draft law contains five sections. Mironenko outlines the content of the sections. The purpose of the draft law is to produce a coordinated state policy in respect of young people. Mironenko says that the Komsomol wants to develop the country's youth movement, but needs more money. He says that various other measures are required to make the draft law on youth a full-fledged piece of legislation. The draft law is the result of three years of work by a wide range of specialists. The deputies can help by refining the wording of the draft law.

At 1533 GMT Deputy Skvortsov asks about the economic section of the draft law.

At 1534 GMT Mironenko replies that there was a section on measures to improve the economic position of young people. However, it was decided that it was not expedient to include economic measures within the youth law.

At 1536 GMT Lukyanov agrees that all the measures must be passed gradually. He then invites Deputy Tsybukh to the rostrum.

At 1537 GMT Deputy Tsybukh, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs, says that the United Nations and other countries have noted the need to have national legislation on youth affairs. Tsybukh says that more attention is needed for social policy among young people. The purpose of the draft law is to make the state care more for young people. Young people must have state support. Tsybukh lists many spheres where young people require more rights. A structure must be created to coordinate state youth policy, says Tsybukh in conclusion.

At 1546 GMT Deputy Prikhodko comes to the rostrum. She says that it is time to correct the mistakes of the past and to provide more opportunity for young people. There must be more attention given to science, education, morality, and culture. Literature and libraries must be given more assistance. Prikhodko concludes her remarks at 1551 GMT.

Debate on Youth Continues

LD0904181990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1552 GMT on 9 April continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Deputy Likhanov says that former leaders of the state promised reforms in youth policy. Special guarantees are needed constitutionally for certain sections of society, including young people. Likhanov supports the idea of tying youth measures in with other draft laws, in order to produce coordinated policy. Proper state structures are needed to implement state youth policy. The position of orphans and children requires special mention. Special training should be given to professional people working with young people.

At 1558 GMT the announcer says that the broadcast of Supreme Soviet proceedings will continue in 15 minutes following the children's program.

Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1613 GMT on 9 April resumes carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session. Deputy Laptev is in the chair.

Deputy Golyakov says that the law on youth is as important to veterans as it is to young people. Main points of the law can be accepted. The second draft should concern itself more with integrating youth policy

into needs of socialist society as a whole. The law should say something about preparing young people for military service.

At 1618 GMT Deputy Yastrebov speaks on behalf of the committee on ecology. The draft is too declarative in character and is based too much on existing Komsomol structure.

At 1620 GMT Deputy Gritsenko expresses the views of his commission on social protection, labor, and wages. Despite some doubts about the form and content of the draft, it is to be supported. Young people make up a third of society, and due attention must be paid to them. At 1626 GMT Deputy Tsarevskiy says that the law on youth policy is an important part of legislation for a democratic society. Young people need encouragement to be effective workers and useful members of society. Young families must have better housing. Cheap loans will help their situations.

At 1633 GMT Deputy Burbulis, for the committee on the work of soviets, says that there are no youth problems as such, but rather problems of society. Burbulis asks: Is a special law required? The committee feels a proper debate on the crisis in the country should take place. Youth policy must be discussed, whether or not in the form of a law. The draft should be accepted at first reading, despite its declarative character. It needs amendment concerning role of the soviets.

At 1641 GMT Deputy Mokanu says all society and young people themselves have confirmed that a law on youth policy is needed. Problems of youth are only now being admitted to. The law faces up to problems of poor job prospects and housing for the young. The law should stipulate formation of job placement services for young people. The state must ensure that adequate leisure facilities are available for them.

At 1650 GMT Deputy Kalashnikov says he is happy to see the general acceptance of the need for consideration of young people's needs in legislation. Changes in Soviet society mean that the Komsomol's monopoly is outdated. The draft's article on financial support for youth organizations is an important one.

At 1657 GMT Deputy Sharonov says he hopes the law will be seen not as an Eastern present for youth, but as the foundation for future policy. Danger of transplanting Komsomol apparatus into new forms is recognized.

At 1702 GMT Deputy Kahn says legislation for various groups in society has already been considered. The aim is not to spread the misery equally, but to enable the common pie to be enlarged. The tax incentives and enhanced job prospects for youth allowed for in the law are correct. The law will promote enterprise and initiative. The proposed social service should help bring down crime rates.

At 1709 GMT Deputy Sysoyev says the law is necessary in the context of the needs of society as a whole. Young people must be involved in all processes of running the country.

At 1717 GMT Laptev calls for a break.

Deputies Comment, Debate Ends

LD0904183890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1718 GMT on 9 April continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 9 April at the Kremlin in Moscow. Laptev is in the chair. Laptev calls Deputy Veyser to the rostrum. Video shows Laptev and Nishanov on the platform.

At 1719 GMT Veyser noted the criticism at the sitting concerning the fact that young people apparently are requesting special rights. However, a draft law on youth is required and it must channel the energies of young people toward forming a democratic society. The Kazakh deputies support the idea of passing the youth bill at its first reading.

At 1722 GMT Deputy Kim says that special measures to improve the position of young people are needed and are extremely important. However, the draft law places too much emphasis on social conditions at the expense of cultural conditions. Also, the rights of students, young people in the Army etc, are not outlined in the document. Some parts of the document are purely declarative. These faults in the document could be eradicated before the second reading.

At 1725 GMT Lukyanov resumes the chair. Kim continues: The document could be passed at the first reading.

At 1728 GMT Deputy Trubin calls for an end to the discussion and for questions to be set to Mironenko. Lukyanov proposes continuing the discussion a little longer.

At 1729 GMT Deputy Zokirov, who represents the USSR DOSAAF, Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation and Navy, says that he knows much about the position of young people. He calls for better treatment of the economic side of the issue of youth rights. Money should be invested in youth policy.

At 1732 GMT Deputy Katrinich says that youth affairs are at a low ebb. The draft law will hardly solve all the problems. However, it is worth passing the draft law at the first reading.

At 1736 GMT Deputy Zelinskiy says that Odessa students took an active part in discussing the draft law at an early stage. The section of the draft law concerning culture and education requires refinement. The draft law should have economic provisions by the time it is presented at the second reading.

At 1738 GMT Deputy Feskov calls for the youth bill to be supported as a necessary document of general principle. Many of the provisions are good. Some earlier provisions have been edited out of the draft law, and it might be worth reconsidering them. Feskov says that it is better to consider the financing of draft laws, because there may not be enough money to pay for all the laws which are passed. Lukyanov supports this view. Feskov opposes the idea of tax-free privileges for youth facilities, proposing other measures which he describes.

At 1745 GMT Deputy Zhuravlev says that the draft law on youth is required in order to change state policy. Policy must be changed to make the economy more competitive. However, no changes are taking place in education, where window-dressing is still the norm. There must be discipline in the classrooms, and good pupils should be segregated from bad pupils.

At 1748 GMT Lukyanov says that 19 people have spoken on the draft law. Only one person opposed the draft law. Does anyone else want to oppose it? No. Then, a vote can be taken on ending the debate on this issue: 406 deputies are present. On a vote for ending the debate: 372 for, 12 against, and nine abstain.

At 1752 GMT Mironenko is called to the rostrum to answer written questions. He thanks the deputies for their comments. He answers Fishin's question about loans for young families; he says that further consideration of this matter is needed. Answering a question by Plotnikov, he says that social benefits for young families were examined and cites some figures. Mironenko says that a new structure for implementing youth policy is not additional bureaucracy. The new structure could cost approximately 50 million rubles. It is essential to have basic principles for youth policy, says Mironenko.

Youth Bill Approved

LD0904203990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1757 GMT on 9 April continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 9 April at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Mironenko continues answering questions. He says that it is difficult to say whether crime will fall due to the youth law, but the draft law should promote such a process. Answering a question about whether the law should consider the rights of young people in the Armed Forces, Mironenko says that this was not considered expedient. Mironenko says that USSR youth policy will probably still apply in Georgia even if the local Komsomol disbands itself there. However, republican bodies have their own rights. Mironenko says that the Komsomol leaders have clear ideas about the goals they will pursue at the forthcoming Komsomol congress.

At 1805 GMT Mironenko thanks the deputies for their contributions.

At 1806 GMT Lukyanov recalls that some have proposed deciding youth issues in different laws. However, when such a proposal emerged 10 years ago, the experts advised against such an approach. A specific state policy with respect to young people is required.

At 1808 GMT an unidentified deputy makes a proposal for the committee stage.

At 1810 GMT A vote is taken: 360 for, 25 against; the bill is passed on the first reading.

At 1813 GMT Foteyev, the chairman of the glasnost committee, speaks on the importance of glasnost and democratization. He opposed attacks on the president and the Constitution. Respect for the president is important. Proposal on respect for president and Constitution is submitted. In the vote: 286 vote for, 46 vote against, and 53 abstain; the proposal is passed by a majority.

At 1817 GMT the announcer says Deputy Kim spoke on Lithuania; it is not included in this recording.

In the evening session deputies are asked to register once again: 384 are present. Nishanov is in the chair. The discussion begins on local government and local economy.

At 1821 GMT Povovarov speaks for 30 minutes on the bill on local government now being submitted for adoption. Each proposal has been carefully examined and compromises generally found. Commissions found compromise solutions and associations of towns can be formed. Local soviets will be responsible for local questions and local soviets' powers will be defined. Various changes in wording of legislation are described. Local taxation must be in keeping with Soviet laws. Pivovarov says that income tax will for the first time be used locally. Local soviets can use funds in their budgets for roads and other local facilities. The territorial tax is defined. Responsibility of soviets for budgets will be increased. Various amendments of Article 17 and later articles are listed. Pivarov asks deputies to support the draft bill.

At 1851 GMT Nishanov invites questions. Pivovarov reads out written questions and answers them. Answering questions of autonomy, Pivovarov says autonomy has not been breached.

At 1855 GMT there are questions on various points of wording in the draft bill. A deputy asks: Why are we wasting so much time discussing all this trivia. Questions conclude.

At 1910 GMT Nishanov lists speakers. Asks if they want to vote on separate articles of the bill: 404 deputies are present; 341 favor proceeding to a vote on separate articles of the bill. Nishanov then proposes a separate vote on the preamble of the bill: 340 for, 19 against, and 18 abstain.

At 1916 GMT Deputy Obolenskiy proposes his amendment to the wording of the preamble. Vote on proposed amendment: Only 69 vote for it, and it does not pass.

Deputy Pribylova proposes amending the preamble to contain the words preserving health and the environment: 93 vote for the amendment, so it fails.

At 1919 GMT two female deputies make their proposals about the preamble, but no vote is taken on them. Nishanov calls a vote on the first section: 361 for, 11 against, nine abstain. It is passed.

At 1921 GMT Nishanov asks one deputy why he was standing at the microphone and did not vote. Deputy Ayypin proposes an amendment to the first section.

At 1924 GMT Pivovarov says that the proposals of Ayypin are covered in the first section, as it stands. Ayypin's proposal is put to the vote: 116 favor it, but this is not enough.

At 1925 GMT Deputy Katilevskiy proposes an amendment to Article 2, Section 1.

Local Government, Economy Viewed

LD0904211390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1927 GMT on 9 April continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 9 April at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Nishanov calls on Pivovarov to clarify the point. Pivovarov says that about 300 people worked on the draft law, and one must not allow ill-considered oral amendments to be made at this stage. Deputy Standnik from the committee which submitted the draft law says that it will be spoiled by sudden changes made on the spur of the moment. Deputy Shekhovtsov from the same committee supports that view.

At 1932 GMT Deputy Kazamarov makes a different point about the wording of an article. Pivovarov says that the wording is correct and comprehensive. A deputy then complains that he did not get the text of the draft law until the last minute. Pivovarov says that the text was available last Thursday. Deputy Stankevich then proposes adding the words: residential district, in one phrase. Pivovarov says that this is not necessary. Stankevich's proposal receives 76 votes; it is not passed.

At 1937 GMT Nishanov calls a vote on the second section of the draft law, which concerns the economic basis of local self-government: 365 vote for, 11 against, four abstain.

At 1938 GMT Deputy Bocharov makes a point about Article 9, proposing an amendment. He also proposes an amendment to Article 11. Pivovarov explains how the wording in the bill was reached and defends it. Deputy Kalmykov says that such proposals were taken into consideration at the committee stage. Two unidentified deputies support Bocharov's proposed amendments. An unidentified deputy opposes Bocharov's proposals. Deputy Stankevich also opposes Bocharov. Deputy Burbolis then makes a point about administrative divisions.

Deputy Stadnik says that he can see no contradiction in the bill on this point. Bocharov's proposal on Article 9 receives only 29 votes and thus fails.

At 1954 GMT Kalmykov comments on Bocharov's proposal concerning Article 11. Bocharov insists on a vote. Pivovarov can see no problem in the current wording of the article. An amendment based on Kalmykov's remarks is supported by Pivovarov: 339 vote for, 10 against, and 19 abstain. The amendment is passed.

At 1957 GMT Pivovarov comments on a further proposal by Kalmykov concerning Article 10. He calls a legal expert to explain that the current wording about state property and communal property is right. Kalmykov elaborates on his position. Pivovarov says that his commission stands by its original wording of Article 10. Nishanov calls a vote on the amendment: 158 for, 161 against, 47 abstain. The amendment fails.

At 2004 GMT Deputy Fominykh proposes an amendment to Article 13 to remove the words: as prescribed. Deputy Kirillov proposes a different amendment to Article 13, adding a phrase. Pivovarov says that the current wording of the article should remain. Nishanov says that the amendment will not be put to the vote.

At 2008 GMT Deputy Miroshin speaks about territorial taxation, saying that the text of the law is correct. Pivovarov reads out Ryabchenko's amendment for a vote; the amendment is not passed; no figure on the vote is given.

At 2012 GMT a vote on Section 3 is held: 355 for, 15 against, one abstains. Section 3 is passed. Nishanov says for proposed amendments.

At 2013 GMT Deputy Khudaybergenbova makes a proposal concerning transfer of land. Another female deputy supports her view, asking why the wording of her first reading was not maintained. Pivovarov says that the government insisted on the new wording. Deputy Pavlov then explains the government's reasons for changing the wording for the third reading of the draft law. The earlier version of the draft law would cost much more to implement. Pivovarov argues with Pavlov's figures. Pavlov says that Pivovarov's original version would cost more. Deputy Miroshin argues with Pavlov's view about financing local soviets. He disagrees with the idea of centralized financing of local government. Deputy Khmura proposes removing two sentences from Article 17, so that local soviets have some power. Deputy Logunov opposes Pavlov's version and favors Pivovarov's original version. Deputy Kalmykov proposes removing Point 5 of Article 17 which concerns the financial rights of local soviets.

Amendments Discussed, Voted on

LD0904215190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2035 GMT on 9 April continues carrying a

recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 9 April at the Kremlin in Moscow. A vote on the amendments proposed by the deputies is held: 198 deputies vote for an amendment to Article 17; the amendment does not pass.

At 2038 GMT Nishanov proposes a vote for an amendment proposed by Khudaybergenova concerning taxation of land: 160 votes for that amendment, but it fails.

At 2040 GMT an unidentified deputy says that Article 17 currently involves double taxation of citizens. Pivovarov rejects this and proposes that the deputy should make that point when the draft law on taxation is debated. Deputy Travkin rejects Pavlov's views on financing the new law and says that local soviets should retain income tax at their disposal. Deputy Zabrodin says that it is impossible to leave all the income tax collected locally at the disposal of local government. Deputy Veyser then says that the polemics may destroy the work which the committee has invested in the draft law. Nishanov opposes the idea of leaving the vote until tomorrow morning. Deputy (?Filshin) proposes a compromise whereby at least 90 percent of taxes will be left at the disposal of local soviets. Deputy Pivovarov says that this proposal does not exist in writing. The republics will be able to pass such a measure for themselves later. Deputy Stadnik asks for deputies to vote for the committee's version of the draft law. Deputy Khudaybergenova requests a more detailed wording in Point 3; she says that this is essential for rural workers. Nishanov says that there is no need to change the wording of the law. Deputy Smirnov asks for the word: income, to be dropped before the word: tax, in order to take into account the changes in taxation law which will be passed soon, whereby cooperatives will be taxed on profit and not on revenue. Deputy Yablokov makes a point about payment for natural resources. Pivovarov rejects it. Deputy Solovyev supports Khmura's idea of proceeding to the vote for Article 17.

At 2058 GMT Nishanov calls a vote on Point 1 of Article 17: 250 for, 53 against, 46 abstain. The amendment fails, not receiving 50 percent of the votes of the total number of deputies in the Supreme Soviet.

At 2102 GMT an unidentified deputy proposes that this amendment should be examined again at a later date. Another deputy asks that the draft law should be left over until tomorrow, because all the deputies are tired and they're not as alert. Nishanov rejects this view.

At 2107 GMT Deputy Boldyrev says that a simple majority is sufficient for Smirnov's amendment to pass, because no fundamental change is being made to the law.

Voting Continues

LD0904220390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2109 GMT on 9 April continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 9 April at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Nishanov puts the amendment to the vote once again: 351 vote for it, and it passes.

At 2110 GMT Deputy Boldyrev raises a point of order. Deputy Miroshin says that this point of order was discussed at the committee stage. The committee did not accept that view. Deputy Pivovarov says that the wording of this law concords with laws which have already been passed.

At 2116 GMT Boldyrev's proposed amendment is put to the vote: 49 support it, so it fails.

At 2117 GMT Nishanov calls for a vote on Yablokov's proposal. Pivovarov supports the proposed amendment to point 2: 344 vote for, two against, 13 abstain. The amendment is passed.

At 2118 GMT Pivovarov opposes Kalmykov's proposed amendment to point 5: 119 vote for Kalmykov's amendment, which fails.

At 2120 GMT Boldyrev refers to the words: turnover tax, in point 3 of Article 17. Miroshin opposes Boldyrev's position. Boldyrev's amendment is put to the vote: only 63 vote for; it fails.

At 2122 GMT Khmura proposes transferring a phrase from point 2 to point 1: 111 deputies favor this, but it fails. Nishanov says that section three is now finally passed.

At 2124 GMT 360 vote for section four, one against, and four abstain. Section four is passed.

At 2125 GMT Deputy Kirillov proposes that rights for local referendums should be extended. Miroshin asks for Pavlov's proposal in Section three to be voted for: 45 vote for; it fails.

At 2127 GMT Nishanov asks Pivovarov to comment on Kirillov's amendment to section four. Pivovarov opposes it. Kirillov withdraws his amendment.

At 2130 GMT an unidentified deputy makes a proposal: 46 vote for it, and it fails.

At 2131 GMT Deputy Aypin proposes an amendment which was already considered at the committee stage. Further point by Deputy Doga is rejected by Pivovarov and Miroshin. An unidentified deputy proposes an amendment saying that a higher body should not reject a measure passed locally: 28 vote for, it fails.

At 2136 GMT a vote on the entire law is held: 372 for, 2 against, 3 abstain. The law is passed. There is applause.

At 2137 GMT Nishanov asks is there are any proposed amendments on the draft resolution of USSR Supreme Soviet on implementing the new law. An unidentified deputy opposes the idea of making the law effective only from 1 January, 1991. Miroshin says that it is impossible to implement the law at an earlier date. Deputy Gayer asks for a more precise phrasing which includes the word: differentiated. Miroshin opposes the idea.

Stankevich proposes a change in the wording of the instructions to Council of Ministers at various levels. Miroshin says that it is implicit in the Constitution that Councils of Ministers at lower levels heed the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers. Nishanov calls a vote: 360 vote for the resolution, none against, one abstains.

At 2144 GMT Nishanov says that the joint sitting will reconvene tomorrow at 1000, 0600 GMT. He thanks the deputies for their work.

Supreme Soviet Discusses Gorbachev Letter

LD1004065990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0634 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Report by TASS parliamentary correspondent from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Apr—The message to the Supreme Soviet from the USSR president has, to a large extent, determined the agenda for today's plenary sitting of both chambers of the Soviet parliament. The sitting began with discussion of a draft decision on urgent measures on improving the situation of women, on protection of mothers and children, and on strengthening the family. In a message to the Supreme Soviet last week Mikhail Gorbachev underlined the pressing nature of these issues and suggested they should be examined as a priority.

Opening the sitting Supreme Soviet chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov said that on instructions from parliament the government has prepared measures on improving the situation of women, and on protection for mothers and children. Last Thursday the results of this work were examined in the parliamentary legislation committee, where many deputies called for matters not to be limited to a Supreme Soviet decision [postanovleniye] but for an appropriate law to be passed. It is expected that a final decision will be made at today's sitting of parliament.

'Soyuz' Urges Lithuanian Parliament Dissolution

LD0904125890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1225 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Report from the Kremlin by TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 9 April (TASS)—Representatives of the "Soyuz" group of deputies in the Soviet parliament suggested today that the results of the elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet be declared invalid on the grounds that the principle of universal and equal suffrage was violated. For the same reasons, they are proposing that "in view of flagrant violations of the Soviet Constitution, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic be dissolved and new elections be arranged to the supreme organ of power in the republic". They also proposed that presidential rule be imposed on this Soviet republic.

The proposal was submitted today at a joint session of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The proposal

follows a visit to Lithuania by representatives of the "Soyuz" group of deputies, who visited the republic on 4 and 5 April. Their declaration was read out at the joint session by the deputy from Omsk, Kim Yen Un.

The "Soyuz" group, which was formed last autumn, has proclaimed that the preservation of the unity of the USSR within the framework of a reinvigorated federation is one of its principal policy goals.

The representatives of the "Soyuz" group propose acknowledging the "anti-constitutional and separatist character of "Sajudis" and all its organizations and raising the matter of their disbandment, and of bringing criminal charges against individuals guilty of violating the Constitution of the USSR and legislation of the USSR."

"The social and political situation in the republic remains complex and has a clearly expressed tendency to become even worse," the document says. "It is typified by the dismantling of the Soviet socialist system and the attempt to destroy the entire system of existing relations with the USSR, which currently exist by the forced adoption of a number of bills, as well as by the further polarization of the population of the republic and the law and order bodies, including the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, according to political persuasion and national origin".

The statement notes that "the people are frightened by arbitrary rule and the menace of unemployment, which has already become a reality in several rayons of the republic...there can be no talk of a pluralism of views. The Russian-speaking population and many Lithuanians have essentially been deprived of the right to express their opinion".

The statement of the representatives of the "Soyuz" group has been handed to Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to be considered at the Presidential Council and in the government.

Supreme Soviet on Dignity of President

LD0904181490 Moscow TASS in English 1803 GMT
9 Apr 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Excerpt] Moscow April 9 TASS—[passage omitted] The USSR Supreme Soviet approved the first reading of a bill on principles of a national youth policy. It envisages a system of legal and social guarantees for young people and also the establishment of a special department responsible for youth affairs.

Members of the Soyuz deputies' group, who visited Lithuania last week, today made a proposal to dissolve the Lithuanian parliament, call new elections and, simultaneously, declare presidential rule in Lithuania.

The statement said the results of the parliamentary elections in Lithuania should be recognised as invalid because of "the violation of universal equal suffrage."

The statement was submitted to Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov for consideration by the Presidential Council and by the government.

The Supreme Soviet supported a proposal from Vladimir Fotiyev, chairman of the parliamentary Glasnost committee, to prepare a bill "protecting the honour and dignity" of the Soviet president and to consider it at the current session.

Fotiyev said the bill was necessitated by "increasing slanderous fabrications against the Soviet president" in public statements and some periodicals and by "pejorative attacks on the Constitution."

On Tuesday, the parliament will discuss the second reading of a bill on the renewal of the federal treaty and the delimitation of powers between the USSR and constituent republics.

It will also discuss a bill on urgent measures to improve the status of women, to protect mothers and children and to strengthen families.

Supreme Soviet on Self-Government Law

LD0904173290 Moscow TASS in English 1702 GMT
9 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 9—The USSR Supreme Soviet promulgated, at a joint session of its two chambers today, the law on general principles of local self-government and local economic management in the Soviet Union.

The law grants local authorities broad powers to decide questions relating to social and economic developments and environmental protection.

The law lays down new principles for forming the power structure—only those functions that cannot be performed at lower levels shall be delegated to superior bodies. In this way, superior councils of people's deputies will be changed from ruling bodies into coordinators of the activity of inferior councils. Local councils of people's deputies will independently work out, approve and implement budget decisions for respective territories. The basis of local budgets will be formed by a new territorial tax and the previously enforced individual income tax, payment for land and natural resources, a local tax, and a tax on profits of enterprises, which formerly was fully used to form the national or republican budgets.

The law will come into force as soon as it is published, except for provisions relating to local budgets, which will be enforced on January 1, 1991, and some other provisions that will be enacted on July 1, 1990.

As the federal law deals only with general principles of self-government, republics will have to promulgate more detailed regulatory enactments, taking into account local specifics.

Draft Law on Appointing Leaders Submitted

PM0904153290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the rubric "Draft Law Submitted":
"New Procedure for Appointing Leaders"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has drawn up and submitted for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet a draft USSR Law "On Appointing and Dismissing Leaders and Other Officials at Enterprises." Taking into account the experience of economic development accumulated in recent years, the document tackles the question of the exercise of the property owner's right to manage his own enterprise.

Taking into account the diversity of forms of ownership laid down in the Law "On Ownership in the USSR," the government-proposed draft makes provision for a different procedure for each of them—appointment, election, or hire of leaders under contract. It is a question of creating a system for filling leadership posts at enterprises such that, on the one hand, strict observance of the owner's economic interests is ensured, and on the other, leaders are protected against manifestations of group or regional egotism and pressure from various management organs. All this will increase the personal responsibility of leaders for the results of economic activity.

The draft law stipulates for all types of state enterprises (associations) the appointment and dismissal of leaders by the appropriate authorized organs of state administration. The leader of a lease enterprise is elected, or appointed, or hired on contract, and dismissed, by the labor collective. An appropriate procedure for the appointment and dismissal of leaders is also stipulated for enterprises with other forms of ownership.

The article on working conditions and guarantees for an enterprise leader is of fundamental significance. It sets a norm under which the leader's rights, duties, and responsibility and the conditions for his material provision and dismissal from his post are determined by agreement between him and the property owner or his representative.

At the same time it is proposed to make amendments to the Law "On the State Enterprise (Association)," deleting the provision on the appointment of leaders by election; corresponding amendments must also be made to the Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Labor.

The draft law that has been submitted is aimed at accelerating the development of all forms of ownership,

economic initiative, and enterprise, strengthening production and labor discipline, and boosting the efficiency of economic activity.

Parliamentary Commission Views Tax Law Amendments

PM0904153090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[PRAVDA parliamentary correspondent Yu. Ursov report under the rubric "Yesterday at the Session": "Tricky Areas of Tax"]

[Text] A session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Plan, Budget, and Finance Commission was held on Thursday to finalize amendments and additions to the draft law on income tax on citizens on the eve of its second reading at the plenary sitting of the [Supreme Soviet] session. Members of other parliamentary committees and commissions and government representatives were present.

What do the deputies propose that is new? The main thing is probably to increase the level of nontaxable income to 100 rubles. Provision is also made for tax concessions for students, pregnant women, and others, as well as people with three or more dependents.

Of course, the debate was heated. After all, taking into account the amendments and changes proposed earlier, the total sum by which the state budget will be "trimmed" could come to approximately R4 billion. Where could this come from?

There were proposals to increase the rate of tax on very high earnings to 80 percent (as was proposed earlier) instead of 70, as is now planned. However, under pressure from certain deputies who are representatives of the creative intelligentsia, these proposals were rejected.

So it can be assumed that at the plenary hearings the problem of how to make good the losses to the state budget will be one cause of heated debates.

Many deputies insisted that income tax should be computed on a per capita basis. But a different view prevailed: Attractive as this idea appears, it is not possible to implement it given the present state of the information and monitoring base.

Why? The point is that the methodology for computing a per capita tax presupposes that the taxpayer independently fills in a declaration of his income, and that includes nonworking members of the family. The declaration is then submitted to the finance organs. Clearly, in their present state, with the extremely low level of computerization, the finance organs could not cope with this burden.

The revised draft law will be submitted for discussion by the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers.

Resolution on State of Emergency Regime

PM1004103190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On Bringing Into Force USSR Law 'On Legal Regime of State of Emergency'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To bring into force the USSR Law 'On the Legal Regime of State of Emergency' from the moment of its publication.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Moscow, The Kremlin, 3 April 1990.

Political & Social

Law on State of Emergency Provisions Published

PM0904151190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 90 Morning Edition pp 1-2

["USSR Law on the Legal Regime of a State of Emergency"]

[Text] Article 1. A state of emergency is a temporary measure announced in accordance with the USSR Constitution and this law in the interests of safeguarding USSR citizens' security during natural disasters, major accidents or catastrophes, epidemics, outbreaks of epizootic disease, and mass riots.

The aim of declaring a state of emergency is to ensure the speediest normalization of the situation and to restore law and order.

Article 2. A state of emergency on the territory of a union or autonomous republic or in individual areas within a republic is declared by the Supreme Soviet of the relevant union or autonomous republic with notification being given to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR president, and [presumably in the case of an autonomous republic] the Supreme Soviet of the relevant union republic.

In the interests of safeguarding USSR citizens' security the USSR president gives warning of the declaration of a state of emergency in individual areas and, if necessary, introduces it at the request or with the consent of the Supreme Soviet Presidium or supreme organ of state power in the relevant union republic. In the absence of such consent a state of emergency is introduced and the adopted decision is submitted without delay for ratification by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on this issue is adopted by not less than a two-thirds majority of Supreme Soviet members.

A countrywide state of emergency is introduced by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 3. When a state of emergency is declared the reasons behind the adoption of the decision are indicated, along with the period and territorial limits within which it is effective.

The USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR president, or the union or autonomous republic Supreme Soviet which has declared a state of emergency is entitled to lift it before the set period expires.

The USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR president, or the union or autonomous republic Supreme Soviet can extend a state of emergency if the circumstances which were the basis for its declaration have not been eradicated or if no other extension procedure is laid down by law.

A decision to declare, extend, or lift a state of emergency comes into effect from the moment of its adoption unless specifically stipulated to the contrary, and is immediately publicized.

Article 4. Under a state of emergency, dependent on the specific circumstances, organs of state power and administration may take the following measures:

1) to step up the protection of public order and installations providing vital services to the population and the national economy;

2) to temporarily resettle citizens from areas which are dangerous for habitation, such citizens to be provided without fail with fixed or temporary accommodation;

3) to introduce special procedures for the entry and exit of citizens;

4) to forbid certain citizens from leaving certain areas or their own apartments (houses) for a set period; to subject violators of public order who are not residents of a given area to expulsion at their own expense to their permanent place of residence or to beyond the confines of the area in which the state of emergency has been declared;

5) to temporarily confiscate firearms, other weapons, and ammunition from citizens; and training military equipment, explosives, radioactive substances and materials, and powerful chemical agents and toxins from enterprises, institutions, and organizations;

6) to ban meetings, rallies, street processions, demonstrations, and entertainment, sporting, and other mass events;

7) to make changes to the plans of enterprises and organizations with regard to the production and supply of output; to establish special procedures for the work of enterprises, institutions, and organizations; and to decide other questions of their economic activity;

8) to appoint and dismiss leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations; to ban the discharge of workers and employees at their own request, except in cases of discharge for valid reasons;

9) to utilize the resources of enterprises, institutions, and organizations to prevent and eliminate the consequences of emergency situations;

10) to ban strikes;

11) to enlist able-bodied citizens to work at enterprises, institutions, and organizations and also to eliminate the consequences of emergency situations, ensuring safe working conditions;

12) to restrict or ban trade in weapons, powerful chemicals, and toxic substances, as well as alcoholic beverages and substances containing alcohol;

13) to impose a quarantine and carry out other compulsory hygienic and antiepidemic measures;

14) to restrict or ban the use of duplicating equipment, as well as radio and television broadcasting equipment and audio and video recording devices; to confiscate sound amplification devices; to institute monitoring of the mass media;

15) to impose special rules for the use of communications;

16) to restrict the movement of means of transport and to search them;

17) to impose a curfew;

18) to suspend the activity of political parties, social organizations, mass movements, and independent associations of citizens that are hampering the normalization of the situation;

19) to ban the setting up and activity of armed formations of citizens not stipulated in USSR legislation;

20) to check documents at the sites of mass gatherings of citizens, and if necessary, where there is information to the effect that citizens are in possession of weapons, to carry out a personal search and a search of possessions and means of transport.

Article 5. The highest organs of state power and administration of the USSR or the relevant union or autonomous republic are entitled to revoke any decision by lower-level organs operating in localities where a state of emergency has been declared.

Special temporary organs may be set up by the USSR Council of Ministers, the Councils of Ministers of union and autonomous republics, and kray and oblast soviets of people's deputies or their executive committees to coordinate operations to prevent and eliminate the consequences of emergency situations.

Article 6. For the period of the state of emergency leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations are entitled if necessary to transfer workers and employees, without their consent, to work not stipulated in the labor contract.

The principle of appointment of leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations by election does not apply during this period.

Article 7. During the curfew citizens are forbidden to be in the streets or other public places without specially issued passes and identity documents, or to be out of their residence without identity documents.

Persons infringing the rules laid down in the first part of the present article are detained by the militia or military patrols until the end of the curfew, or in the case of people who do not have their documents on them, until their identity has been established, but for not more than 72 hours; detainees may be subjected to a personal search, and articles in their possession may also be searched.

Article 8. The violation of any requirements laid down in accordance with Points 3, 4, 6, 10, and 12-16 of Article 4 and of the requirements stipulated in the first part of Article 7 of the present law entails an administrative penalty in the form of a fine of up to R1,000 or detention for up to 15 days, unless the said violation entails criminal liability under existing legislation.

Article 9. The dissemination of provocative rumors, actions provoking the disruption of law and order or kindling national discord, active obstruction of citizens or officials in the exercise of their legitimate rights and duties, and also malicious disobeying of the legitimate instructions or demands of an employee of the internal affairs organs, serviceman, volunteer people's militiaman, or other persons carrying out their official duties or their public duty to safeguard public order, or any other actions disrupting public order and the tranquillity of citizens, or violation of the rules of administrative oversight, if committed in localities where a state of emergency has been declared, entail the imposition of a fine of up to R1,000 or administrative detention for up to 30 days.

Depositions on the aforementioned offenses are made by authorized personnel of internal affairs organs or of the local commandant's office.

Cases of violations stipulated in Articles 8 and 9 of the present law are examined within 72 hours by a people's judge sitting alone, or by the chief of the internal affairs organ or his deputy, or by the local commandant.

Article 10. Leading a banned strike in state of emergency conditions or preventing an enterprise, institution, or organization from operating entails criminal liability and is punishable by a fine of up to R10,000, or up to two years' correctional labor, or up to three years' imprisonment.

Article 11. In exceptional cases, if the USSR Supreme Soviet or USSR president so decides, troop units of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR KGB can be used alongside USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal

Troops to eliminate the aftermath of emergency situations, protect public order, and ensure citizens' safety. These units operate in accordance with military regulations and USSR legislation on the duties and rights of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops.

Article 12. On the instructions of the USSR Supreme Soviet or USSR president, the USSR minister of internal affairs, the USSR defense minister, or the USSR KGB chairman can set up a joint operational headquarters and appoint a local (rayon) commandant to coordinate the actions and leadership of military units that are being used to eliminate the aftermath of emergency situations and also to organize interaction with internal affairs and state security organs.

The commandant issues orders regulating questions connected with maintaining the state of emergency regime within the framework of the present law.

Article 13. When declaring a state of emergency, the USSR defense minister, in accordance with a USSR Council of Ministers decision, can draft in for a period of up to two months specialist reservists who are required to eliminate the aftermath of natural disasters, major accidents or catastrophes, epidemics, or epizootic diseases.

Article 14. The USSR Supreme Court is granted the right in state of emergency conditions to change the territorial jurisdiction of civil and criminal cases prescribed by law.

Article 15. Citizens who have suffered in some way in emergency situations or as a result of work to prevent or eliminate the aftermath of emergencies, will be given accommodation by state organs or by enterprises, institutions, or organizations and will be given compensation for any material damage and assistance to find work or any other requisite help.

The terms of and procedure for providing accommodation and giving compensation and other requisite assistance are laid down by the USSR Council of Ministers and union republics' councils of ministers.

Article 16. In cases where the organs of state power and government are not functioning properly in places where a state of emergency has been declared, the USSR president can introduce temporary presidential rule while observing the union republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In such cases the authority of the relevant organs of state power and government is suspended and their functions are vested in an organ created by the USSR president or an official appointed by him, who are entitled:

to employ the measures stipulated by Article 4 of the present law;

to suspend the authority of local soviets and temporarily carry out their functions;

to submit proposals on question of state, economic, and sociocultural building to the supreme organs of state power and government of the USSR and of the relevant union or autonomous republic;

to take jurisdiction over any enterprises, institutions, and organizations in the relevant area, in line with the procedure laid down by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Article 17. The USSR Foreign Ministry immediately informs the UN secretary general of the declaration, extension, or lifting of a state of emergency.

USSR President M. Gorbachev.

The Kremlin, Moscow, 3 April 1990.

Gorbachev Calls Perestroika 'Second Revolution'

LD1004083390 Moscow TASS in English 0823 GMT
10 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—Soviet President and General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev today met delegates to the Young Communist League (Komsomol) 21st Congress which opens here on Wednesday.

Representatives of more than 30 million members of the Young Communist League will discuss further ways of perestroika in the Soviet Union and prospects for the youth movement.

Addressing the delegates, Gorbachev described the current situation in the Soviet Union as a turning point. This century's second revolution is now virtually unfolding in this country, he said.

Under these conditions it is essential for all perestroika-oriented forces of society to unite, and the Soviet Communist Party is suggesting an extensive platform for such unity, Gorbachev said.

Speaking of relations between the Communist Party and the Young Communist League, Gorbachev voiced confidence that the Komsomol would continue to march side by side and together with the party.

Presidential Council Views Lithuanian Action

LD0904172490 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1700 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 9 Apr (TASS)—There was a sitting of the Presidential Council today under the chairmanship of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev at which the situation on the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and around this republic was considered. It was noted that the reply from the republic's Supreme Soviet to the appeal from the USSR president is composed in an unconstructive spirit, does not open real ways to resolve the problem, and in essence leads matters to a dead end. The current leadership of Lithuania, by its unconstitutional actions and the escalation of unlawful measures is

blocking the possibility of getting out of the crisis and is intensifying the situation in the republic, for which it bears full responsibility.

The meeting of the Presidential Council, guided by the mandate of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, reached the conclusion on the need for the adoption of further measures of an economic, political, and other nature aimed at defending the USSR Constitution and the interests of citizens living on the territory of the republic, and the country as whole.

Presidential Council Members Interviewed

PM0904133590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Presidential Council members V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs; A.N. Yakovlev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary; and V.A. Yarin, worker, by unnamed TASS correspondent: "Presidential Council Members Speak"; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Members of the newly formed Presidential Council are the center of public attention. Well-known themselves, they are today attracting particular interest from millions of people in our country and abroad. An interview for IZVESTIYA conducted by a TASS correspondent acquaints the readers with three of the president's advisers.

Persuasion Not Guesswork

[TASS] How do you see the activity of the Presidential Council in the immediate future?

[Bakatin] We must take a look at its present activity for starters. The Presidential Council is a council. A consultative body which helps the president choose the optimum decision. But the president himself chooses and makes the decision.

Our job is, first, to be equal to this task. Second, not to try to outguess the president but to be able to be persuasive. We must certainly be mentally prepared for the fact that not all of the president's decisions will be submitted to the council first.

[TASS] What opportunities do you have owing to your appointment as member of the Presidential Council which you did not have previously as USSR minister of internal affairs?

[Bakatin] As for my involvement in the council, it does not give me any new additional opportunities as a minister. But as a man it gives me access to a definite amount of very diverse presidential information. But the main thing is that it gives me tremendous additional duties which take time—and there is not, of course, any more time in the day.

[TASS] When the new form of rule was introduced, a great deal was said about the need for firm presidential power. How great an impact will it have, in your view, on the effectiveness of the fight against crime—an acute problem facing our society?

[Bakatin] I am unequivocally in favor of the institution of the presidency as the most effective form of combining legislative and executive power. The need for this was predetermined by the menacing increase in symptoms of a crisis of power and ungovernability. Far more complex decisions are of course required than the mere election of a president. But I have been particularly alarmed since the discussion of the problem of presidential rule began—and am still alarmed—by the fact that the advocates of this form of government used the following idea as an argument: A strong president is needed to firmly restore order.

That is a very simplistic and erroneous approach. However strong a president is, there is one thing he cannot do—allow himself to violate the laws. Nor must he allow others—whoever they may be—to violate the laws. Can the president with his powers today guarantee this? That would be a very simple solution to a complex problem.

We need to make strong progress in at least three areas as a minimum: 1. We must have an effective law in line with society's requirements. 2. We must have strong law enforcement bodies. 3. We must have a certain minimum legal culture in society.

I think that this clear path of resolute radicalization in all areas—ranging from the economy to politics—on which the president embarked at a stroke will enable him to win extensive support and implement additional real steps to step up the activity of the entire law enforcement system. Without doubt, this will ultimately increase the effectiveness of the fight against crime.

Increasing Responsibility

[TASS] At the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, you, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, said that the "introduction of the presidency is a fundamental transition from collective indeterminateness [razmytost] to personal responsibility." However, some of the public sees the institution of the Presidential Council as the continuation of the traditions of collegiality and this organ itself as the latest "collective consciousness." In your view, how far is this interpretation of the creation of the Presidential Council justified?

[Yakovlev] It is justified if we do not confuse the concepts of "collective consciousness" and responsibility. "Two heads are better than one"—this has, after all, been said long before us.

The USSR Presidential Council is indeed as it were a collective consciousness attached to the USSR president. It is not, of course, unique and does not hold the monopoly on this—there are other bodies.

But the aim of setting up the Presidential Council is for it to act as a consultative body under the country's new institution of power, help shape and implement the president's policy as part and parcel of the Soviet state's overall policy, fulfill the president's individual instructions, and conduct regular analysis of the situation in the country and individual acute or highly complex political situations and hitches which may crop up at home or abroad.

Every head of state has something of the sort. The name, specific functions, and composition may vary, but the essence remains the same.

At any rate the president has the right to choose, the right to decide. The council can and must analyze or elaborate proposals, submit recommendations, and raise questions on its own initiative—and generally tackle everything that a consultative body does tackle.

But only the president can make decisions and give orders.

So, the transition in one branch of power from collegial decisionmaking to individual decisionmaking involves an increase in responsibility both for the person making the decisions and for the authority, the institution of the presidency as a whole. At the same time one can hope that the creation of a collegial consultative body, a "collective consciousness," will enable any decision to be better prepared and discussed comprehensively prior to its adoption.

At First Hand

[TASS] How did you react to your appointment to the Presidential Council?

[Yarin] Quite calmly. To be frank, I expected the president to take this step. I am not naturally referring to myself personally but to a working person in general. I do not regard the fact that it turned out to be me as a personal victory. It is a victory for my views.

Let me add that the inclusion in the council—in addition to professional politicians—of a peasant, a worker, esteemed writers, and a well-known economist is convincing evidence that the presidency will act on behalf of and for the people.

[TASS] Do you feel quite prepared for this role?

[Yarin] My work in the USSR Supreme Soviet has given me a very great deal of help. I have developed an ability not only to grasp questions of, let us suppose, state planning or the budget, but also to help distinguish the quite ignoble aims behind what are sometimes quite good appeals. I have done a great deal to educate myself, I have dug up a pile of legal, political, and other literature which has given me the knowledge I require as a parliamentarian. I think that this will also help me within the Presidential Council.

[TASS] How do you see your personal task in this lofty body?

[Yarin] What is now needed is a firm stance in implementing the ideas and reforms of the leader of perestroika—Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. If I can be of use to the president's "team"—and I share his views—if we succeed in taking a substantial step forward, that will mean I am fulfilling my task.

But I am also hoping to be an active intermediary between the Presidential Council and my voters—workers and members of their families. I intend to supply firsthand information about the life, concerns, and problems of the working class.

[TASS] Do you have specific ideas for proposals to the president?

[Yarin] The president has now instructed several members of the council, myself included, to prepare a package of proposals on ways to curb the increase in crime. I am concentrating on this specific job.

Presidential, Federation Councils To Meet 14 Apr
LD1004094590 Moscow TASS in English 0926 GMT 10 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—The Soviet Presidential Council and Federation Council will meet next Saturday [14 April] to discuss the government's proposals for expediting economic reform, President Mikhail Gorbachev revealed today.

Speaking here to delegates of the forthcoming congress of the Young Communist League, he said the joint meeting should take responsible, difficult but essential decisions requiring national accord.

The president and the Presidential Council, Gorbachev said, intend to adopt an early package of measures to give fresh impulse to economic transformations. It is essential first of all, Gorbachev said, to ensure the effective functioning of new principles for economic management in keeping with fundamental laws passed by the Supreme Soviet.

The basic steps initially planned for 1992 and 1993 should be taken instead this year and early next year, the president said.

New Opposition Parties Fail To Form Coalition
LD0904173590 Moscow TASS in English 1708 GMT 9 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Kirill Dibrova]

[Text] Moscow April 9 TASS—Differing platforms and views of the current situation in the country prevented the leaders of 17 new Soviet parties and movements from forming a coalition at a meeting here today.

The meeting was held at the Soviet Peace Committee at the initiative of the Central Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party.

The March Congress of USSR People's Deputies amended some articles of the Soviet Constitution and paved the way to a multi-party system in the country.

Today's meeting was attended by representatives of the Russian Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, the Alliance of Constitutional Democrats, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Social Democratic Association, the Greens Party, the Soviet Party, the Party of Urban and Rural Masters, and many other political organisations, representing all trends in the country's political life.

The attitude of the parties to the Communist Party and the communist ideology proved to be the stumbling block to a coalition. Some of the parties, such as the Democratic Party, reject anything connected with Marxism. Some, like the Soviet Party, believe that the theory contains some rational elements. Others, like the workers' wing of the Party of Urban and Rural Masters, stick to communist positions.

The opposition political organisations also disagreed about a strategy for Soviet economic development, the political structure of society and nationalities issues. They were also not ready to seek compromise solutions and to renounce their political ambitions for the sake of the common goals. Members of the new organisations went no further than mutual reproaches and accusations.

In addition, the parties have not solved their internal problems. Some of them, such as the Alliance of Constitutional Democrats, include as many as five or six factions.

Burlatskiy Advocates 'Strong' Presidency

90UN1120A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 10, 7 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Fedor Burlatskiy: "Security and Bold Reforms"]

[Text] Next week the USSR Congress of People's Deputies will discuss the question of establishing the institution of presidential government and electing a president. It would be no exaggeration to state that we find ourselves at a turning point in perestroika and, possibly, in our entire history. Either we set out along the path of democratization in resolving the pressing tasks of the people's life, or the job of reconstructing our society will tumble down into conservatism or anarchy. The person who initiates reforms, as has many times been stated, should know that they can end in revolution. Or in retreat, I might add.

There is nothing strange in the fact itself of introducing presidential government. Only very incompetent or not very conscientious people can associate such government with restrictions on democracy. This principle was

incorporated into the U.S. Constitution 200 years ago and at that time marked the peak of democracy based on separation of powers and reciprocal checks. Today presidencies exist in dozens of countries—in France and Italy, in the FRG and Austria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.... In contrast to what opponents assert, strong presidential authority is formed precisely on the basis of nation-wide elections; weak presidential authority—on elections by the parliament. Therefore, those who fear a strong presidency should exert every effort to promote its subordination to the parliament. Incidentally, this concept was expressed by Czechoslovak President V. Havel during a conversation with us in the Czechoslovak Embassy several days ago.

As far as I am concerned, I arrived at my position a long time ago. The idea of a presidency and separation of powers was declared back in 1964 when the abortive Khrushchev constitution was being drafted. On the eve of the 10th party conference, a simple outline was presented in our newspaper taken from the experience of contemporary civilizations: a strong parliament elected nation-wide, a strong president elected nation-wide, an independent judicial authority, including a constitutional court, and the Declaration of Human Rights. Only nostalgia for our first constitutions prevented us from making the wise decision at that time, although it was evident that a bicameral parliament with the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet as speaker could not become a completely functional institution. This model was conceived as a counterbalance to the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial power, and as a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Can such a model be adapted to today's conditions?

But why is it right now that the need for institution of the presidency has become apparent? As it is popularly said—the peasant does not make the sign of the cross until the thunder comes crashing out. Well, here we are—the thunder has rung out. It has rung out in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic, and Moldavia, and may well ring out in at least 20 other hot spots in the country. A wave of conflict is surging toward our homes. During the latest rallies even in Moscow and Leningrad, people were afraid to go out onto the streets; men watched over their daughters, women over their sons, the young over the old, and the old over the young. The reasons? In addition to social and historical ones, there is a political reason as well—a sharp deterioration of executive authority. People are murdered and the murderers are not brought to justice. There are riots and disturbances by revolutionary gangs and nationalist elements—no one touches them. In a number of regions, hundreds of thousands of people are expelled from their native parts and nothing happens—the instigators get away with everything, and even representatives of the authority find themselves among them. Where are we going?

The problem of security, on a personal basis and overall across the country—this is what has demanded that we revive our shattered executive authority at this precise

time. Then we recalled that this is the normal (and not extraordinary!) operation in a number of countries. We remembered about the presidency.

Of course, security is not the only reason for establishing such authority, nor is it the main one. The main reason it is necessary at precisely this moment is—bold reforms. The policy of perestroika has recently been justly criticized for its half-heartedness, for its indecisiveness in the struggle against bureaucracy and conservative tendencies. Yes, realistic plans do exist for effective solutions to surmounting the growing shortage of food and essential goods. Yes, realistic plans do exist for effecting transition to a mixed economy. But why is it not done? There is no unity of will, no linchpin of authority which might take upon itself the entirety of responsibility for reforms, without becoming sidetracked, and accomplish them steadfastly in deed.

Without such a linchpin, neither the laws on land nor the laws on ownership will be effective. Nor will the law on leasing. They will lie on a shelf like unreleased films. This is the reality of things which cannot be escaped.

All of this is so. But, as even the ancients said, there are not purely positive and purely negative institutions in politics. Each time you must choose what is preferable and absorb the possible negative consequences. We cannot help but be disturbed by the matter of guarantees to the effect that the presidency is not used, even in the distant future, to evolve into authoritarian rule. The heritage of the Gulag still beats all too strongly in our souls for us to forget about this danger. We must have the guarantee of genuine popular sovereignty. We need a strong parliament.

What are they—these guarantees?

The first: repeal of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and establishment of the principle of a multiparty system. This is the main guarantee. For not only our experience, but that of other countries, too, shows that the main source of authoritarianism and the personality cult lies in the one-party system. This automatically reproduces a pyramidal structure with a great leader or *fuehrer* at its apex. Churchill accurately defined the Stalinist party system—it is a bulldog fight under a rug. Secret, ferocious, unlawful. We see only the result. Someone is raised up—Stalin, Malenkov, or Khrushchev—and the feathers fly from someone else. There are no elections, no responsibility even to the party, not to mention the people. Of course, an efficient multiparty system will not be fashioned here right away—for the time being ethnic passions prevail over social interests. It took more than a decade for this to occur in the West. But we must begin this today, right away. We may not get the same chance tomorrow.

The second guarantee: ability to recall the president by the parliament itself (even when the president is elected by all the people), and introduction of the principle of the USSR Supreme Soviet conducting a vote of confidence in the government.

The third: periodic accounting on the part of the president and government, and providing responses to the queries of members of the Presidential Council before the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The fourth: periodic (though perhaps as infrequently as once per month) presidential press conferences.

Other mechanisms for promoting a balance of power may also be considered. Many of these will appear in practice since presidential government is not a panacea for our problems, but only one—albeit extremely important—step on the path of democratization and *perestroika*.

Finally—how are we to elect the president? It is felt that at our current stage, taking into account the need for guarantees of strong parliamentary authority, it will be better to elect him not by universal popular vote, but in the USSR Soviet of People's Deputies, preserving a direct dependence of the president on legislative organs. Over the course of the next four years, consolidation of the parliament and the new USSR Constitution will enable transition to a stronger presidential authority, elected by all the people of the country. Then the president will be able to become, as it is in other countries, the symbol of national unity and the universal popular will, the guarantee of security for our citizens and prosperity for the country.

Law Protecting Presidential Honor Suggested

PM0504095790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "Beyond Bounds of Norms and Decency; a Few Words About Presidential Honor"]

[Text] On 3 April A. Denisov, chairman of the Commission on Questions of Deputies' Ethics, spoke on Leningrad television. Leningraders and Muscovites could hear him. But the subject of his talk was by no means on a local scale and, it seems to me, deserves wide attention.

A. Denisov told television viewers about a sitting of the commission the reason for which was a recent statement on Leningrad television by USSR People's Deputy N. Ivanov. Demanding yet again an objective, unbiased investigation of his and T. Gdlyan's "case," Nikolay Veniaminovich read out serious charges of a personal nature against our president. It is true that he noted that they have no proof and moreover that neither he, N. Ivanov, nor T. Gdlyan want to compromise M.S. Gorbachev without grounds—this, they said, is being done by "interested parties" on behalf of the investigators.

I shall not venture to judge N. Ivanov's true intentions in the minutes of air time allocated to him. The commission on questions of deputies' ethics deemed his statements addressed to the President to be tactless and offensive. I fear I may be wrong, but it seems to me this

is the first instance of a decision of this commission receiving wide publicity. There is a serious reason for this.

I know that "shrewd" observers will be found who will say: Well, they are discrediting honest investigators again! Without being a convinced opponent or competent supporter I want to say that in any civilized society there are norms of political conduct compulsory for everyone, be he an investigator, a minister, or a parliamentary deputy.... One of these norms is to respect the president who, like the state coat of arms and flag, is a symbol of the country. Of course, it is not a case of protecting the president from criticism—in that respect above all our parliamentarians, and they are not alone, have been highly successful in the past year. It is possible and necessary, if there is cause to do so, to criticize presidential policy but nowhere in the civilized world is anyone allowed to cast a shadow on the president by confiding their own "conjectures" and "impressions." I repeat: Nowhere is this ever possible. Alas, here, too, we are the first....

Great and small auditoriums today are filled to the limits with criticism against the state's leading men. As a candidate people's deputy, I myself recently witnessed how for many contenders for a seat the right (and often the sole) argument in the election struggle consisted of scathing accusations against the representatives of power. The long years of public muteness seem to have resulted for us in a new anomaly: Without bothering with proof we are subjecting to crushing abuse those whose posts and office were only yesterday publicly honored. Well, we cannot do anything without taking it to extremes.

As for presidential honor, in addition to the president himself, society should also be concerned for it. That is how it is done throughout the world. In the United States, for instance, insulting the president is equated with insulting the state flag and is punishable by law. Perhaps we, too, should think about how to preserve through legislation the honor and dignity of the president alongside other state symbols. The first occasion to do this has already arisen.

People will say: But what about glasnost? People will say: But what about democracy?

There should be no limits to glasnost and democracy. But there should be limits to decency. Political and human decency which, of course, are indivisible.

Kryuchkov on KGB Role in Rule-of-Law State

PM0904082990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 8

[TASS interview for PRAVDA with V.A. Kryuchkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR KGB: "Law as the Main Guideline"]

[Text] Question: In the conditions of the one-party system in Soviet society the state security organs were an instrument of the party. In this context the following question arises: What place will the KGB occupy in conditions of a multiparty system, Vladimir Aleksandrovich?

Answer: I believe that the first part of this question distorts the actual meaning of relations between the CPSU and the KGB. The point is that these relations have always been based on the same principles and were of the same nature as the relations of any other organ of state management of the USSR with the CPSU and its leading organs.

At the moment these relations are undergoing specific changes in connection with the implementation of the course toward the restoration of the full power of the soviets and the restructuring of the activities of the CPSU itself. The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress states that the party is renouncing all legal and political privileges, is ready for political dialogue and cooperation with all who favor the renewal of socialist society, and does not rule out the possibility of the creation of new sociopolitical associations of citizens, including parties.

In the process of the creation of a genuine rule-of-law state the legal bases of the activity of KGB organs are also being strengthened. For instance, the draft law on the USSR KGB, which is currently being examined in the USSR Supreme Soviet, makes provision for oversight of the activities of the KGB by the supreme organs of state power and management—the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the country's president and head of government, and at local level, the corresponding representative organs of power within the confines defined by legal norms.

It is to be hoped that the Law on the USSR KGB will be adopted before too long. Therefore, the principles enshrined in this law will be operating in conditions of an incipient multiparty system in our country.

I think it is important to note that the USSR KGB conducts its activities in the interests of foreign and domestic policy and sees its main task in providing all-around assistance to the supreme organs of power of the Soviet state in the achievement of the general political goals.

KGB staffers have always been and remain convinced supporters of the socialist path and favor profound renewal of the CPSU and the restoration and enhancement of its prestige.

As for staffers' membership of the party and the functioning of the party's structures in a multiparty system, these questions will have to be resolved by the staffers themselves on the one hand and regulated by the legislature on the other hand. World experience indicates that

no matter to what party a staffer of the security organs belongs, he is guided and confined in his activities by laws.

Question: It is no secret that the bulk of KGB organ staffers are communists. How will cadre policy be implemented in the event of the emergence of other political parties in the country? Do you regard it as necessary to place the activity of KGB organs in these conditions beyond any kind of control?

Answer: The ruling party in any country, and the Soviet Union is not likely to be an exception, conducts its own cadre policy. The forms which this work takes vary, but their essence everywhere lies in the selection and placement in key posts of the state apparatus of people who share the views and ideas of this party and are capable of implementing both its political line and specific action programs. Naturally, all this must take place within the confines of the law and the viewpoint of a specific party organ need not necessarily be accepted.

The CPSU is politically accountable to the people, who have given it their vote of confidence in elections to soviets at all levels from local to union level. Without shirking responsibility for the level of security of the state and its citizens, the observance of the constitution, and many other key questions the party cannot sidestep its responsibility for the selection and placement of people in the most complex sectors of state activity, including those connected with safeguarding the security of the state and society.

And so, in conditions of a multiparty system the CPSU cannot neglect the selection and placement of cadres. No party can be deprived of this right. No one would question this. All world experience backs up this view.

In conditions of broadening democracy the forms and methods of the implementation of cadre policy are changing. Renouncing the direct formal nomenklatura-based approach, the CPSU is going over to indirect influence on the cadres. The forms differ and include cadre education and training and nomination to various posts. The party will implement its line via communists working in state organs and social organizations.

As for oversight of KGB organs in the state, financial, prosecutor's office, party, or any other sphere, it not only does not become redundant but, on the contrary, is intensified in conditions of the establishment of a rule-of-law state. And we are well aware of this.

Of late representatives of KGB organs at the center and at local level are joining committees to combat crime and, consequently, in this sphere of their activity they come under the supervision of the corresponding soviets of people's deputies. That is just one example. The laws on state security and on the USSR KGB will be a reliable basis for oversight on the part of government organs and soviets.

There is more glasnost and openness, and ties between the chekists and the working people and all components of our society's political system, including many informal associations, are strengthening. This is happening in the interests of both KGB organs and the working people whose rights and freedoms we are protecting against criminal encroachments on the basis of strict observance of Soviet laws. Democracy and glasnost, apart from all else, also mean public control.

Question: How do you picture the mechanism of oversight of the activities of state security organs by the representative organs of power, and what will be the limits to glasnost in this oversight?

Answer: The mechanism of oversight of the activities of state security organs by representative organs of power will be provided both by existing legislation and the draft Law on the USSR KGB mentioned earlier. It specifies that the USSR KGB is accountable to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the president of the country, and the USSR Council of Ministers. The chairman of the USSR KGB submits an annual report on the activities of the USSR KGB to the USSR Supreme Soviet. The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions periodically hears reports from leaders of the USSR KGB and its structural subdivisions. Information about the activities of the USSR KGB and organs and troops under its jurisdiction can be obtained by USSR people's deputies in accordance with their status, that is by means of requests and written questions. Oversight functions will obviously also be carried out by the Presidential Council, one of whose main tasks will be the elaboration of measures to ensure the country's security.

As for the limits to glasnost in oversight, there can, of course, be no mention of any limits of oversight in the case of supreme organs of power and administration. As for open discussion of the activities of the KGB and their oversight, among others by the mass media, we will have to find a sensible balance between glasnost and the secrecy requirements connected with the specific nature of our work. In my opinion it is understandable that in a number of cases the forms, methods, and content of the activities of the USSR KGB, just like similar special services in any other country, constitute state or official secrets and cannot be disclosed until a specific point in time.

We are attentively studying foreign experience in respect of the aforementioned questions. We are finding much that deserves attention and will apply it with due account for the specific features of our country. I can assure you that in the question of glasnost we are pursuing our own path. It is glasnost which will enable us to gain even broader support of the working people, without which the success of our work is unthinkable.

Voronin Attends Railway Ministry Collegium Session

PM1004092090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Concrete Measures Outlined"]

[Text] The results of work by railroad transport in the first quarter of 1990, the state of affairs as regards the safety of train movements, and other important questions of the sector's work were examined at a session of the USSR Ministry of Railways collegium held in Moscow 5 April.

It was noted that the railmen now have to concentrate all their efforts on making up for the lag that has developed in shipments. Particular attention should be devoted to the delivery of fuel, especially coal, oil, and petroleum products. It is necessary to prepare rolling stock and the railroad track in good time for the mass shipments of crops and the summer passenger shipments. The collegium outlined concrete measures to ensure stable, smooth running of the country's railroads.

L. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and V. Tetenov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union Commission for Questions of Transport, Communications, and Information Science took part in the collegium's work.

Railway Transportation Shortcomings Discussed

LD0904125490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0800 GMT 9 April 90

[Report from Rostov-na-Donu with correspondents Nikolay Chebaterev and Natalya Vortanyan and Fedor Makarovich Kotlyarenko, Russian people's deputy and head of the North Caucasus Railway; from the "Soyuz" program presented by Nikolayeva]

[Text] [Nikolayeva] I do not think one needs to spend a long time talking about how important railway transport is for the national economy. Whatever the case, interruptions on the railways lead to losses in the millions of rubles. Here are some figures. The annual losses to national income because of the failure to deliver freight to enterprises in other sectors amount to R10,000-12,000 million. These are awe-inspiring figures. What lies behind them? Primarily, it is violations of the integrational links between enterprises, regions, and republics. That is what we are going to talk about in the radio hook-up on this program conducted by my colleague, Natalya Vortanyan.

[Chebaterev] Your correspondent Nikolay Chebaterev is in Rostov-na-Donu, and I would like to introduce my conversation partner, Russian People's Deputy Fedor Makarovich Kotlyarenko, head of the North Caucasus Railway.

[Vortanyan] The North Caucasus Railway unites many regions of the country, including those in the Transcaucasus, where at the moment the situation is often one of

crisis because of interethnic conflicts. Transportation demands are not met, and because of this integrational links and contractual obligations are violated, and the conveyor belts of many enterprises stand idle with the lack of spare parts. It is very important today to sort out the work of railway transport in order to stabilize the country's economy as a whole.

[Kotlyarenko] Only today I received a group of miners from Novoshakhtinsk. They had come to ask me to step up supplies of coal trucks. The situation is the same in the Donbass, the Kuzbass, and in, say, Bashiria, regarding bulk freight, etc. And where is the rolling stock? Of course we had little in reserve even before, and now, when interethnic relations in the Transcaucasus have become more complex, this has become a most urgent problem. To date there are 4,000 trucks whose movement has been interrupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and it has all come to a stop on the North Caucasus Railway. This issue must of course be seen keeping in mind the economic links of the country as a whole with the Transcaucasus, and also with reference to meeting other demands for rolling stock—I mentioned the miners. Tens of thousands of trucks are out of circulation because of the complications of interethnic relations. I think the republics should bear responsibility for this state of affairs. The basis for the economic and republican relations of our federation should be reviewed.

[Vortanyan] It would obviously not be a bad thing for these republics to provide compensation for the losses they are causing the North Caucasus Railway, among others.

[Kotlyarenko] That is exactly what I am talking about. This has been going on for a year and a half, when we became essentially a front-line railway. Last year we lost about R60 million in income because freight was not transported and trains were at a standstill. This year already almost R15 million have been lost. Secondly, the entire railway transport supply system has basically been destroyed. It is now spring. We have to get the tracks ready for summer passenger transport, and we have no sleeping cars. They are not being delivered from the timber-processing enterprises that previously supplied the railway with wooden sleeping cars. We are simply destroying what we have. How are we going to work in the future? It is time to solve these issues. We already have presidential power and a Presidential Council.

[Chebatyarev] Natalya Sergeyevna, we have been talking about integration. Rostov Oblast is a very large industrial area where powerful sectors of the national economy are concentrated. Many enterprises are literally in a fever as to where to go and who to turn to. People say: Please, please help us to Fedor Makarovich, but he cannot help in any way, for the reasons we have given. [Kotlyarenko] A whole chain of unpleasantnesses stretches out. It is having a very serious effect on the

entire economy of the country, not only from the point of view purely of transport, but also from that of the economy and enterprises.

[Chebatyarev] But Fedor Makarovich, laws have been adopted, and there has been an appeal to the peoples of the Transcaucasus from the USSR people's deputies. Have these documents helped at all, or do they not work?

[Kotlyarenko] The whole point is that they are not working. The proper discipline is lacking and there is no monitoring of compliance with the decisions that have been adopted. Impunity leads to greater evil.

[Vortanyan] You know, I think the time has come for concrete action—the time to use authority.

[Kotlyarenko] Without a doubt. Authority must be used to strengthen discipline and increase accountability.

[Vortanyan] Fedor Makorovich, let me take the opportunity of your participation today to congratulate you on your election as a people's deputy of the Russian Federation.

[Kotlyarenko] Thank you, Natalya Sergeyevna.

[Vortanyan] Our conversation has come to an end. Thanks to those taking part.

[Kotlyarenko] Thank you.

Draft Law on Public Organizations Studied

90UNI261A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 11, Mar 90 pp 8-9

[Article by M. Yukov, doctor of jurisprudence, and L. Okunkov, candidate of jurisprudence: "Public Organizations and the Law"]

[Text]The USSR Council of Ministers has directed the USSR Ministry of Justice, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Academy of Sciences, and a number of other departments to prepare a draft law on public organizations. Existing studies, alternative drafts, and proposals from scientists and specialists are being thoroughly analyzed by a working group. At the request of the editorial office, lawyers who are participating in this elaboration share their views on the future draft law.

The continually increasing number of different informal movements, public organizations, and new forms of associations of citizens is a sign of our times and a sign of perestroika, which has awakened the unprecedented political activity of the Soviet people. Important changes are taking place in the life of the traditional public organizations. Many of them are undergoing a "second birth" and are gaining a "second breath." Under these conditions, the adoption of the Law on the Status of Public Organizations becomes a command of the times, and a critical practical necessity. The constitutional right of the citizens of the USSR to freely join in public organizations must be implemented in exact legal standards that stipulate the basic principles of organization

and in guarantees of the activities of all public formations, their rights and duties, and responsibility for illegal actions.

First, we will turn to world practice. In foreign countries there are unified legislative acts which concern all public organizations, and special acts about parties. Thus, in Hungary, according to the 1989 law "On the Right of Association," private persons (that is, citizens) and legal persons "can establish and organize the activity of political parties, professional unions, mass movements, organizations to represent interests, associations, or other organizations that are not at variance with the provisions of the present law." At the same time, its individual provisions do not apply to political parties, about which specific references are made in this law. Hungary also adopted a law on parties recently.

A list of public organizations gives similar laws in general terms for Poland and the PRC. Parties and other socio-political organizations are not mentioned in them in particular. In Great Britain, the activity of societies that do not have an economic character are regulated by the law on mutual aid societies of 1974. The "mutual aid society" concept includes charitable societies, clubs of working people, and societies for the organization and maintenance of homes for the aged.

A universal law that encompasses all public organizations, including political parties and various movements, is considered preferable for the current development of a political system. This kind of a legal formulation can be given: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to unite in public organizations and movements, professional and creative unions, voluntary societies, funds, and other public organizations."

At the same time, taking established practice into account, it would not be advisable to extend the application of the law to cooperative and other public organizations that seek to make a profit, or to religious associations.

Principles of Activity

Under conditions of a diversity of public formations, an extensive spread of various (including informal) social movements, and their competition and struggle for leadership, it is necessary to approach the definition of the principles of activity of public organizations with great care. No doubts are raised by such principles of their activity as voluntariness, equal rights, self-government, legality, and glasnost. However, it is hardly likely, for example, that such a traditional principle as democratic centralism can be acceptable to all public formations.

The law should emphasize with great certainty the establishment of public organizations without prior approval, which excludes the presence of any kind of special permission of state and public organs. But this, naturally, does not exclude the necessity for registering a charter and for control over their activity. Along with this, the law must not permit the organization and activity of

associations of citizens that pursue unconstitutional objectives, and that profess hostility and hatred on a racial, national, and religious basis.

Requirements like these are contained in the legislation of a majority of foreign countries. Thus, in accordance with the Basic Law of the FRG, "all Germans have the right to establish unions and societies. Associations whose aims are at variance with the criminal laws or are directed against the constitutional system or against the idea of mutual understanding among peoples are forbidden."

Affiliation with any public organization does not entail the acquisition of any kind of advantages and privileges. This is fundamentally important. Because now membership in individual public organizations gives certain privileges, particularly for occupying some positions. This kind of practice evokes a negative public response and, of course, it does not satisfy the principle of social justice.

Who can become a member of a public organization? According to the general rule, adult citizens of the USSR; however, the charters of these organizations can provide for the acceptance of other categories of citizens (minors, foreign citizens). This is the way this question is resolved in other countries as well.

It is necessary to make provision in the legislative system for the possibility of citizens uniting in socio-political and other movements, such as people's fronts and the "green" movement, that do not have a fixed membership.

Guarantees

The future law must actively implement the provisions of the Constitution and international agreements on civic and political rights to create conditions for public organizations to fulfill their charter tasks and to adhere to the principle of mutual noninterference of state organs and public organizations in each other's internal affairs.

The most critical is the question concerning the preliminary concurrence of pertinent public organizations in the adoption of decisions by state organs of control. In our opinion, the law should limit the list of such cases to the greatest possible extent. In principle, administrative decisions must not depend on the opinion of a public organization or be blocked by it. If, in the opinion of the organization, such a decision does not respond to the interests of its members, then other legal methods of action exist. For example, an official representation can be sent to the organ that makes such a decision (as happened recently regarding certain acts of the government on the part of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]). We undoubtedly consider that, in the resolution of questions affecting the interests of public organizations, it is necessary that their representatives take part.

It is considered inadvisable to indicate the specific legal rights of one or another public organization in a future legislative act. Given the diversity of these organizations, it is difficult practically to indicate even in a general way what rights they enjoy in the administration of state and public affairs and in conducting a socially useful activity. At the same time, we consider it important to consolidate the principal positions in the part of the legislative initiative, the nomination of candidates for deputy, and the protection and representation of interests of their members in state and other organs.

Registration and Control Procedure

There is now virtually an absence of registration of public organizations or their charter on an all-union basis. According to the resolution of the TsIK [Central Executive Committee] and the SNK [Soviet of People's Commissars] of 6 January 1930, the charter of societies and unions that do not have profit as an objective and that extend their activity throughout the territory of the USSR, were affirmed in a procedure determined by the legislation of that union republic on whose territory it is proposed to locate the governing body of the society or union. Under current conditions, these legislative acts have practically completely lost their force, they do not reflect the existing realities, and on a number of positions they are at variance with the international obligations of the USSR.

The legislation of a majority of foreign countries knows two procedures for registration. In the United States, Hungary, Poland, and the FRG, it is conducted by the judicial organs, and in Great Britain, the PRC, and a number of other countries, by organs of state administration.

A proposal has been expressed in the press to entrust the registration of charters, depending on the level of public organization, to the USSR Council of Ministers, the councils of ministers of union and autonomous republics, and to ispolkoms [executive committees]. In our opinion, it is preferable from a legal position that the charter of all-union public organizations be registered with the USSR Ministry of Justice. It could also be charged with the management of a single register and with control over the activity of public organizations. The charter of republic and local public organizations could be registered with the appropriate organs of justice or other state organs that are determined by the legislation of union and autonomous republics. In order not to permit arbitrariness in such an important matter, a judicial procedure should be established for appealing decisions on a charter whose registration was rejected.

Are all public formations subject to registration? In foreign countries, registration stipulates the acquisition by public organizations of the rights of a legal entity and the receipt in full measure of all rights prescribed by law. Without registration, its activity is not possible within the framework of the status of a public organization. Thus, in Hungary an association established by citizens

is not considered a public organization if its activity is not of a permanent nature, or if it did not undergo the required registration. In Poland, according to the law, societies of a simple form can exist, called "ordinary societies," that do not have the rights of a legal entity.

Therefore, in our opinion, the activity of associations of citizens that do not raise the question of recognition as legal entities is legally permissible. However, without the registration of a charter it would be incorrect to endow such an association with the status of a public organization and the necessary legal rights. The recognition of public organizations as legal entities entails endowing them with civic legal capacities and is associated, as a rule, with the registration of these organizations or of their charters. Therefore, it seems that an association that has not registered its charter, must not enjoy the status of public organizations and be seen as a legal entity.

A large number of different especially commercial organizations not associated with the objectives of the activity of public organizations are now being established within the framework of public organizations. Such organizations, being formally public, unjustifiably enjoy taxation privileges and other advantages. In this connection, it is necessary to establish that the creation and activity of commercial enterprises in the system of public formations is carried out on general principles with other organizations created for the purpose of making a profit.

It is necessary in law to clearly demarcate the terms of reference of the USSR and the republics on questions of conditions for the formation and activity of public organizations.

Only general principles and provisions, and also questions of the formation and activity of all-union public organizations, should be considered in the sphere of regulation of all-union legislation; and the resolution of all questions associated with the formation and activity of republic, inter-republic, and local associations of citizens should be considered prerogatives of the union and autonomous republics.

How is the activity of public organizations to be controlled? The practice of foreign countries goes along the line of acting upon public organizations for their violation of the law, employing such measures of answerability as a warning, a fine, and curtailment of their activity. Warning and curtailment of the activity of public organizations is also provided for by law in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Taking this into account, it seems possible to establish the legal responsibility of these organizations. For a one time violation of legal requirements, the organ that registered the charter of the public organization issues it a written warning. In the event that the public organization does not correct the violation within a month's time,

or performs unconstitutional acts, its activity can be stopped by a decision of the court, or a fine is imposed on it.

The question about abrogating decisions of public organizations that were made in violation of the law is quite pressing. For example, according to Hungarian legislation, the court has a right to annul a decision of public organizations that violates the law, and, if necessary, to order that a new decision be made.

The practice of foreign countries follows the line of establishing the control of state organs over the activity of public organizations. Such control can rightfully be exercised by financial organs (over the financial-economic activity of the public organization), and by local organs of Soviet authority and organs of the public prosecutor (prosecutorial oversight for the fulfillment of legislation concerning public associations of citizens). Under our conditions, apparently, it is also useful to entrust the control function to organs that register the charters of public organizations.

Liberal Democrat on Sympathies With Other Forces

PM0404134790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS correspondent V. Zenkovich report: "Liberal Democratic Party Founded"]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 31 Mar—The constituent congress of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union was held at the Rusakov House of Culture today. [passage omitted]

"The Liberal Democratic Party's main goal is to build a deideologized rule-of-law state," Party Chairman V.V. Zhirinskiy, a 42-year old jurist, declared. "There is a multitude of social organizations and associations in the country whose views are close to ours. The most significant among them are the Union of Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), the 'Moscow Tribune' Club, the Moscow People's Front Democratic Faction, the Christian Democrats, and the Peasants Party. Despite the similarity of views, however, these organizations exist outside our party."

More on Militia Anti-Gang Operations

PM0904122590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel S. Kalinayev under the "After Briefing" rubric: "'Orda' Appears Before the Court"]

[Text] Official statistics: Last year 1,310 organized criminal gangs were exposed—20 percent up on the previous period. They committed 93 murders, 377 robberies with violence, 355 robberies, and 4,691 thefts of state, cooperative, and personal property.

...At 1100 hours on 14 January this year, about 30 men drove to Moscow's Bega Hotel in private automobiles and two taxis. The sturdy, vigorous young men had decided to engage in "discussion" of a far from parliamentary nature, as the arsenal of weapons discovered on them bore witness, in particular: knives, hatchets, axes, nunchaki [meaning unknown—FBIS], steel bars, crow-bars, and even CS gas canisters.

Fortunately they did not "have things out," thanks to the vigilance of militiamen on this occasion. However, as it transpires, this attempted division of spheres of influence between two groups was just the tip of the iceberg. After all, one of them under the code name of "Orda" [horde] began operating back in 1988, according to the capital KGB administration's operational documents. Picking on Kuntsevskiy, Sokolnicheskiy, Perovskiy, and Kiyevskiy Rayons, it extorted large sums from cooperative members and officials in state trade and everyday service enterprises. The gangsters' booty came to more than R250,000 during this period. The following was discovered on the arrest of active gang members: a TT pistol with ammunition, signal flares, eight portable army radio sets, a telephone set equipped with scrambler, and... the identity card of a staffer of the Moscow Oblast Soviet Executive Committee City Internal Affairs Administration. An investigation is under way, and "Orda" will be coming before the court.

...In the course of joint operational investigation measures Krasnodar Kray staffers caught red-handed a group of thieves including a section chief from a city internal affairs department crime prevention service. More than 400 tonnes of meat were discovered and documented at meat combines during the investigation, as were 200 tonnes of sunflower seeds and wheat and 700 liters of liquor.

Those are just some of the joint operations mounted with KGB staffers to neutralize particularly dangerous criminals disclosed at a briefing at the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry on 3 April.

Minister Protests Report on Contamination

LD0904210990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 9 April in its "Vremya" newscast broadcasts a 4-minute interview with Lemayev, the minister of oil-processing and petrochemical industry of the USSR, on phenol contamination in Ufa.

With regard to the phenol contamination of drinking water in Ufa, the presenter notes that Minister Lemayev phoned the program to protest about the remark made in a "Vremya" video report yesterday to the effect that Ufa is a hostage of the petrochemical industry. He presents an interview by correspondent Madril Gafurov with the minister. Lemayev agrees that the incident is a disgrace and a tragedy, but puts the blame for it on the enterprises of the Agrokhim Association rather than on the enterprises of the petrochemical industry. Lemayev believes

that it is the task of works, ministries, and science to work together to solve the problem of ensuring that enterprises are of use to people rather than harmful to them. In response to a question about the urgent need for reconstruction at Ufa's oil-processing enterprises, Lemayev says: "Today there is a program on how to technically re-equip existing works. This program should be implemented in the next seven or eight years and we must make enterprises ecologically clear."

Gafurov accepts this point, but reiterates that the people of Ufa have appealed to Gorbachev and Ryzhkov to close a number of harmful works as soon as possible, and no doubt these will include some of the ministry's own enterprises. Lemayev responds: "In the immediate future there will be a tour of specialists to Bashkiria to jointly compile such a program, to discuss it with collectives, consolidate it, and begin its implementation. In cases where it is impossible to improve the ecology and the ecology causes great harm, we will make decisions jointly on the closure and possible withdrawal of these works."

The premier concludes by saying that the "Vremya" program will continue to cover this issue as it has obviously not yet been resolved. Video shows interview in office.

Economic

Abalkin Holds News Conference on Economic Reform

LD0904222590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1830 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] [Announcer] As we have already reported, a press conference given by Academician Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, took place in Moscow today. Here is a detailed report on this meeting with journalists which has been prepared by our correspondent. It begins with a statement by the deputy head of the government:

[Begin Abalkin recording] We are setting ourselves the target of creating a highly developed, highly efficient economy, an economy that is receptive to scientific and technical innovations, an economy that is orientated toward the consumer, an economy in which healthy competition and rivalry between various types of economic management and forms of ownership develop, in which the way is open to initiative, creativity and the spirit of the initiative of enterprise. And it has been proved quite obviously both by our own experience and to an even greater extent by world practice that the creation of a highly efficient economy of this kind is impossible without going over to the widespread use of market mechanisms. What we have in mind are all the tools of the institution of the presentday market, the market of the end of the 20th century, which includes both a developed system of state regulation of the economic processes and powerful instruments for the

social protection of the population, for ensuring employment, and an active incomes policy.

At the same time the course of the processes at the end of last year and at the beginning of the current year, the complications in the economic situation in the country, linked with a whole range of factors—including a certain destabilization of the social and political situation and the intensification of regional and interethnic conflicts—and the difficulties which we have come up against in regulating the consumer market and the market in the means of production have obliged us to think again and again about how we should move in this area, about the need to bring forward the implementation of the measures which in the government program were included in a later timescale and have obliged us to start practical work in this direction. We are currently working carefully on the creation of what might be called the critical mass of conditions necessary and sufficient in order to enter this new stage of economic development, to enter a market structure.

Of course the formation itself of the market—this we know perfectly well, we know it also through the experience of those countries which have gone over to such structures—will require a fairly lengthy period of time, a whole number of stages, intermediary steps and preparatory conditions, but a start has to be made. It is impossible to go on trying to balance upon two incompatible structures, the remnants of the old system of management—usually we call it the administrative and command system—and the elements of the new one: It is impossible to balance on these two wobbly chairs. The government is now preparing proposals, it is proposing a whole series of documents. The country's best scientific forces have been brought in to work on them, specialists in practical application, staff of the economic reform commission and central economic departments.

A careful calculation is being made now of the possible consequences of the steps that are being undertaken: These have to be seen in advance, possible difficulties have to be foreseen and forestalled. Active work is being carried out on including in advance, and in good time, social protection in the system for the population, primarily those strata that are poorly provided for, families with large numbers of children, and individuals on fixed incomes, in order to ease as far as possible the conditions of the transition and to prevent living standards from being lowered in these strata of the population.

After all of these calculations and preparatory material are ready the government, as the body of executive power, will place them for consideration before the legislators, those who have the right to take decisions. And evidently, as work is completed on the preparation of the documents we are prepared to put forward and defend in front of the legislative bodies, commenting upon the specific steps, measures and proposals which we have worked out will also develop more and more widely.

We are now at an intermediate stage in which we are looking for calculations, comparing the alternatives, and putting the action program into a more precise form. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin then answered journalists' questions. Talking about the possibility of using Poland's experience in the transition to market relationships, he said this:

[Begin Abalkin recording] We are indeed watching carefully the processes taking place in that country, just as we are those in other Eastern European countries; we are studying the experience of those countries which in their own day have changed over to market structures during the postwar period. We are not confining ourselves exclusively to material from just one country. There is no such thing in existence as the experience of any one particular country that is capable of being disseminated in the form of a carbon-copy—meaning take that particular option, put a piece of carbon paper underneath it and then reproduce it mechanically. The historical conditions, the relationships between the social and political forces, the traditions that arise in any particular country and a mass of other circumstances are too diverse so that they do not permit, and never will permit, a ready-made standard, a ready-made model to be found that can be transferred on a one-to-one basis onto different historical conditions.

There is a very great deal that is interesting in the option that is currently being implemented and applied in Poland under the name of the Balcerowicz Plan. There are a number of serious, positive results, including the stabilization that has been achieved of the consumer market. We know the social forces that are giving support to the government program despite the fairly substantial lowering of living standards in the country, and the conditions that have led to this program enjoying wide public support in the country today. But this does not coincide with the present situation in the Soviet Union, nor with the public support upon which our government is able to count. The conditions are different. But we must take everything that is interesting, we must pass it through the filter of our own specific historical conditions and reflect it in our program. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Going on then to answer a question about price reform in the Soviet Union, the deputy head of the government stressed:

[Begin recording] [Abalkin] This is one of the most complicated questions on which we are seeking the most sensible solution. Various options are under discussion, and it must also be borne in mind—and I mentioned this—that implementation of a transition of this kind, even if we speed it up sharply, if we bring it forward in so far as the timescale for its implementation is concerned, will nevertheless not be effected in one single day. This will also be determined by the possibilities that exist for setting prices free—all at once, gradually, by different

groups, accompanied with the application of certain regulators for the maximum levels of prices. At any rate it is clear in principle that the setting of prices by administrative means, simply raising them administratively, is not what is necessary for an economy of a market type. And we are trying—in particular in the drafts that exist today—to introduce taxation price regulators, for example. The question is this—and we are working on it now—are there sufficient taxation measures to hold back inflation? In particular we have brought in specialists who are very familiar with Western experience and they, too, have warned us and put us on our guard in particular during our latest discussion that even the experience of the West shows that one will hardly be able to solve this problem with the help of taxes alone. In principle, therefore, this is a question of the way in which the stages follow each other. A market without prices which balance supply and demand, a modern, developed, market, of course does not function.

[Unidentified speaker] How will the transition to a market economy affect the Soviet Union's relations and economic ties with the other CEMA member countries?

[Abalkin] We have embarked consistently upon the path of expanding the independence of our enterprise, associations and cooperatives, of expanding their independence in determining the program of their activity, in the elaboration of their plans and in the sale of their output: And we are extending this policy to foreign economic links. The Soviet Government's concept was set out at the latest CEMA session. We expect a broad transition to trade at world prices and to settlements in freely convertible currency, starting from next year. What will be developing increasingly actively in foreign economic links will not be direct, intergovernmental agreements in which the volumes of deliveries for coal, oil, gas or whatever other goods are determined in advance for five years to come, but to an increasing extent direct links between enterprises and firms based upon business cooperation, obligations under agreements and the strictest responsibility on the part of each side: But there will be no guarantee that we will conclude these contracts no matter what and deliver output irrespective of other conditions. Our partners overseas must know this, as indeed must those within the country: No one is going to be bound to supply you with output—that is the subject of agreement.

[Unidentified speaker] When are shares going to become the norm in our country instead of something exotic?

[Abalkin] Our commission—the Commission for the Economic Reform—is currently preparing draft legislation on behalf of the government to set up joint-stock companies. Taking into consideration the working practice of the Supreme Soviet, I am able to foresee that this law is not going to be adopted very quickly. In parallel, therefore, with this law-making work we have worked out an interim provision on setting up joint-stock companies in the country, and if I am not mistaken it was

examined approximately two weeks ago at a sitting of the Council of Ministers Presidium acting on our proposals.

In the very near future this interim provision will be put into effect, it will start to work, and the first truly joint-stock companies will be formed. We envisage the following transitional measures. First of all the free sale of shares to juridical entities: That is to say enterprises, banks and cooperatives will be able to invest money freely in joint-stock companies; there are provisions where a state body, say, retains a controlling holding of shares in order to control the property and protect the interests of the proprietor. These issues have been worked through sufficiently well and for the present we have...[changes thought] in our proposals today, at any rate, a more cautious concept has been formulated for the sale of shares to physical individuals, of shares bearing names.

The setting up of joint-stock companies and in general the setting up of such a complex structure of ownership relations—state, cooperative, leasing, joint-stock and the collective property of the enterprise—all of this is part of the critical mass of conditions which are essential for the formation of the market structure. That is to say, in preparing this totality of conditions, legislative, legal and economic conditions, and in resolving the question of credit interest, the banking system and price-setting, we must certainly include in this—and we do include in our program—what is now called removal from state ownership or the creation of real substance for the ideas contained in the law on the multiplicity of forms of ownership, of forms of economic management in our country. [end recording]

[Presenter] And of course the journalists could not fail to ask a question about what the government itself should be like in the implementation of such a wide economic program?

[Begin Abalkin recording] The government must be invested with full authority to implement this program. After the program has been approved it must have sufficient independence in the implementation of this program: It must be freed from the need to discuss and coordinate every practical step in its activity with the bodies of legislative power that have come into being. Not one government can operate consistently and energetically and be answerable, because in coordinating every step we erode responsibility and afterwards we neither discover who is responsible nor who is the author. It must also be clearly understood that after 1 January of next year—and this is very soon, the time will pass without you noticing it—when all 15 republics will go over to the new principles of management and self-management and when all agriculture, the agro-industrial complex and the whole sphere of enterprises in the light and food industries, the housing and municipal services undertakings and the construction sphere will be transferred to them, it will then be too late to write a letter to the USSR Council of Ministers about why there are no tooth brushes, why there is no tooth paste or pasta

in this or that particular shop. This must indeed be a different government, but it must be a different society, too.

As far as expectations are concerned, most likely one has to prepare for a negative reaction on the part of the Supreme Soviet. It will be very impartial discussion at any rate. But nevertheless one thing remains. Honesty must be valued more highly than anything else in politics. A dishonest policy has no chance of success, either in the short term or in the long term. There is no other alternative. Neither parliament nor society today will accept talk of anything else. [end recording]

Stresses Quicker Market Transition

LD0904172490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] The program of the transition to market relations in the economy of the Soviet Union: That is how one might sum up in brief the subject of the press conference in Moscow today by Academician Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Our Correspondent (Valeriy Kiosa) reports:

[(Kiosa)] The importance of this meeting between Leonid Abalkin and the journalists goes far beyond the framework of the usual briefing. This is understandable: It was about new steps being taken by the government to deepen economic reform in our country. In particular, it is a question of a whole package of draft bills aimed at creating in our country an economy oriented toward the consumer and open to the spirit of enterprise. And this is impossible without a changeover to controlled market relations.

Outlining why it is necessary to accelerate such sharp changes in the economy, Leonid Abalkin said:

[Begin Abalkin recording] The complications in the country's economic situation, linked with a whole range of factors, including a certain destabilization of the social and political situation and the intensification of regional and inter-ethnic conflicts; and the difficulties we have encountered in regulating the consumer market and the production market have obliged us to think repeatedly about the need to accelerate the implementation of the measures which, in the government program, were included in a later time-scale, and have obliged us to start practical work in this direction. A start must be made. It is impossible to go on trying to balance between two incompatible structures, the remnants of the old system of management and the elements of the new one. The government is now preparing a whole series of documents. The country's best scientific forces have been brought in to work on them. [end recording]

[(Kiosa)] What are these new proposals of the government? I would single out first and foremost a deep reform of the country's banking system. In particular, it is a question of the USSR State Bank indeed becoming the main bank of the country. It is a question of creating

a whole network of commercial banks which are not subordinate to any department. At the same time, credit policy will also change, of course, which will make it possible to reduce the endless pouring of credit resources into the national economy and thereby effectively resist inflation. Leonid Abalkin also announced that currently the government is also preparing a law on joint stock companies in the Soviet Union. That document is due to become the basis for removing from the state the ownership of property in our country and getting rid of the character it has of belonging to no one—something that is currently particularly important for us.

Of course, the transition to market relations in the national economy is impossible without a reform of prices, which will affect every citizen of the Soviet Union, and will undoubtedly reflect upon the material prosperity of several strata of the population. Measures for the social protection of those strata of the population which are poorly provided for will have to counter that process—and these measures are also currently being worked out by the government.

So the USSR Council of Ministers is preparing a program for the changeover to the market. Implementation must radically change the country's national economy and the whole life of the country's population. But how will it be received in society? The reply to this question by Leonid Abalkin shows that the government does not cherish any illusions. The attitude is most likely to be negative in many respects. In the opinion of the deputy head of the government, one must prepare oneself for lengthy and difficult work in implementing this program. However, Leonid Abalkin is convinced that we have no alternative to the market, and with that, perhaps, one cannot but agree.

[Announcer] A fuller account of the press conference can be heard on the First Program at 2230.

Ministers Open to Suggestions on Economy

LD0904170190 Moscow World Service in English
1500 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin has said that the cabinet is ready to discuss any programs on how to stabilize the economy, regardless of where they come from. The only condition, Abalkin noted, is that such programs would aim at really improving the state of affairs and living standards.

Describing the current changes in an interview with a new Moscow paper BUSINESS WORLD, Abalkin pointed out that these changes were directed at securing conditions for healthy competition between various economic management forms—state-owned, lease, collective, and share-holding enterprises. On the economic situation today, Abalkin referred to a certain trend toward a faster consumer goods production pace.

'Shock Therapy' for Economy Advocated

PM0904110190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Prof. Anders Aslund, director of the Stockholm Institute of Economics of the Soviet Union and East European Countries, by correspondent Al. Stepanov: "Is 'Shock Therapy' Needed? Swedish Scientist on Our Economy"; date, place not given; first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Prof. Anders Aslund, director of the Stockholm Institute of Economics of the Soviet Union and East European Countries, talks with PRAVDA's correspondent.

He has studied the Soviet economy for many years and worked for several years at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow. His book "Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reforms" has become a best-seller in many countries.

[Stepanov] Dr. Aslund, my first question might appear banal, but here goes: What is your assessment of the economic situation in the USSR?

[Aslund] To be brief, the situation now is extremely grave. According to official data, national income increased 2.4 percent last year. The optimism of this statistic is clearly excessive, for it takes no account of a "mere bagatelle"—inflation. Physical indicators are not gratifying either: Electricity generation fell 0.6 percent, steel production fell 1.8 percent, and the volume of commodity shipments in transportation fell 2.2 percent. I will point out that, despite glasnost, you have now curtailed the publication of current statistical data in physical terms. And yet it can be seen from all indicators that the economic situation was deteriorating throughout last year, from quarter to quarter. Without going into details, I will say that in our opinion the USSR's national income in 1988 fell by four to five percent. But inflation stood at about seven to eight percent.

[Stepanov] What do you see as the causes?

[Aslund] The halfheartedness of the economic reforms and the tardiness with which they are being implemented. What is happening in your country now reminds me of the situation in Poland in the early eighties. Three years of temporizing and delays cost that country's national economy unspeakably dear—national income fell 22 percent. Whichever way you look at it, what happened there is best characterized by the somber word "disaster." And I see absolutely no indications that the Soviet economy will succeed in avoiding the same fate. Unless, of course, your leadership realizes that the time of half-measures has gone forever and that cardinal steps are needed to introduce a market and to eliminate shortages, i.e. to balance supply and demand.

[Stepanov] Are you talking of a price hike?

[Aslund] Just so. Of raising retail prices at least 30-40 percent.

[Stepanov] I can imagine the population's reaction to such measures!

[Aslund] It must be explained to people once and for all: either a price hike with subsequent stabilization of the economy, or an irreversible slide into crisis—a crisis such as you have never dreamed of. Understand that an economic collapse is beginning in the USSR. An attempt to advance toward the goal gradually, taking tiny little steps, is tempting but fruitless. God forbid that I should prove a bad prophet, but if the economic reform does not stop marking time, then your national income too will fall some 20 percent over the next two years. Need I explain what this will mean for the living standard, which does not strike the imagination even now?

[Stepanov] What is there to explain here?... We have already heard repeatedly that a price hike is inevitable and that genuine profound reforms cannot be implemented without one. But maybe it is better first to balance supply and demand by increasing the volumes of production of scarce commodities?

[Aslund] Of course that is better. But how do you intend to do this without touching prices? Western economic science has not yet invented such a prescription.

[Stepanov] This is, in fact, the answer I was expecting. Particularly as our compatriot V. Novozhilov showed as far back as the late twenties that it is not production but distribution that is to blame for the emergence of a scarcity. Shortages begin when prices cease to play the role of a "leveler of supply and demand."

[Aslund] Which is what is happening now, is it not? I can assure you that you will never see the day when production provides goods for all the money that has been printed.

[Stepanov] And yet you cannot rectify the matter just with a price hike.

[Aslund] Yes, this is only the first step. It must be followed by others—a change in financial policy and privatization, i.e. the creation of a stratum of owners. In your country it is still possible to scare very, very many people with this last word, also with the addition of the adjective "private." Then let us call them "proprietors." This is not so frightening, is it? For you spent many years in the USSR trying to foster a "proprietary feeling" in your citizens, didn't you? I can assure you that it will appear in an instant, as soon as the "proprietor" gets his property. In general, I wish to ask you: Does the USSR intend to switch from the edict-administrative economy to a market economy?

[Stepanov] We appear to be tackling this alone. At any rate, since 1987, when the economic reforms were proclaimed...

[Aslund] But you must act, not proclaim. Act! Do as Poland is doing, let us say. The most impressive economic experiment of recent decades is now under way in that country.

[Stepanov] Certain figures really are impressive. During the period from December 1988 through December 1989 the prices of foodstuffs there increased 978 percent, those of nonfood goods increased 630 percent, and services 541 percent. The dangerous trend toward a considerable production slump has not been overcome...

[Aslund] I understand your irony. I can add another figure—55,000 unemployed, and much besides. Not that anyone said that the switch to a market would be simple and painless. Certainly not! Difficulties await your country too. You can compare this with a surgical operation, with a bitter yet essential medicine, or with shock therapy. You must not wait until 1993, when Academician Abalkin's program envisages the switch to a market.

[Stepanov] It is known that our government, including Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, is following with great interest what is happening in Poland. A group of experts has been there to study the way Balcerowicz' reforms are being implemented in practice. (L. Balcerowicz is finance minister and Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki's deputy—editor's note). It is probably not for nothing that they are called a "great leap toward a market," is it?

[Aslund] Quite right. The galloping growth in prices is already coming to an end in Poland. I would like to say a few words about alleviating the social consequences of such painful reforms. Of course there are in your country many tens of millions of people with such a low living standard that they simply will not survive an uncompensated price hike. People on a fixed income—students, pensioners, invalids—must be paid compensation, as has been done in Hungary, let us say. Does talk of unemployment not shock your readers?

[Stepanov] We are little by little getting used to the idea that it is inevitable. Temporary unemployment, at any rate, when quite inefficiently operating enterprises will be closed down. Do you remember Academician Aganbegyan's speech at the international conference "The Soviet Union in the World Economy," in whose work you participated? For he too acknowledged the inevitability of unemployment on switching to a market...

[Aslund] Yes. And Leonard Vid, first deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee, who spoke after him, did not dispute that either. This is what we are speaking about. There are already millions of unemployed in the USSR now. And these people do not receive a penny from the state, whereas in a normally working economy they will be able to get at least an allowance.

In general, a return from the world "beyond the looking glass" to a world built according to economic laws will give you a whole number of advantages. The ruble will

become convertible, joint-stock companies will appear, and private persons will be able to own shares in them...

[Stepanov] And yet, in my opinion, our country cannot borrow the Polish experience in every particular. They themselves spent several years plucking up courage before applying "shock therapy." Not to mention the different social structure of Polish society—the existence of private agriculture, say. Under our conditions the government has a hard job deciding on unpopular measures. Serious social complications are possible.

[Aslund] This is already a sphere of pure politics, rather a question of confidence in the government's policy. I will refer again to Poland. Data from sociological polls attest that 85 percent of those polled are in sympathy with Mazowiecki. Despite all the difficulties the people are experiencing.

If your government vacillates, newly elected President Gorbachev must adopt a courageous decision.

[Stepanov] Yes, he did, in fact, speak of radically advancing the reform in his very first speech in his new capacity...

[Aslund] I would like this to happen. I can only wish you success on this difficult path.

Price Reform Needed for 'Regulated' Market

904A0284A Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Apr 90 p 2

[Report on interview with A.V. Orlov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform, by TRUD political commentator V. Golovachev; date and place not specified: "Before a Sharp Turn"]

[Text] We have asked A.V. Orlov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform, to comment on the interview with N.Ya. Petrakov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, (see page 1) and to respond to questions concerning the economic situation in our country.

[Orlov] I believe that on the whole the interview with N.Ya. Petrakov reflects the existing situation quite objectively.

The situation in the economy is indeed difficult; it has come to the point where a decisive choice has to be made. It is impossible to procrastinate any longer.

[Golovachev] Many people now believe that the government has acted indecisively. What is the explanation for this?

[Orlov] I cannot speak for the government, but I will state my personal point of view. Sometimes, it appears to a detached observer that the government is omnipotent, that it can do everything it considers necessary. In reality, it is not so. The government is primarily an executive and administrative organ; it acts according to

the laws passed. But the laws, for example, on property, land, and the Basic Legislation on Leasing, were adopted very recently. We cannot fail to take public opinion into account; in this matter, not all the structures and strata of society have supported government endeavors. Relations between the center, certain union republics, and the local organs of power at times get complicated. Finally, many labor collectives have turned out not to be prepared for freedom and self-financing. Also, mistakes have been made, including by the government, as is the case with any new endeavor.

[Golovachev] The main issue at present is how to finally overcome the crisis. As is known, the proposals for accelerating the transition to a regulated market that are now being developed are highly significant in principle. How do you imagine this personally?

[Orlov] The market does not amount to anarchy or an uncontrollable rampage of the elements, as many people imagine. In all highly developed countries the market is regulated primarily through the use of economic instruments. Prices, taxes, and interest rates are the most significant regulators of market relations. With regard to prices (this is what concerns the people the most at present), in the regulated market there ought to be three levels of prices: firm, maximum, and free prices. The regulators are necessary in entrepreneurial activities and in the finance sphere. Therefore, not everything in the "elements" of the market is as primitive as it sometimes appears to be.

Certainly, the regulated market will create an absolutely different situation; it will call for eradicating stereotypes and the mentality of leveling and dependency. It will be associated with many phenomena we are not accustomed to and which are sometimes dramatic (bankruptcy, a labor market), and so on. However, it is simply impossible to create a civilized society with a standard of living worthy of free people without this transition to the regulated market.

[Golovachev] Is a reform of price-setting among priority measures?

[Orlov] Certainly. Apparently, we can already refer to the mistake made two years ago when under public pressure we failed to implement this reform. Incidentally, at that point I was also against reforming retail prices. What the specialists predicted is indeed happening: The goods are altogether disappearing, and have to be purchased in the "black market" at sky-high prices. Certainly, the reform of price-setting cannot be implemented without pain. This is why we must proceed so as to reduce to a minimum the negative manifestations it entails. On the other hand I am afraid that, if we try to postpone the reform of prices yet again, and thus the entire transition to regulated-market arrangements, the further disintegration of our so-called trade and the consumer market will be unavoidable. Everyone knows what that means... However, I definitely want to stress that price reform is possible in 1991 at the earliest.

[Golovachev] But what will happen in the immediate future to those who even now live below the poverty line, given the increase of many free and maximum prices? This is of particular concern to the trade unions.

[Orlov] Indeed, this is the number one question, the most significant question. The most essential premise for a transition to market arrangements is provided by a society resolutely taking care of protecting its low-income citizens. To be sure, in general it is impossible to overcome the crisis without lowering the standard of living of some groups of the population. In this instance, we will have to go through a difficult time. To my mind, this should be said bluntly, and the people should agree to some sacrifices knowingly. However, this should not by any means affect the low-income citizens (the retirees, handicapped, families with many children, and so on). On the contrary, they need to be helped, and their situation needs to be alleviated. Under these circumstances, consolidation in our society, and mutual social and psychological support are very important.

[Golovachev] Could you use an example to show how you envision the transition to the regulated market?

[Orlov] Certainly. Let us look at trade, for example. This is one of the first sectors in which the program of demonopolization in the economy should begin. The system of total allocation of market stocks and the absence of full-fledged wholesale and retail trade is one of the most dangerous monopolies. It projects the dictates of producers into the sphere of exchange.

It is necessary to abandon as soon as possible the practice of centralized distribution of marketable merchandise stocks and the firm attachment of suppliers to consumers. However, the problem is how to ensure all of this in an environment of comprehensive shortages? There is no simple answer to this. The reform of price-setting should bring us closer to an equilibrium of demand and supply of merchandise, at least in the initial stage. It is necessary rapidly to switch to free wholesale trade.

[Golovachev] So, should market prices be introduced at once?

[Orlov] Certainly not. To my mind, the instantaneous introduction of market (equilibrium) prices appears impossible, taking into account inefficiency and waste in our economy and the considerable discrepancy between total goods produced and funds for payment. The reform should provide for changes in the level of prices in stages. Incidentally, an extensive discussion of the drafts of the price reform is still ahead; a decision will be made only after this.

Certainly, the emergence of a market economy poses the danger of a substantial increase in the price of foodstuffs and a number of nonfood goods. Temporary stagnation, or even a reduction in output and merchandise supply,

and the elimination of products that are not advantageous for the producer are possible (which, incidentally, is happening in our country at present without any market).

Ignoring these most significant circumstances may bring about social upheaval, which may in turn cause a new round of still more powerful crisis phenomena in the economy and boost the inflationary spiral.

Due to this, the transition to the market, as I see it, requires that measures be taken in order to prevent or at least substantially alleviate the abovementioned economic processes.

The resources of the most significant foodstuffs and socially important nonfood items should be provided as an initial premise (along with the reform of price-setting and the implementation of measures aimed at reinforcing the finance system and stabilizing monetary circulation).

To my mind, the greatest possible increment of the resources of foodstuffs should be ensured on the basis of import formation, including a revision of the policy of aid to other states, switching to trade between CEMA member countries in freely convertible currencies at world prices (which is already being implemented), and a sharp reduction of product losses in production, procurement, trade, and consumption.

It is necessary to devise specially designated distribution of goods for certain consumer groups—low-income individuals (retirees, students, handicapped, families with many children). How is this to be accomplished in practice? Designated coupons for certain products are one way to do it. In this case, it is expedient to concentrate the corresponding assortment in special shops or trade sections. The introduction of a coupon system does not rule out the use of simultaneous monetary compensation, especially in the event of rapid changes in maximum prices. However, I repeat that this is just one of the possible models.

[Golovachev] Do you believe that large joint-stock shops and department stores operated jointly with Western companies may appear in our country?

[Orlov] Certainly. At the first stage, a certain segment of state property should be transferred to the control of labor collectives under leasing arrangements and on a joint-stock basis. Subsequently, a considerable percentage of small and medium-size stores (shops), including some branch stores and trade companies, should, to my mind, be transferred or sold on a competitive basis to become family, individual, or collective property.

Some of the large trade companies and department stores, and domestic stores with a unified technological and trade cycle and their own developed material and technical facilities should also be leased or transferred to

joint ownership (including joint-stock companies), without ruling out the participation of foreign capital.

It is expedient to retain as state property some of the large trade enterprises, as well as the shops for veterans, shops such as "Small Child" and "Family" (for families with many children). The current trade administrations that in most cases represent an administrative superstructure above the retail outlets may be eliminated. This, however, should be resolved by local soviets.

I believe that it will be necessary to develop trade for checks and for convertible currencies. Apart from the traditional sources of currency supply to the populace (work abroad and transfers of currency funds from foreign individuals and organizations), it is necessary to increase the currency proceeds of citizens from Soviet enterprises (including joint enterprises) that sell their products abroad. I believe that the sale of currency to the populace by the state (the Bank for Foreign Trade) for Soviet currency at a market rate (including an auction rate) is a significant measure.

The withdrawal of the state from the system of public catering and the sphere of services (shops, tailor establishments, barber shops, and so on) proceeds along the same lines.

As I see it, these are just some of the features of a possible model of market economy with regard to trade.

As can be seen, we are on the threshold of a complex and, apparently, protracted process of creating the regulated market. This is a new and difficult endeavor. Profoundly thought-out decisions, the consolidation of our society, and a clear understanding of the goals and tasks of this significant stage of our economy are necessary in order to cope with this endeavor.

Agricultural

State Commission Official on Land Rent Proposals

PM0604112790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

["Topical Interview" with Ye.I. Gaydamaka, chief of the Main Administration of Land Use and Land Management at the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases, by TASS correspondent G. Yevstifeyev for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "Land Rent"; date, place of interview not given]

[Text] Moscow—Only a small number of the articles of the Fundamentals of Land Legislation apply with immediate effect, as lawyers call it. The others will come into force after the adoption of republic land legislation and other legally binding acts. One of the most significant standards of the new law concerns land rent [plata za zemlyu].

We discuss this topic with Ye.I. Gaydamaka, chief of the Main Administration for Land Use and Land Management at the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases.

[Yevstifeyev] As soon as land taxation and land rent are mentioned in the Fundamentals of Land Legislation, it is explained that their size will be determined on the basis of the quality of the plot of land in question...

[Gaydamaka] Until recently a system of zonal purchasing prices was in use in our country. Its imperfections are visible with the naked eye since the conditions in which specific farms operate are unique and differ even between neighboring collective or state farms.

[Yevstifeyev] Does this mean that we are returning to the differentiated ground rent [renta] which existed in the country during the NEP [New Economic Policy] years, despite the fact that this term is not even mentioned in the law?

[Gaydamaka] It is true that the lawmakers have avoided using the word "ground rent," but the term "land taxation based on location and quality" refers precisely to this concept. As yet it is difficult to discuss the precise size of this tax. However, it is clear that the size of the tax in such a vast country where farming is practiced in such vastly different regions as the approaches to the Siberian Tayga and the exceptionally fertile valleys of the Transcaucasus must be differentiated.

An economic evaluation of land has been carried out. It comprises soil production potential and suitability for the cultivation of specific crops.

[Yevstifeyev] Could it not happen that in conditions of constantly strengthening market relations producers will simply raise the prices for their output in order to compensate for the land rent that is being introduced?

[Gaydamaka] It is true that the payments for land must be in line with the prices for the marketed produce. However, if the tax is based on differentiated rent payments, setting of arbitrary prices by producers will be ruled out. The size of the ground rent will be the bigger, the higher the prices for products are.

[Yevstifeyev] This poses the threat of "distortions" to which our bureaucrats have always been prone. How can we free our farmers from them if the state has been provided with such a powerful economic lever?

[Gaydamaka] There have always been more than enough "levers." In the past they were merely very cleverly camouflaged and presented as beneficial to the farmer. Now the state is honestly declaring that it will exact a tax for land use. And that the tax will be the higher, the better the quality of the plot and the more convenient its location.

As for protection against the manipulation of the size of the tax, only glasnost can help. Everyone in a rayon must know how much tax is due on specific plots. We are

proposing, for instance, that it would be right to compile a detailed chart of similar plots of land in every rayon for general inspection specifying the ground rent (tax) index and the manner of payment. It will be up to the future holders of this land to choose a plot according to their pocket.

Agricultural Developments for 22 Mar-3 Apr

LD0504032390

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 22 March-3 April, unless indicated otherwise. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parenthesis at the end of each item.

22-23 March

No significant developments reported.

24 March

Massive sowing of cereal crops and annual grasses has begun in Belgorod Oblast. The work is being done in as short as time as possible because of the unusually warm weather. (0200)

Sowing of oats is coming to an end in southwest Belorussia. All farms are sowing barley. (0200)

25 March

Because of the early spring, sowing work has already started in the Ukraine. Barley, oats, and peas already have been sown on 2.3 million hectares, which is more than half the entire area to be sown with early cereals. At a number of farms the sowing of sugar beet has begun already, much earlier than usual. (1100)

26-27 March

No significant developments reported.

28 March

Sowing machinery has started work in the beet fields of Kuban. This crop occupies 20,000 hectares as of this morning. The peculiar feature of this year is that three quarters of the beets will be cultivated using intensive technology. In total, spring crops have already occupied about 500,000 hectares of Krasnodar Kray. (0600)

Agricultural workers in Azerbaijan have begun sowing corn. (1100)

29 March

Belgorod Oblast sowing of early grains and annual grasses: The crops have already been placed on 200,000 ha, more than half of the acreage set aside for these crops. (0600)

30 March

No significant developments reported.

31 March

Kursk Oblast plans to sow early cereals and perennial grasses on more than 500,000 ha this year. The halfway mark has already been reached. (0400)

1-3 April

No significant developments reported.

Military

'Pressure' on Officers Drafting Reform Reported

PM0904124190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by I. Chernyak: "Your Move, Minister"]

[Text] A session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security's subcommittee on the Armed Forces recently examined a draft concept of military reform.

Several officers had taken part almost clandestinely in the draft's preparation. Those "exposed" wrote documents to justify themselves and there were also threats of dismissal from the Armed Forces. What gave rise to the Defense Ministry's dissatisfaction?

The draft sweeps away all dogmas which had so far been regarded as unshakable. For instance, it proposes a gradual transition to a professional army manned on a voluntary basis (as is done in 58 countries in the world), to which representatives of the Defense Ministry are to this day firmly opposed. The principle of universal military service is retained only for war time. On behalf of the deputies' commission for preparing the draft, the commission's chairman, V. Lopatin, advocated the creation of national military formations in the republics, control over the Defense Ministry by supreme state organs, and full accountability of the military department's leaders to the Supreme Soviet.

Many innovations, including controversial ones, are proposed: They include the assignment of the leadership of the Defense Ministry only to a civilian, the introduction of alternative service, the reduction of the number of political workers, officers, and generals through an increase in the number of sergeants and civilians, the elimination of the military construction detachments and railroad troops as a labor army, and the participation of all parties and public organizations in the formation of military policy. The deputies will seek guarantees of the right of military men to take part in trade unions and various political parties. It provides for the creation of new services in the army: legal, psychological, socio-consumer and cultural backup services, and military courts (instead of military tribunals).

Representatives of seven institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, three military academies and four institutes took part in the preparation of the draft "on a public basis." The Military Medical Academy, the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy refused to take part in the work, according to V. Lopatin.

"We do not lay claim to a monopoly," USSR People's Deputy Colonel A. Tsalko said at the session. "There is a good Kalmyk saying: To organize races you need at least two horses. Let the Defense Ministry draft its own—alternative—draft and the deputies will determine which one to vote for."

The draft reform as a whole has been approved. After the elimination next Friday of elements which have given rise to criticism, it will be submitted again for discussion by the subcommittee. As for the pressure exerted on the officers by the Defense Ministry... At the proposal of Academician Ye. Velikhov, USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov will be sent a letter from the USSR people's deputies asking him to express gratitude to the officers who took part in preparing the draft.

Transcaucasian Military Council Examines Problems

LD0804032990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1530 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] A session of the military council of the Transcaucasian military okrug has examined urgent measures for strengthening organizational and political work to eradicate the reasons for incidents and crimes connected with the evasion by soldiers and youths of conscript age of service in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces, with nonregulatory interrelations, the theft of weapons and ammunition, and deaths.

It was noted that recently the number of offences connected to nonregulatory relationships has somewhat decreased and the theft of state property and money has decreased more than threefold.

The state of affairs regarding discipline in a number of units and subunits has improved. A decision adopted envisions specific measures to eliminate deficiencies. A number of officials have been strictly reprimanded at the extremely low organization of work to strengthen military discipline and instructed to introduce regulation order in the units under them.

Chitanava, chairman of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers, spoke at the session. Gasanov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, and Markaryants, chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, took part in the work of the military council.

Defense Committee Meets on SRF Budget

18010024A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS item entitled: "Committee Session"]

[Text] In Moscow on 5 April a session of the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet took place. Questions of the financing of the Strategic Rocket Forces [SRF], as well as the development of capital construction and the social sphere of this branch of the USSR Armed Forces took place.

Prosecutor Views Crime in Army, Other Issues

PM0404150990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Justice A. Katusev, chief military prosecutor, by N. Burbyga under the rubric "From Competent Sources": "Not Just 'Bullying'"—date of interview not given; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] A meeting with journalists was held at the Main Military Prosecutor's Office. Questions of military discipline and legality in the Armed Forces were discussed. Our correspondent met with Lieutenant General of Justice A. Katusev, chief military prosecutor, and asked him to answer a few questions on this subject.

[Burbyga] Aleksandr Filippovich, what is the purpose of today's meeting?

[Katusev] We hold meetings of this kind annually. This is done with the aim of drawing public attention to the problems of discipline and legality in the Army, which unfortunately have grown more acute in connection with events in the country. After all, it is no secret that crime among minors has risen by 22 percent, and by a third in the country as a whole. [sentence as published]

[Burbyga] Alarming letters from parents whose sons are serving in the Army continue to arrive at the editorial office. They complain that the notorious "bullying" has still not been eradicated.

[Katusev] I must say that a merciless war has been declared on "bullying." Certain results have been achieved. In 1989 the number of crimes of this kind decreased by nine percent in comparison with 1988.

Nonetheless, what we are doing is "too little, too late." As before, among the young people drafted into the Army there are many who have been "raised" on fist law. Among the draftees each year there are more than 50,000 people who have been in conflict with the law. This is what we should look at.

Or take another issue. Was there ever any friction among servicemen in the past on interethnic grounds? No. There was comradeship in arms. And what do we have now? Servicemen group together according to nationality.

[Burbyga] You have just cited a precise figure testifying to the decline in crimes connected with "bullying." Why are there no other figures? Is this some kind of secret?

[Katusev] Unfortunately, the statistics about crimes committed in the Army are as yet classified. Although in my opinion, there is nothing to hide. The figures should be made public. The Army can only gain from this. For instance, in Moscow's Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon alone more crimes are committed than in the whole of Moscow Military District.

[Burbyga] Judging by the editorial mail, draft-dodging is a particularly topical problem today. In the Kiev Military District there were more than 1,000 "draft dodgers" in 1989, against 48 in 1988.

[Katusev] It is true that this problem is now more acute than it has ever been.

It is characteristic in particular of the Baltic republics and the Transcaucasus, where a certain section of nationalistically-minded young people refuse to fulfill their

constitutional duty to the country. Moreover, this frequently happens with the "blessing" of the republican supreme organs of power.

And another thing. If society paid as much attention to draft-dodging as it does to "bullying," I believe it would be much easier for us to combat this phenomenon.

[Burbyga] Unfortunately, there are other cases too which prompt "deserters" to seek refuge from the barracks hooligans. Sometimes they even turn to us, to the newspaper, for assistance...

[Katusev] They should not turn to the newspaper but to their commander or his superior. If they have no confidence in them—and I admit that this can happen—then they should turn to the nearest military prosecutor. It is important to grasp that anyone who deserts his unit is also committing a crime. Subsequently it can be very difficult to establish precisely why he left his unit. Was it because he was getting beaten up, or did he just want to go absent without leave? Unfortunately, that happens sometimes too. Some young people try to speculate on nonregulation relations. And now, incidentally, they have also started speculating on interethnic relations.

Baltic Republics

Vilnius Radio Carries 9 Apr Council Session

Agenda Adopted

LD0904143890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT on 9 April begins carrying a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius. It is announced that five more delegates have now joined the work of the session; they were elected last Friday in repeat elections.

The following agenda is presented:

1. Confirmation of mandates of newly elected deputies. This is later postponed until tomorrow.
2. Reelection of the Vote Counting Commission.
3. Draft law of the republic of Lithuania on enterprises.
4. Clarification of the Lithuanian Supreme Council concerning the issue of recruitment of citizens of Lithuania to the Soviet military forces.

At 1207 GMT the Vote Counting Commission is reelected.

At 1208 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis reports on the current political situation. Landsbergis speech ends at 1256 GMT.

At 1257 GMT a representative from the Lithuanian community in Australia takes the floor to make a speech of congratulations.

At 1259 GMT Bronislovas Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council gives an account of his visit to Canada. Kuzmickas says that the Canadian Government is looking to the U.S. Government before making any commitments concerning Lithuania's independence. He says that in Canada, he was asked about the objective of his visit. Kuzmickas says that he wanted to clarify certain points about the policy of his government: Lithuania is ready to discuss any issues with Moscow and the world except one, and that is her independence. Kuzmickas says that unconditional support could not be expected from Canada. One condition for this is he said, that Lithuanians, right as they are concerning their occupation and annexation, should not look at the issue from their point of view only, they should also be concerned with stability in Europe and the world. This should be stressed in the policies of this government. Kuzmickas concludes his speech at 1315 GMT.

At 1316 GMT Deputy Vagnoris reports on the next item of the agenda, i.e. the draft law on enterprises. He discusses the situation from the point of view of economics, theory, and practice concentrating on inflation, taxation, and economic activity at various enterprises, private, limited, and others. Vagnoris concludes his report at 1335 GMT.

At 1336 GMT the session is adjourned until 1405 GMT.

Military Service Draft Debated

LD0904152990

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1405 GMT on 9 April resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius. Debates continue on the draft law of the republic of Lithuania on enterprises.

At 1440 GMT it is announced that commissions were entrusted with the task of assessing the draft and the proposals to it, and to present it for publication and public discussion in two weeks.

At 1445 GMT there is a minute of silence in remembrance of those who were killed in Tbilisi last year.

At 1446 GMT Deputy Serksnys reads the draft clarification of the Supreme Council on the recruitment of the citizens of the Lithuanian Republic into the Soviet Armed Forces.

At 1456 GMT debates are held on the draft clarification; a vote is taken: 89 for, three against, nine abstentions. The document is adopted.

At 1500 GMT Deputy Motieka takes the floor to make some announcements. He reads a letter of protest written to Gorbachev by work veterans.

At 1506 GMT it is proposed to make an amendment to the decision adopted by previous Supreme Soviet sessions concerning help, cooperation, and support in the recruitment of Soviet soldiers on the part of medical staff and other services. A vote is taken on the proposal, and the motion is passed with a majority of votes.

At 1510 GMT the session adjourns until tomorrow at 0800 GMT.

Draft Concerning Military Service for Lithuanians

LD0904165290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1446 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Draft clarification of the Supreme Council on the recruitment of the citizens of the Lithuanian Republic into the Soviet Armed Forces, read by Deputy Serksnys at the Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The laws and regulations of the republic of Lithuania do not impose a duty for its citizens to serve in the Armed Forces of an alien country. However, at present, this service has not been prohibited either.

Therefore, every citizen of the republic of Lithuania who does not regard himself as a citizen of the USSR is free to decide whether or not to join in the Armed Forces which are not those of this republic.

On the basis of generally acknowledged legal regulations, taking an oath must not be demanded from the citizens of the republic of Lithuania who are forced to do military service [words indistinct].

From the point of view of laws of the republic, calling the citizens of this republic for military service in the Armed Forces of other states is illegal, because this is an attempt to apply by force laws of an alien state which are not valid on the territory of Lithuania. [passage omitted] Refusal to do military service in the Soviet Armed Forces is not liable to criminal responsibility. [passage omitted] The city and rayon executive committees of people's deputies are instructed by the regulation of the republican government not to take part in the 1990 recruitment to the Soviet Armed Forces and to discontinue provision and financing of municipal services to the military recruitment offices in Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Landsbergis Addresses 9 Apr Council Session

LD0904165590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1208 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Speech by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] Good day, esteemed colleagues and deputies: Much has happened in the past two or three days, and at the same time there is a lot of information. I would like to share all of this with you.

Of course, I will not be able to review and discuss everything. In our present political situation a new, perhaps long-term and well-planned factor is the attack by Soviet propaganda against Lithuania. This is the struggle for international opinion, which almost without exception has been on the side of Lithuania. Attempts are being made to disturb it, to change it, to show that by far not everyone supports us, etc.

The meaning of this attack is also a demonstration that international opinion is an exceptionally important factor in our present struggle. Our weapons are our will, our steadfastness, and our quiet work. Our other weapon is international opinion—which supports us and presses the Soviet Union to behave in a more just way than it has up to now.

Here is one of the obvious matters which, it seems, must concern the Soviet leadership on the scale of its policy, because the basic argument and factor of that policy is that Mikhail Gorbachev's prestige and his image, created over several years, are in danger. The image of the savior of mankind is in some danger. Some people have started thinking, and this has also been stated in the press, that he is not like this, that he is an old-style dictator and a poor politician, who has driven himself into a corner with careless extremist statements concerning Lithuania. In other words, perhaps, he is not a man of tomorrow, but a man of yesterday at best, of a today which already is leaning towards yesterday.

We also had some illusions, or perhaps we wanted to have them, that some brutal actions in Lithuania could have been decided by the supreme military authority,

that it was a certain policy that compromised Gorbachev, that it could have been a line carried out independently. Unfortunately, Mikhail Gorbachev's behavior towards Estonia, in his conversation with Estonia's president, threatening that the same measures used against Lithuania be applied against it, bear witness to the contrary, that perhaps all these measures applied in Lithuania were planned very well and were approved at the highest level. [passage omitted] It is possible that Moscow does not desire negotiations, that it does not desire preliminary goodwill contacts, that it avoids them by stating conditions for Lithuania, knowing in advance that they cannot be accepted. Then it is very convenient to say that Lithuania does not wish to comply with such a simple condition. [passage indistinct]

And now an international propaganda attack will take place. For this purpose, diplomats, journalists, and even military men are being used. And here is very shocking news—a high-ranking military leader, the commander of the state of emergency in Karabakh and other areas, Major General Safronov, is explaining that there is a direct contact and [words indistinct]. There is information that emissaries arriving from Lithuania have incited the activity of armed groups, and after the arrival from Lithuania of those instigators there have been more clashes, more victims and so on, in Karabakh and in the neighboring areas.

Hardly anyone believes this. I am not going to talk on how this looks to us in Lithuania. But very effective Goebbels tactics are being used; I repeat, something will stick, or maybe, there is some connection. [passage indistinct]

Last Saturday we saw a military helicopter flying low over a crowd of people packed into Vingis Park. It is difficult to imagine what would have happened if the Lithuanians had not had strong nerves and if they had not replied to the event with scorn but had responded with panic, or what would have happened if the wind—there was a strong wind that day—had forced the helicopter to the ground. There would not have just been dozens killed, but hundreds crushed to death. [passage indistinct] I think that General Yazov will put this protest in his bottomless drawer and his bottomless conscience.

Now we have the problem of the Press Palace. [passage omitted] We know that if this palace is controlled by the CPSU branch in Lithuania, this will be the end of freedom of the press. [passage omitted] But one wonders whether this is a special task since the provocation with the Procuracy yielded no results. [passage omitted] The aim is to disturb work so that it is possible to accuse the leadership of the publishing house of working inefficiently. [passage indistinct] I had an opportunity to speak about this to General Maksimov, and to have long and sharp exchanges with him. He has been sent here from Moscow to carry out these operations, or to supervise them, or to support them. [passage indistinct] Gen. Maksimov demanded that civilians be removed from the

palace so that the Army could discharge its sacred duty, and we demanded that the Army, which is the source of all this tension, not look for other culprits, because it is the culprit itself. [passage indistinct]

If this is the problem of the ownership of the Lithuanian Communist Party, then the Lithuanian Communist Party must take more initiative, go to arbitration, to the Supreme Court, or solve this problem at a corresponding level. [passage omitted] There is a sense of blackmail and psychological pressure. This policy is also continuing with economic means. Some things are for internal use, some for foreign customers. They wish to impress on the inhabitants of the Soviet Union that the situation in Lithuania is unstable, that there is great tension which has almost reached critical point. The escalation of tension is taking place, and it is terrifying to think what will happen. [passage omitted]

They say that there is a threat to the rights of Soviet citizens, but so far no one can say which rights are being threatened. [passage indistinct] It is very strange that those who proclaim themselves champions of human rights in Lithuania make use of such measures as invitations to boycott the elections, which is a basic democratic right, inviting people to strike while saying themselves at the same time that the economic situation in Lithuania will sharply decline—although it has not yet declined so badly. Everything is functioning normally in our country, but it could be made worse, and then these forecasts and intimidations would be justified. I believe that if a strike does take place in Lithuania that has an economic impact, the losses should be covered by the supporters of those organizations, the supporters of those activists who are beyond the borders of Lithuania, who occupy high posts and who instigate these affairs as patrons of certain organizations in Lithuania itself, and act through them. They should bear economic responsibility. [passage omitted] If this is the property [of the CPSU organization in Lithuania], which has already yielded a tenfold profit to the investor, such as the Press Palace which has repaid tenfold the expenditure on its construction, we will see pure colonialism here. This has always happened when an empire has invested something in the colonies and then coerces them by defending its rights and its property. [passage omitted] Very old and very refined Stalinist methods are being used to distort statements by foreign figures in the Soviet press. [passage omitted]

We, for our part, must do more and better than we have done to date. We need much better internal information in Lithuania, better ties with the rayon press, direct ties and even conversations. [passage omitted] We must have more wavelengths on the radio and television in Russian. This is expected by Lithuania's citizens who want to hear a greater variety of opinions. Maybe it would be necessary to make more frequent use of simultaneous translation; we need more statements in Polish, maybe, making use of the part of the program in which Warsaw is

broadcast. We should broadcast more in Polish, maybe not only in Polish but also in the other languages of the nations in Lithuania.

In the foreign sphere we see a very well developed attack by Soviet propaganda. Now we hear there that the Soviet Union's leadership is allegedly in favor of negotiations with Lithuania, only that unacceptable condition is omitted. On the whole, when foreign politicians speak of negotiations, they always say that negotiations are negotiations without preconditions. But Moscow omits this in silence and wishes to demonstrate that they are for negotiations. But we know the conditions. [passage omitted]

They say that Moscow wishes to solve everything legitimately, in accordance with the law, and constitutionally. Only for some reason these Lithuanians are acting illegally and are violating the Constitution; they themselves voted for the Soviet Constitution! Such a vote was taken for Stalin's Constitution, too. The whole Soviet people marched unanimously up to about two years ago, when for the first time the voice of the people was heard and when 1.8 million people in Lithuania rejected the amendments to the Soviet Constitution. They forgot about that. They pretend to be naive and say that the Lithuanian themselves adopted the Soviet Constitution. And why now do they not want to leave the USSR in peace and order? There are enough people without clear ideas, sometimes even among the diplomats, who accept such arguments in silence. [passage omitted]

Sometimes it is explained that the Soviet Union will properly solve this, its internal affair, in accordance with the desire of one republic to secede. Once again it is stated that this is an internal affair. This sometimes even gets into the comments by the British and Italian foreign ministers. Thus the same old deceptive propaganda methods are not in vain. [passage omitted]

Moscow is now behaving: it is allowing secession, if someone is not wise or is dissatisfied, let them go; but it must be done in order, without haste, in accordance with the law, taking into consideration the will of each inhabitant, and so on. They want to look like good uncles who have difficulties with disobedient, badly brought up or immature children. This paternalism has always been a characteristic of the emperors and tsars, to regard themselves as parents who have the right to punish their children for their own benefit. They want to explain the whole situation from this position. [passage omitted]

Here too we must be active. We need a political offensive in the international arena. We must have an effective special information service in Lithuania, without sparing expense, and must find qualified people for this purpose. We must coordinate this activity with the modest means of the Lithuanian information centers abroad. We must encourage our emigres to pay much more attention to this political struggle. We have to overcome a certain indifference of foreign governments. [passage omitted]

In the United States, where Foreign Minister Shevardnadze paid a visit with this entourage and his propaganda staff, the beginning of this Soviet propaganda offensive was marked. The U.S. officials, repeating their previous warnings to the effect that the use of force in Lithuania is impermissible, and that it would affect relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, agreed in advance, however, on the date of the summit meeting. There have already been various comments about it. This is a factor that binds Moscow on the one hand but which, on the other hand, encourages it that what it has done so far in Lithuania has not interfered with the fixing of the date. Utterances by some officials sound strange when, speaking of relations with Moscow, they call them our difficult love. [passage omitted] On the other hand, the U.S. President has made a more strongly formulated warning than ever before. [passage omitted] Proposals can be heard to raise Lithuania's problem at the international Hague tribunal. There are proposals about mediation between Lithuania and Moscow by some influential persons. [passage omitted] The diplomacy of the nations on the Soviet Union's scale may be a factor which may suddenly provoke an action of great revolutionary importance in other republics and in Russia. It may happen that the Soviet Union's Government will be of no importance. Nations will speak to nations and will agree. [passage omitted] Then we will know whether Gorbachev and his leadership are tomorrow's people or yesterday's people.

Thank you for your attention.

Kuzmickas Reports to Lithuanian Supreme Council

LD0904155490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1259 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Report by Bronislovas Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius on 9 April—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] When meeting journalists, television staff, or politicians, I was constantly asked the following questions: Why had I arrived; what did I want to tell Canada, the Canadian Government and parliament; and what did I want from Canada?

I formulated my answers the way we had formulated them here before, which was that Lithuania is inclined to negotiations with Moscow and to a dialogue with the entire world on any issue, well perhaps not exactly any issue, but at least on most issues, excepting that of independence. It seems to me that this answer was understood quite well. I said that I came to ask that Canadian MPs [ministers of parliament], members of the government, and politicians find within the scope of their possibilities and understanding, a way to influence Soviet diplomats, politicians, and world public opinion that military force should not be used in Lithuania, that the economic blockade should not be imposed, and that negotiations should begin without any preconditions, as negotiations should. [passage omitted]

I become convinced that while going to Canadian or U.S. society, we should not want to be supported unconditionally, saying that we are right and that therefore we should be supported unconditionally, regardless of what impression our behavior makes on them. In order to be supported we have to fulfill one condition, which is that our political activity should correspond to a certain image of a serious and responsible people, in other words, we should present a certain image [preceding word in English]. This is not too difficult to fulfill, and it virtually corresponds to what we are: We are a peace-loving, quiet, rational, Baltic nation, aspiring to its legitimate demands by absolutely legitimate means.

Therefore, any demonstration of hostility toward Moscow or Gorbachev would not be met with success. If we were to pursue our objectives in disregard of how tension could develop between East and West, this would not be met with approval, either. This means that while working toward and aspiring to retain our independence, we must at the same time bear in mind the possible development of the entire context of international relations. Here—and I completely agree with this—if, let us say, relations between the USSR and the United States cooled to the point where a certain U.S. influence would have no effect on the USSR, what would this mean? This would mean that they Moscow could deal with us without any ceremony, too.

Now, what is the position of the Lithuanian problem at the moment? Unfortunately, so far it remains on a moral and humanistic level only. It is somewhat too early to see it on the level of real political decisions. However, the moral pressure applied is great and it has a tendency to grow. Here, a simple human logic is at work, which is that people want to support the weaker. [passage omitted]

Our deputies, our people should make more visits to these states. We must continue explaining what we are, but we should not act resolutely, pushing only our own cause. We somehow must get into the context of the mentality and political thinking of these countries and their interpretation of our issue. This context is fine, in other words, a certain language is used and a certain level when talking politics, and we must be able to lay out our problems according to these. [passage omitted]

Landsbergis on Presidential Council 'Threats'

LD1004103590 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0000 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, apart from other questions asked at the news conference that took place late tonight, was also asked to comment on the conclusion of the USSR Presidential Council.

V. Landsbergis said that he could only express his regret that such a rough statement was made in addition to other statements in which Mikhail Gorbachev used unjustifiably coarse and insulting phrases.

It can also be noted, said V. Landsbergis, that the statements made by the Soviet leader depend greatly on the political situation. A meeting between Yakovlev and Lithuanian parliamentarians took place in Moscow before Shevardnadze's trip to Washington. This meeting was presented in Washington as the wish of the USSR to start a dialogue with Lithuania. Now this meeting has been persistently interpreted by the Soviet press as a private meeting that was not binding on the Soviet Union. One gets the same impression when one compares mild statements made by Shevardnadze in Washington and today's statement made by the Presidential Council. Thanks to comparatively mild statements the date of the summit has been decided. This concession was obtained from the president of the United States, so now President Gorbachev can allow himself to make very rough threats to Lithuania. Of course, this is not pleasant for us. The only benefit from this could be that the West would be able to realize what, in fact, the Soviet Union is and if President Gorbachev is indeed the person they imagine him to be, Vytautas Landsbergis said.

Lithuania's Ozolas on Actions of Soviet Troops

*LD1004113690 Vilnius International Service
in Lithuanian 0000 GMT 10 Apr 90*

[Excerpts] Assessing the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces on the territory of Lithuania during the past weeks, Lithuanian Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas said that these were a crude interference into the republic's internal affairs aimed at destabilizing the situation, demoralizing the public, and hampering the work of the administration. Such actions are illegal, even from the point of view of Soviet jurisdiction, said Romualdas Ozolas. By their aggressiveness, these actions outstrip even the behavior of the Red Army in 1940. The Lithuanian deputy prime minister was speaking on Lithuanian television last night. [passage omitted]

According to the deputy prime minister, to hope that negotiations with the USSR leadership would start soon was not realistic; unofficial talks, not necessarily with top ranking people of the USSR, are possible. [passage omitted]

According to Romualdas Ozolas, the negotiations are inevitable. The leadership of the Soviet Union, which has been oriented toward restructuring, sooner or later will want to negotiate with us. However, this does not mean that the president of the USSR would want to recognize our independence in the way we want it to be recognized. However, the deputy prime minister stressed, everyone must know that there will be no discussions with anybody about renouncing our independence.

Forecasting oncoming events related to the issue of negotiations, Romualdas Ozolas said that the actions of the armed forces, which had become more active even during E. Shevardnadze's visit in the United States, indicate that there are forces in the USSR which could

press for another, more productive sitting of the Presidential Council, to conclude with a decision on introduction of USSR presidential rule in Lithuania to follow the earlier sitting, which did not discuss the Lithuanian problem. [passage omitted]

Soviet Newspapers Comment on Lithuanian Situation

*LD1004112890 Moscow TASS in English 1112 GMT
10 Apr 90*

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—The complex situation in Lithuania remains one of the main topics in Soviet newspapers.

"Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and his team lack political prudence. A policy cannot be based on ultimatums and confrontations," concludes PRAVDA.

"Musicology Professor Landsbergis knows that an innumerable number of music variations can be created with seven notes," PRAVDA's special correspondent writes from Lithuania. "Why does politician Landsbergis usually use only one note—the note of ultimatums?"

In the event of Lithuania's secession from the union, the problem of establishing new economic relations that correspond to new political realities will inevitably arise, Aleksandr Troshin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, believes.

In an interview published in the newspaper RAB-OCHAYA TRIBUNA, he emphasises that in that case trade will have to be conducted on the basis of freely convertible currency and at world market prices. Oil inside the Soviet Union is much cheaper than on the external market. The prices of meat, milk and light industry products—in which Lithuania specialises—are slightly more expensive on the domestic market than in the West.

In 1940, the level of the development of Lithuania's industrial production was 66.7 per cent lower than the country's average, Troshin said. Only seven per cent of the population was engaged in industry at that time.

Today Lithuania is, in the main an industrialised republic with a highly developed agricultural sector. Fifty billion roubles were invested in the Lithuanian economy to achieve that.

"Secession from the USSR must not and may not be a unilateral act, accomplished all at once. It is possible only after a transitional period during which new mutual relations will be determined and established and both social and economic issues must be resolved.

"The most responsible decisions on the republic's separation from the union should be taken only through a referendum," Troshin emphasised.

USSR Deputy Procurator on Lithuanian Situation

*LD0904171590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 9 Apr 90*

[Report by special correspondent Gennadiy Kolenov from Vilnius]

[Text] If the past weekend days were filled with reports on rallies here in Lithuania—let me remind you that one of them was held in Vilnius by Sajudis, and another in Klaipeda, organized by the Yedinstvo movement—today was, first of all, the continuation of the work of the session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, and secondly, it was filled with several simultaneous news conferences. I managed to attend one of them. Answering journalists' questions, in particular the question: To whom are the militia bodies and the law enforcement bodies of the republic now subordinate? Aleksey Dmitriyevich Vasilyev, deputy procurator general of the USSR, said:

[Begin Vasilyev recording] As far as the militia workers are concerned, you know yourselves what the minister of internal affairs has said on this matter. This position is certainly creating certain difficulties in the work of the law enforcement bodies, and I would say frankly, has a destabilizing element to it. As for the procuracy bodies themselves, I personally have already had meetings not only with the apparatus of the republic's procuracy, but also that of some rayons. (?We say to them in such a case) well, fine, we are all lawyers, we are procurators, we are investigators. Our task is clear, precise and well defined in both the USSR Constitution and in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Constitution. One wonders what is stopping you? You have all the right conditions. Work, get on with your specific business. We are all obliged to ensure a calm, fruitful life for Soviet citizens, including those of the Lithuanian SSR. There is comprehension, but there is also, of course, another approach to this problem. This is the rigid, irreconcilable approach by the current leadership of the republic's Supreme Soviet, when they consider only the person they appointed to have been appointed procurator, although the unconstitutionality of this decision is now well known to everyone.

The attitudes of those working in the procuracy are not all the same. There are open supporters of the position adopted by the current Lithuanian SSR leadership. There are people—they are a majority—who doubt. That's to say, this is a category of people, even among those working in the law enforcement bodies, who today, because of the situation, because of the actual situation, so to say, the realities of the day, have not managed to adopt clearly a specific, definite, precise position. To some extent they are at the waiting stage. But on the other hand, there is very strong psychological pressure on this category of workers in the procuracy—for how can one start talking about democracy, about the construction of a rule-of-law based state, that the leaders of the Supreme Soviet of the current Lithuanian Republic talked a lot about? [sentence as heard]

We are not forcing events, and are not taking measures to dismiss people. As for the rest, we are trying to work using the tactic of not hurrying, of giving people the chance to make up their own minds. But with regard to those who go firmly on the path of sabotaging the Constitution of our country, ignoring the demands of the Constitution, we shall, in the end, be forced to take those steps which we are empowered to take by the Law on the Procuracy of the USSR. [end recording]

Vasilyev on 'Destabilizing' Laws

*LD0904203190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 9 Apr 90*

[Video interview with USSR Deputy Procurator General Aleksey Dmitriyevich Vasilyev by correspondent Lyubovtsev in Vilnius, date not given; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Lyubovtsev] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, I know that you have already been here in Vilnius for several days and, of course, you have noticed that over these few days the republic's Supreme Council has adopted more and more new laws. Apparently it has already adopted more than 50 such legislative acts. How do you appraise them from a lawyer's viewpoint?

[Vasilyev] As a lawyer, I have to say—this follows from the decisions of the country's supreme legislative bodies, from the congress, and from the president's decrees—after all, it is a generally known norm that in cases of a republican law contradicting—and the reality today is such that the republic exists within the Soviet Union, and therefore the USSR Constitution has force and is binding in its effect—in cases of contradiction between republican and Union legislation, it is the law of the USSR that has force. This is a generally recognized norm and there can be no other points of view here.

But this hasty activity of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in adopting laws that contradict the Constitution is continuing. It is regrettable. It seems to me that to resolve fairly, sensibly, and in a way that life demands, those problems that have arisen—and they have indeed arisen, they do need to be resolved, and they will be resolved—it is necessary, of course, for this hasty legislative activity that contradicts the Constitution to be halted, and for unlawful decisions to be annulled, as should be done by any body that has adopted such decisions, thus creating real conditions for the constructive solution of all problem that have arisen.

Undoubtedly, the situation in the republic concerning the adoption of a number of laws is having a destabilizing effect on the work of the Procuracy bodies and we cannot allow this, because the interests of Soviet people and the interests of the citizens of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic will only suffer as a result of this.

Lithuania's Prunskiene Gives News Conference

*LD0904201490 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 9 Apr 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The first news conference given by Lithuania's new government was held in Vilnius today. Speaking there were Prunskiene, the chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, and her deputies Brazauskas and Ozolas. They told journalists about the first session of the cabinet of ministers, which examined organizational matters. Those taking part in the news conference replied to numerous questions.

Our special correspondent asked what specific measures, what steps is the government planning to find a way out of the deadlock in which relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union ended up following 11 March, that is, following the adoption of a decision on the republic's immediate secession from the USSR. Kazimiera Prunskiene replied:

[Begin Prunskiene recording] In the first place, we are not talking about secession, but about the restoration of statehood, that's one point. And the other point is that we are not only planning, but acting. We have permanent contacts, distant contacts, with the Government of the Soviet Union, and we made unilateral addresses both to President Mikhail Gorbachev and Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Ryzhkov on beginning, immediately beginning, talks, or at least, consultations on beginning these talks. We have to date not received specific replies and consent to this, although [word indistinct] is being exerted on a whole range of problems arising, both in the economic sphere, in connection with the actions of the Army, and in connection with the spring call-up. [end recording]

Landsbergis, Cepaitis Hold News Conference

*LD0704104390 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
0615 GMT 7 Apr 90*

[Interview with Sajudis Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis and Virgilijus Cepaitis, chairman of the Sejm Commission for Citizens and Nationalities Affairs, in Vilnius on 7 April, by Polish journalists in Warsaw and in Vilnius; the "First Program" is broadcast via radio link—live]

[Text] [Announcer] We invite you to a radio link between Warsaw and Vilnius. Jan Gadomski reports:

[Gadomski] No ordinary meeting on Polish Radio's First Program today: through the intermediary of Radio Vilnius, a group of Polish journalists will meet President Vytautas Landsbergis. He is also the chairman of Sajudis, which has changed from an organization supporting perestroika into the leading force for independence. On behalf of Polish Radio listeners and on my own behalf, I welcome you, Mr. President, very warmly.

In the Warsaw studio, questions for you have been prepared by editors Leon (Wojko), Konstanty (Gebert), and Andrzej Zychowicz. In the Radio Vilnius studio, we also have Polish Radio's special correspondent, Ms. Maria Wiernikowska. Forgive me for welcoming you last, but you are after all the co-host of today's meeting. Colleague Jacek Borkowski from GAZETA WYBORCZA, has taken advantage of the opportunity and is also in the Vilnius studio. I don't think we need any ceremonious introductions on this occasion.

Our interlocutor in Vilnius, on whom today the future of the Lithuanian people depends to no small extent, and, because his activity has wide international effects as well, our interlocutor is fully aware that Poland and the Poles identify with the idea of Lithuania's independence. This is so obvious, so deeply rooted in the history, in the mentality of the Polish nation, and in the nature of the changes taking place in Poland, that all further assurances could only weaken this significance.

So I propose that we move on to the purpose of our meeting: that is, to the questions posed by Polish journalists. As I'm speaking at the moment, I'll take the opportunity to put the first question to President Landsbergis: Mr. President, there is universal support for the Lithuanian people's strivings for independence in Europe and in the United States, as well. The use of force is just as universally rejected. Political solutions are expected. This is stressed by Polish foreign policy, but not by just that. On the occasion of Shevardnadze's visit, President Bush stressed such expectations. Lithuania's independence is desired, but one which wouldn't threaten Gorbachev, wouldn't interrupt his perestroika; and therefore a political approach, by way of compromise—for there is no other policy.

And here I come to my question: Does the response adopted by the Lithuanian parliament to Gorbachev's message point the way to a compromise, at the end of which Lithuanian independence will be seen; or will it be—after a dramatic confrontation—the beginning of a new stage?

[Landsbergis in Polish] We will be waiting for this answer from Moscow, whether our message is to be the beginning of simple, coherent talks; perhaps introductory talks, which would lead to inter-state negotiations.

[Gadomski] The next question from Editor Konstanty Gebert, please.

[(Gebert)] Mr. President, when you announced the historic declaration on the restoration of Lithuania's independence, what international support were you counting on? Were you counting on your government being recognized by other world states? Were you counting on this from the Government of the [Polish] Republic?

[Landsbergis] On the one hand, we weren't counting on any special steps in our direction, steps of immediate support. We knew we had to do this, because the time had come. It is our duty. We didn't count on any sort of

support and what could be connected with that. But we also knew that our step would be a kind of test for countries and for states, above all those which have contact with politics in this region of Europe or with great politics, world [politics]. This is the situation in which we find ourselves, then, and not only we—as Lithuania—but also (?the states mentioned).

[Gadomski] Editor Zychowicz, please.

[Zychowicz] Not so long ago, Mr. President, you said bitterly that the West wants to sell Lithuania. How do you assess the stance of the Western powers now? Do you perceive an increase in pressure on Moscow from that quarter?

[Landsbergis] The United States is taking a firmer position at the moment, thanks to the attitude of congress, in fact. As for the West European states, the attitude (?there) is more differentiated, perhaps. The Scandinavian countries support us more, even in the sense of state contacts; also in (?this) sense Poland and Czechoslovakia supported us, also establishing inter-state contacts, (?including) the well-known invitation by President Havel, with the proposal to use—if one can put it like this—Czechoslovakia as a neutral place for negotiations. And a very important day for us, a dangerous day, one could also say the arrival of a Polish Sejm delegation, as an official delegation of another state, was for us very important political support, as was the communique published, which caused such Soviet complaint, known from the press. [as heard]

[Gadomski] Colleague Borkowicz, in the Vilnius studio, please.

[Borkowicz] Mr. President, do you think that eventual negotiations will be only negotiations between the Lithuanian government and Moscow; or perhaps they will be negotiations between Moscow and a delegation representing the three Baltic republics?

[Landsbergis] It could turn out in various ways. Of course, the situation is the same; the political-legal situation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is the same, but the conditions, the specific demands, which the Soviet Union may make of the individual Baltic countries, may differ. In any case, if time runs so slowly in Moscow and so quickly in the Baltic countries, it may happen that there may be joint inter-state negotiations by the three republics and Moscow; and there may be some kind of conference of the whole region.

[Gadomski] Our radio colleague Maria Wiernikowska, in the Vilnius studio now, please.

[Wiernikowska] What can be the subject of negotiations with Moscow? Can it be a referendum?

[Landsbergis] [word indistinct] first and foremost they are to be introductory negotiations, regarding future inter-state negotiations. At these negotiations, we envisage and we have even made a statement, that all

matters, all issues can be discussed—apart from independence. If Moscow wants to talk about some kind of referendum, we can discuss it, without any initial promises or anything like that. As we know, the best negotiations, (?particularly) official negotiations, are those for which no initial demands are put forward.

[[Wojko]] [Wojko], from the studio in Warsaw. Could you be more precise about what reaction you expect to your response to the message from President Gorbachev to you?

[Landsbergis] We expect an answer not only to our message. Our message, like that of President Gorbachev, is a component part of a much greater political game, if one can put it like that, although the game is very serious. It will certainly resolve issues much greater than just Lithuania.

[[Gebert]] Mr. President, Konstanty (Gebert) from the studio in Warsaw. To what do you attribute the stoical calm with which the Lithuanian people watches successive Soviet provocations in your capital, in your country? Does this calm result from determination, from the conviction that you are right; or is it, as some Western press (?correspondents) have suggested, indifference and apathy? How do you see it, Mr. President?

[Landsbergis] In no way do I think that it is indifference. The Lithuanian nation is concentrated, it is determined, it is supporting us with its calm, to the same degree as when it responds to our appeals.

[Gadomski] Moscow has made economic threats. Editor Zychowicz in the Warsaw Studio.

[Zychowicz] Has the Soviet Union used any means which could be seen as preparations for some kind of economic restrictions?

[Landsbergis] This has been spoken about previously, not only (?regarding) the continuation of an independent Lithuania, but maybe six months or a year ago, when they already knew that we were going in this direction; and it turned out that these threats remain only threats; that they were also only a kind of political pressure and not anything real, which could be carried out immediately after the declaration of independence. That didn't happen. The contacts, the economic obligations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union, as we proposed, are being continued.

[Wiernikowska] Maria Wiernikowska. When we were making arrangements [for this program] you said: Goodbye until then, provided the radio is still free. Was that just a joke?

[Landsbergis] It wasn't a joke. There is always a percentage of reality in our jokes.

[Wiernikowska] We have in the studio Mr. Virgilijus Cepaitis, chairman of the Sejm Commission for Citizens' and Nationalities' Affairs.

[Gadomski] We welcome you warmly from Warsaw.

[Cepaitis] (?It's a pleasure).

[Wiernikowska] The accusation is made against Sajudis—and a certain proof of the verity of that accusation are the manifestations in Lithuania now by the Vilnius Civic Committee on behalf of citizens of the Soviet Union—that it has to a certain extent neglected nationality issues, issues of the Polish and Russian peoples.

[Cepaitis in Polish] I think this results from the fact that the strength of Sajudis [word indistinct] was somewhat exaggerated by observers; and only now, when Sajudis has to some extent come to power—to some extent, I say—can one begin to talk about being able to start to resolve those issues which have piled up for decades. Our Supreme Council has already—(?after) about a week's work—[established] a Commission for Eastern Lithuanian Affairs, (?which) will be concerned with the region which is of most interest to our listeners in Poland. As you know, we have already started broadcasting the Polish program on Lithuanian television. We (?have discussed) the transmission of the Leningrad program. These are the first real steps which Sajudis is beginning to take, when it now has the real possibility of doing something.

[Gadomski] From Warsaw, a question from editor (Gebert).

[Gebert] Mr. President, today's TRYBUNA, until recently the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] organ, carried a frontpage reproduction of a map which is allegedly being distributed in Vilnius and in Lithuania. On this map, the borders of greater Lithuania extend beyond today's frontier of the Lithuanian Republic and take in Polish territory in the northeast. Are such maps indeed being distributed? Does this kind of claim indeed exist?

[Landsbergis] I don't know what you mean by the word distributed. There are various cooperative enterprises which produce God knows what. I knew of those maps on which the frontier of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, probably, is shown. and (?that) frontier, which is found on that map—I don't think it signifies any claims by the Lithuanian Republic today.

[Cepaitis] I add that I recently saw postcards in Poland with a map of Poland inside its 1938 borders, which were also distributed by somebody. I didn't make any complaints about those maps.

[Gadomski] Editor Zychowicz.

[Zychowicz] Mr. President, you spoke of the determination, of the concentration of Lithuanians in defense of independence. I want to say that we here in Warsaw are full of admiration for that determination. But the war of nerves has been going on for four weeks now. As in every trial of strength, mental stamina is necessary. How do you assess the stamina of Lithuanian society, in face of this constant pressure?

[Landsbergis] I know that the assessment made by observers is very high. I wouldn't like to praise my own nation, but I believe in its stamina. It has endured various pressures for almost fifty years, various spiritual and psychological pressures, and has come through. At the moment, we have had very great doses in a short time, intensified by a show of military force, a seemingly totally (?soulless force), ready to sweep everything away; but we have no choice. The only thing to do is to endure.

[Wiernikowska] The (?moods) of the Supreme Council seem to indicate a completely different atmosphere. (?It sent) an answer to Gorbachev, whose author was Mr. Cepaitis, if I'm not mistaken. And here I have a question for you: why did you (?polish) the variant, which was much more radical? Why did such well-known dates as 1940, as 11 May disappear from the answer to Gorbachev? Why is there no clear mention of independence? Why is there mention of the Soviet Constitution?

[Cepaitis] It wasn't just my project. A few more people worked on this draft. Perhaps I gave the draft this form. I think the (?view) won, that Gorbachev had to be left some room for maneuver. If our answer had been completely tough, it wouldn't have given him... he would have been forced, in a way, to answer our toughness with even more toughness. I don't know whether this is (?well thought-out), but the majority of the Supreme Council voted thus.

[Gadomski] Jan Gadomski, Warsaw. Mr. President, have you secured yourselves allies in the fight for an independent Lithuania and if so, to what extent? I'm thinking not of allies outside the frontiers of the USSR, but in the USSR itself and not just in the Baltic region but in the Russian nation, for instance, where groups are making themselves more and more strongly heard at the present time, which want to reject anachronistic imperial principles—to mention just the strong current in the so-called Inter-regional Group. So, a question about allies in the USSR itself.

[Landsbergis] We have such allies and they come to visit us, as delegates, as groups, as deputies, from Russia. They send us letters and telegrams and so on. We know that democratic movements are ready to support us and we have already seen such support in the form of rallies, large rallies, in [word indistinct], in Lvov, and also in Moscow, and other Russian cities. There are announcements of more such rallies. Of course, those democratic forces are not just supporting us, but themselves as well in this way, gathering around themselves all people striving for justice, democracy, freedom of peoples [word indistinct]

[fWojko] (Wojko), Warsaw. With reference to that question, and to your earlier statement that your step of declaring independence is a test for states, for peoples and societies, how do you assess the reaction of the Russian people and society? How do you, for example, assess the fact only 93 deputies voted against the resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies stating that

your step was illegal? That was considerably fewer than voted against the election of president by that Congress. [sentence indistinct] How do you assess that? Don't you feel—to put it frankly—isolated in your struggle?

[Landsbergis] No, not really. The voting on the third day of the Congress took place in a very heated atmosphere, artificially heated and anti-Lithuanian, at that moment. I don't want to accuse the deputies who could have abstained from voting for that decision, which was presented as the most (?legal) and constitutional; and (?who, in this respect) often (?believed), and still do, as the whole Soviet propaganda in the world is conducted under the same slogan: (?pro Constitution), about those (?criminals) who violate the Constitution. [sentence as heard] How can they? Too few political activists in the West, experienced people, react in this way: Gentlemen, the Constitution of the annexing state cannot be imposed on the annexed state; and that state cannot later be accused of not submitting to the Constitution of the aggressor or occupier.

[Gadomski] Editor Gebert, please.

[(Gebert)] Mr. President, let's try some forward-thinking. Let's assume, as we believe and hope for you with all our hearts, that it will succeed; that an independent Lithuania will be created. What next in that region? How do you imagine the future, Mr. President? Will it be a federal structure with the other Baltic republics and with Scandinavia; or do you see links with Poland? Or, on the contrary, a people deprived of independence for half a century will not want to enter into too close contacts with other peoples? How do you see the future, Mr. President?

[Landsbergis] Above all, I see close cooperation with the Baltic countries, which have been and are in a very similar or the same situation, (?after) regaining independence, with all the problems resulting from what has been, and from what we have [word indistinct] I am also counting on good cooperation and good relations with Poland. No one knows what shape our relations with the Soviet Union will take and maybe with Belorussia, which, in the form of its (?ruling) forces, is more conservative than even the other republics in the European part of the Soviet Union. But certain changes will also come about there in the direction of democratization and greater self-determination of the nation and society; and our relations will also undergo improvement here. There are [word indistinct] national and other issues which will have to be resolved jointly among Lithuania, Belorussia, and Poland. That's evident.

Next, answering your question, I think that first of all the Lithuanian nation will want independence and that's all: to be in their own state, masters in their own yards; and, later on, after some years, maybe we will begin thinking about greater links with Europe, not only by opening the frontier, but maybe otherwise, too. But we will come to that [words indistinct].

[Gadomski] Ladies and gentlemen, time is inexorable and orders us to end the conversation. Thank you, Mr. President; thank you, Mr. Cepaitis; thank you to our Polish colleagues. We thank you for your attention, listeners. I hope I can say: listeners in Lithuania and in Poland. Goodbye.

[Announcer] You have been listening to a press conference with President Vytautas Landsbergis, organized by Polish Radio's First program, in studios in Warsaw and Vilnius.

Lithuanian Deputies Give Moscow News Conference

LD0704100990 Moscow World Service in English
0510 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] [Announcer] Various views, above all in Lithuanian itself, are aired about the consequences of the one-sided restoration of its independence by the republic's parliament. The stand of the people who initiated the independence was outlined at a news conference in Moscow. Taking part were the reappointed permanent representative of Lithuania in Moscow and a member of the republic's parliament, Egidijus Bickauskas, and another Lithuanian MP [Member of Parliament] Nikolay Medvedev. We bring you highlights of the news conference. First a statement by Egidijus Bickauskas:

[Bickauskas in Lithuanian fading into English translation]: At present it is essential to start a dialogue between Moscow and Lithuania. I'll be permanently staying in Moscow, which is an important point, and have powers to seek contacts and launch the dialogue both on behalf of the government and on behalf of our republic's parliament. We realize full well that a dialogue must begin and we are striving for that. We have what to say [as heard]. The Soviet Union has its own interests in Lithuania—economic, political, and military. Everything cannot be cut off in one go. These problems concern not only Lithuania and the Soviet Union. There are also European and world problems.

[Announcer] The Lithuanian member of parliament, Nikolay Medvedev, talked about how he pictures to himself the subject of the dialogue:

[Medvedev in Lithuanian, fading into English translation] We must define what the independence of a republic is and divide the notion into baskets. The dialogue might then begin also on the baskets. If some problems cannot be put into one basket, or a serious contradiction shapes up, the particular subject may be split into smaller details. I believe that only in this way it will be possible to come to some understanding.

[Announcer] No matter what, the situation now is difficult. And for that reason the next question to the Lithuanian representatives seems quite logical—if everything could start all over again what would you wish to have done differently? An answer from Nikolay Medvedev:

[Medvedev] I would begin to solve the republic's problems not with the language problem. I would start from what united as many residents of the republic as possible in order to prepare a strong social base. We gave too much attention to the language problem and in this way scared residents of Lithuania who don't speak Lithuanian.

[Announcer] Of course, in the long run, all the residents of Lithuania should know its language but this must be achieved in a milder way, without affecting the national feelings of other people, said Nikolay Medvedev. It is also necessary to have closer ties with the democratic forces of Russia proper, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and other republics, and to coordinate their activities. I would have regarded more attentively our public statements. For some statements, which sounded correct in Lithuanian, were totally unacceptable or at least were too harsh on the Russian ear. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that our parliament gathered for the first time. Many MPs lack political experience and haven't had the time to work closely together.

Public Interviewed at Press Building

LD0904213990 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Video report by correspondent A. Barkhatov from Vilnius; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Barkhatov] The central newspapers of the republic are published at the House of the Press, with the exception of, perhaps, one: the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA. During these days this former publishing house of the Communist Party of Lithuania is surrounded by people practically 24 hours a day. Following yesterday's five-hour stay here on the square by a column of militia vehicles, rumors have aggravated the situation. Some assert that, on orders from Moscow, they want to close all newspapers by force and print one, SOVETSKAYA LITVA, the organ of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee on the CPSU platform. Others talk about the virtual seizure of the building by the Sajudis voluntary militia, which has created a conflict with the internal militia guard. Together with the editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA, Aleksandr Pavlovich Gelbakh, who has still retained his office here, we decided to see everything with our own eyes, although this course didn't turn out to be so easy. But at least we're inside. [video shows young people gathered outside the building, Gelbakh and correspondent being allowed inside; correspondent then shown interviewing a young man wearing a green armband] What does this green armband mean? Tell me.

[Unidentified man] It's a Sajudis armband.

[Barkhatov] Sajudis voluntary militia?

[Man] Not only Sajudis, but the parliament of the republic.

[Barkhatov] You are authorized to maintain a guard here?

[Man] Yes.

[Barkhatov] Tell me, where are you actually from, are you students, workers, what?

[Man] It varies, I, for example, am a student, but there are workers.

[Second unidentified man] I'm also a student, but I work, too.

[Barkhatov] How many are you, as there are the most incredible rumors?

[First man] About 30 persons. [video cuts to correspondent interviewing militiaman in the building]

[Barkhatov] Tell me, doesn't it hamper you that there is both your post and the voluntary, so to speak, post at the doors and in the corridors?

[Militiaman] How can I put it, does it hamper us or not? In the main, they carry out all the work here.

[Barkhatov] That is, they are helping you?

[Militiaman] We probably help one another. [passage omitted]

[Barkhatov] Will you conclude a contract, so to speak, seek some kind of compromise which might allow you to publish a newspaper here? It is coming in from Minsk at present.

[Gelbakh] The point is that this publishing house belongs to the CPSU and is built from CPSU funds. For this reason, we have to enjoy priority in publishing a party newspaper. I believe that's how it will be, I am convinced of this. But for the moment, as you can see, this is very difficult.

[Barkhatov] Is force really the only argument? In general, bringing you in here by force, would this be convenient for you?

[Gelbakh] I adhere to the position that even a rude word is a weak argument, and force the more so. This really is an expression of weakness. From my point of view we have to approach real democracy, and then there won't be any problems.

[Barkhatov] And the practical path?

[Gelbakh] The practical path is direct presidential rule, based on the current democratic laws which have been elaborated in our country.

[Barkhatov to camera, over video of people at work in the publishing house] How, when, and who will resolve a dispute which has, in essence, already grown into an open conflict, we have not, as yet, found a reply to these questions in a single department.

TASS Updates House of Press Situation

LD0904220990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1830 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Report by TASS special correspondents]

[Text] Vilnius, 9 Apr (TASS)—The House of the Press of the Lithuanian publishing house of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee is like a rebel camp these days. On the entrance doors are iron chains and locks and fire hoses have been put in position at the doors. People wearing green "Sajudis" arm bands, stand at the entrance to the building, check passes and identity cards.

As was reported by a spokesman of a military unit of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry from Vilnius Garrison, at about 4 AM in the morning of 6 April the troop patrol of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry guarding the publishing house discovered and detained on the premises 11 interlopers who had broken in through a window.

The commander of the detail made unsuccessful attempts to ask the internal affairs bodies of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] to collect the detained persons and find out why they had broken into the House of the Press, which is the property of the CPSU Central Committee. The detained persons were on the premises till 11 AM.

In the night of 6-7 April more than 100 people with passes of staff of the publishing house gathered in the House of the Press. They said they were carrying out the wish of the republic's Supreme Soviet and would guard the building. With their actions they practically blockaded the troop detail, which they removed from guarding the building and set up their own system of passes.

On the morning of 8 April an attack by persons unknown was mounted on the building of the old publishing house which had previously also been taken under guard by representatives of the USSR internal Affairs bodies. In view of this, the command of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry unit decided to step up the guarding of facilities, including the House of the Press. But the troop details which arrived at the House of the Press were unable to enter the building because all the outside doors had been wound with chains, locked, and fire hoses had been placed against them.

Then on Sunday at 0735 local time the inhabitants of Vilnius received an appeal to "save" the House of the Press. By 10 AM more than 10,000 people had gathered outside the building with anti-Soviet slogans.

At this same time representatives of the unit command came to Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, who assured them that the people who were unlawfully in the House of the Press would be removed. However this promise has not till now been carried out.

Soyuz Deputies Hear Lithuanians' Concerns

PM0904115190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Special correspondent Captain Third Class V. Urban report: "Right of Defense"]

[Text] Vilnius, 6 Apr—It has been a long time since the gorkom [city party committee] had so many visitors. People started gathering from early in the morning of 5 April—long before the planned time. Just what had brought them here? As is well known, the gorkom holds CPSU positions and the Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania is located in its building. It was here that members of the "Soyuz" group of deputies held their reception.

Anyone unable to attend was able to talk to the USSR people's deputies on a confidential telephone line. It was ringing off the hook. Just what were people talking about. I put that question to the deputies who were taking turns to man the telephone.

S. Shuvalov:

"First and foremost, socially important problems were raised. People are alarmed. Let me explain that with a very typical example. Correspondents from Lithuanian Television's "Panorama" program came to the auditorium where I was speaking. Those present asked them quite flatly to leave. I'm no supporter of such action. I started to explain why this had happened. And I realized that we also need to listen to those who refuse to be filmed. Many people said that, after coming to the gorkom—particularly if they are shown on screen—they could simply be asked to resign from their jobs. Take the phone calls. They sounded the same alarming note. Incidentally, the current situation in the republic is alarming representatives of various nationalities. This is clearly visible from the telephone dialogue with people. Most of the callers support the USSR president's appeal to the people of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]."

V. Alksnis:

"We know, and all the callers were convinced, that the line was being tapped. The local 'democrats' do not tire of repeating that there are no human rights violations in Lithuania. Well, I hope they will learn a lot at least through this means of phone-tapping."

So as not to leave these arguments unsubstantiated, let us enter one of the offices where USSR People's Deputy V. Khmura received visitors for three straight hours. We will quote some of their bitter monologues. In order not to cause any consequences for the people involved, we are withholding their surnames at their request.

"The most frightening thing is that all the mass media are in the hands of 'Sajudis.' Anybody with a different opinion is simply not allowed to speak. Take the decision made by the parliament's republic on independence. All

you hear on TV and radio is that the people have started breathing more easily and that everything has changed for the better. And the situation is being whipped up, with people constantly referring to the threat from Moscow."

"The position of those people's deputies from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the Moscow and Leningrad City Soviets who sent congratulatory telegrams to Landsbergis is amazing. They should change places with us. Then they would see what is going on here. And we would agree to going to Russia."

"There were Russian and Lithuanian classes in our school. Both children and teachers lived in harmony. But then last year all teaching in Russian was stopped. Tension emerged. The most painful thing was that nobody was charged with finding work for the Russian teachers. We were virtually thrown out onto the street."

Here is the statement from militia Lieutenant V. Kolesnikov, who said that he would not withhold his name:

"The republic's minister of internal affairs decided to end party organizations' activities within our organs. Now lists of those who have not handed in their membership cards are being drawn up. This is being done to deal with unsuitable people. Or take the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet resolution on the formation of a special subunit to guard government institutions and the parliament. All this has been published in the newspapers. It is particularly worrying that all the staffers in this future subunit will be specially selected. People here are also planning to select a special-purposes militia detachment. In my view, all these actions are likely to provoke a major conflict."

The members of the "Soyuz" group assured us that all requests would be put to the Supreme Soviet and the USSR Government.

I can give this newspaper's readers the number of the Vilnius USSR Citizens' Committee: 61-17-18. On calling, they will be able to get information on the situation in the republic.

Just how is the republic's leadership assessing the situation? At a recent press conference V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, voiced the opinion that there is a feeling that even the question of holding a referendum in Lithuania—if such a wish were evinced—could be discussed with the USSR along with any other questions, with the exception of the question of annulling the act of independence proclaimed by the Supreme Soviet. If we are talking about a referendum, we need the appropriate conditions for it. The content of the referendum will also be important. The content, Landsbergis noted, could vary.

Today's newspapers have published the appeal from the republic's Supreme Soviet to Lithuanian young people.

It states, in particular: "Although the Lithuanian authorities are powerless to protect young people from compulsory recruitment, nonetheless they will shoulder the legal and moral responsibility for their citizens' refusal to serve foreigners. The authorities will make every possible effort to protect you, sons of Lithuania. The Supreme Soviet has legally repealed your requirement to serve in the Soviet Army. And it has suspended the activity of military commissariats."

At a press conference given by the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform journalists asked Major General A. Vysotskis, military commissar of the Lithuanian SSR, to comment on the draft situation. He said that the draft will start as planned. And it will be a difficult draft. The main question being raised by young people is: What will be the view of the republic's leadership and of our neighbors and friends if we go to serve? After all, all official organs are constantly repeating that people should not serve in an army of occupation. That, Vysotskis stressed, is why we must conduct serious explanatory work.

Landsbergis Notes Prospects for Dialogue

PM0904112690 Paris LIBERATION in French
4 Apr 90 pp 23-24

[Interview with Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis by Bernard Cohen in Vilnius—date not given]

[Excerpt] Vilnius—[Introductory passage omitted]

[Cohen] Soviet television is no longer so aggressive toward you, a Lithuanian delegation is in Moscow.... In short, is a period of detente starting?

[Landsbergis] There are indeed encouraging signs. I think that we are experiencing the start of dialogue, of the dialogue which we have wanted since the start. Why is the USSR changing its attitude? We should probably see in this the influence of international political factors, notably the fact that the U.S. Congress will pass a resolution on Lithuania this Tuesday and the fact that the Finnish head of state has postponed his visit to Moscow as a sign of solidarity with us. Of course, the Soviets have so far managed to influence the attitude of some Western governments but, at all events, it is Washington which will have the last word.

In the USSR itself, the authorities must take account of signs which undoubtedly show the strength of our positions: There have been demonstrations of support for the Lithuanian cause, and political strikes to show solidarity are possible. Closer to home, virtually all the deputies of the Latvian parliament have signed a letter of encouragement which has been sent to us. The Soviet Government is beginning to realize that it cannot force republics which want to leave the union to remain: Estonia, for instance, has just decided to take the same course as us.

[Cohen] However, according to some Estonian leaders, it seems that not everybody approves of the speed with which you proclaimed your return to independence.

[Landsbergis] Everybody is entitled to a view on the subject. However, I will tell you that I have received many calls from Estonia not to give in to Moscow's demands, for instance for the organization of a referendum. The firm stance we have taken since 11 March has helped the Estonians to prepare their own independence, and has served their purpose. Those who criticize us are entitled to do so, but they could also thank us quietly and discreetly....

[Cohen] According to some rumors (Footnote: On Tuesday morning, Moscow radio said that President Landsbergis had accepted this demand. The problem is that the official Soviet station, referring to the Lithuanian president's speech to parliament, attributed to him remarks which he never made), you are finally prepared to agree to hold a referendum which would decide Lithuania's status. A few days ago, Vice President Kasimiras Moteka told us that there was no question of that. What do you think?

[Landsbergis] No referendum can cast doubt on the decisions made by the Lithuanian "Supreme Council" (parliament—LIBERATION editor's note). Lithuania's independence is a fact, it is indisputable. But we have no objection in principle to consulting the people on various subjects, and if the Soviet Union wishes to discuss that with us, we would have no objection to doing so.

[Cohen] But on what questions other than independence could a referendum be held?

[Landsbergis] I am considering several possibilities. But I prefer to discuss this direct with Moscow, without any intermediary.

[Cohen] According to you, when will real Soviet-Lithuanian negotiations start?

[Landsbergis] You know, we have been negotiating with them for years! With many grains of sand you eventually make a heap. In practical terms, there has never been an interruption in the dialogue: Several of our ministers have direct contact with their Soviet counterparts, for instance on economic questions.

[Cohen] In this connection, after fearing an economic blockade by the USSR, your attention turned to the dangers of Soviet military intervention in Lithuania after 11 March....

[Landsbergis] There have so far been no economic sanctions against us. With regard to a possible military intervention, we must remain vigilant but without giving in to panic. Provocations are always possible, with the aim of making Mikhail Gorbachev's position even more difficult. But the greatest danger would be for the Lithuanians' political unity, the cohesion which has been demonstrated through this parliament, to be undermined by outside pressure, be it from the USSR or

Western countries. At all events, for the time being, no consistent political force is capable of opposing independence. What about the pro-Moscow communist minority? If the Soviet army were ever to try to install them in power by force, it would be an extremely grotesque spectacle.

[Cohen] What is the state of relations between Sajudis, your movement, and the majority pro-independence communists?

[Landsbergis] Neither the Communist Party nor Sajudis are monolithic groups, they both include factions. In the party there are people trained in the mold of the nomenklatura, in Sajudis there are radicals whom I would not describe as anticommunist but who feel the greatest distrust for the communists. But nobody here is talking of hanging the communists, any more than they are anywhere else!

[Cohen] At present, the Lithuanian parliament is examining a law on the political parties, which envisages the outlawing of parties "linked with a foreign power."

[Landsbergis] States which have a long democratic tradition can afford the greatest liberalism in this sphere, but unfortunately this is not yet true of us. We cannot afford to allow a group (the pro-Moscow minority communists—LIBERATION editor's note) financed by a foreign country, supported by a foreign army, to openly proclaim its desire to destroy an independent state.

[Cohen] Before World War II, Lithuania had a rather authoritarian regime. Why, on returning to independence, have you continued with the 1938 Constitution?

[Landsbergis] That was a symbolic act, aimed at demonstrating the continuity between the former republic destroyed by Soviet annexation in 1940 and the present one. Soviet propaganda has accused us of wishing to recreate an authoritarian presidential system by invoking the 1938 Constitution whereas we immediately adopted transitional legislation, adapting Soviet Lithuania's laws to the new conditions of independence.

[Cohen] Does Lithuania's history not demonstrate some attraction to authoritarianism? It is often stated in the West and in the USSR that the Lithuanians took up arms against the Red Army from 1944, but not against the Nazis from 1940 to 1944....

[Landsbergis] This is an aspect of history which is often not known in Europe, but Lithuanian resistance against the Nazis did exist. When the Nazi troops entered Lithuania, there were armed groups in Vilnius and Kaunas which tried to resist. When they occupied the country, the Nazis expected the provisional Lithuanian government to collaborate with them, but, after a month, they overthrew it when they realized that that was not the case. Resistance against the Nazis continued after the war, turning into resistance against the Soviet army. The latter sparked off an uprising by Lithuanian peasants by

trying to forcibly enlist them. Many of them hid in the forests, took up arms, and refused to give up for eight years.

Lithuania was alone in that struggle, the whole world knew nothing about it. So, when we are now told that nobody in the West will heed us or support us, it does not frighten us. And today, although the situation is not comparable, I hope that the Soviet army will not force our young people to flee to the forests and resist.

[Cohen] Just a short time ago, you were an expert on Lithuanian composer Ciurlonis, you are now a political leader, constantly fighting. When did you last play the piano?

[Landsbergis] I have not been able to sit down at a piano since the elections on 24 February. Yes, I have, but it was only to satisfy the foreign television crews who wanted to film me at the piano. I have several times asked for a piano to be installed in this office, but clearly nobody has yet had time to do it.

Ministry Official Discusses 'Special Units'

LD0604153090 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in Lithuanian No 12, 23-29 Mar 90

[Interview with unidentified Lithuanian MVD officer, by Rimvydas Valatka: "What We Do Not See."]

[Text] We have seen CPSU and "Yedinstvo" meetings. We are acquainted with their hysteria and tone of ultimatum delivery. They are brave. They know, the empire is not going to surrender the sweet morsel of Lithuania that quickly, and without any resistance. Here follows a GIMTASIS KRASTAS interview with an officer of the Lithuanian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] who, for obvious reasons, did not wish to reveal his name. We are discussing things we cannot see.

— Military movements in Lithuania, helicopter overflights, and relocation of equipment materiel were not matters of chance, our source tells us. According to information we have received, both the security and army forces are operating in accordance with an pre-arranged plan for destabilization of the the situation. I wish I may be wrong, however, the so-called scouting, diversionary brigades may make their appearance in Lithuania, also, should such a need arise. Let us recall Azerbaijan. It is possible to make predictions, that soldiers and officers' families will soon become targets of attack. Such incidents have already taken place, and they can be treated accordingly as the need arises. An alleged arm seizure attempt was purported to have taken place in Kaunas last Saturday and the soldier on duty was supposedly attacked, however the arms were left untouched. A soldier was beaten and tied up in Alytus. It was later brought to light that this was carried out by the soldiers themselves upon their discovery that he was a special unit's (KGB) agent. Juridical precepts do not apply to special detail units. According to information

we have received, trained civilians are present in Lithuania, who, when the need arises, will carry out attacks upon soldiers, officers' families, and Lithuanian political activists.

Vilnius is full of fillers (plain-clothes men) from the Belorussian SSR MVD. What are they doing here? We are also concerned by the fact that Lithuanian MVD Minister M. Misiukonis calls his USSR colleague Bakatin several times per day.

[Question] What do you propose should be done?

[Answer] Not to begin with occupation of the television, of course. Thanks to the cleverness of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (in changing weapons' grading), the militia is already partially disarmed: They had 3000 automatics and now only 1500 remain. What should be done? First of all, militia workers should swear an oath of allegiance to the Lithuanian Republic. At the moment, we are still bound by an oath to the USSR, and even this interview would cost me dearly. Not everyone would swear allegiance—militia would thus be purged [cleansed]. It is imperative for the Supreme Council to put an end to KGB organs' activity. Our conviction is one-sided thanks to their activity: It is anti-Lithuanian.

In addition, it has already become imperative for the Lithuanian Supreme Council to turn to military units to tighten the guarding duties so that military towns would be guarded by combined militia and military patrols. In the event our minister replies that there are insufficient forces for this, we can remind him that there were sufficient forces to monitor Sajudis at one time—up to 40 km of video tape had been compiled on Sajudis people [supporters] and professional plain-clothesmen were employed in tracking Sajudis people. To carry out this task, they had been diverted from their regular duties of tracking criminals. There would be sufficient forces.

Anti-Lithuanian forces are threatening with strikes and other disruptions. Each rayon should assign two to three militiamen to Vilnius and Klaipeda. The militia may be increased by making use of non-departmental protection—it is not included in the budget. All that is required is fund allotment by enterprises. Sajudis people also could initiate protection of certain production units.

It is imperative to assign Erikas Kalecius' unit, having first reinforced it with new members, for the protection of the Supreme Council, television and radio, and of Lithuanian politicians.

[Question] New Lithuanian border crossing points are being set up. How do you assess this fact?

[Answer] As an idea instigated by an enemy who is a professional. These points should be dismantled—we have no need of new sources of tension. Lithuania's defense committee, which should not include a single KGB representative, should already be initiated. There are a great many patriotically-inclined individuals

within militia ranks who would carry out their duty provided there was no hindrance from within. Here, I speak on behalf of a group of officers. This group is of the opinion that Liutauras Vasiliauskas might become the minister of internal affairs, or that he might become first deputy, with R. Ozolas taking on the ministerial duties. We are worried, in general, by your too protracted dilly dallying around problems that could be put off. The government has not been set up. The militia has not been sworn in yet.

Postscript: According to information received by the captain, some husky and athletic looking young men have appeared among the Lithuanian KGB ranks—they hail from Moscow, but they speak Lithuanian.

Kochetov on Army Call-Up in Lithuania

LD0604185490 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 6 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Yevgeniy Kiselev] What is worrying everyone greatly, in connection with the situation in and around Lithuania, is the problem of the forthcoming spring call-up of young recruits to the Soviet Army. Here is what a high-ranking representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense said about this to a correspondent for the TASS TV [as heard] service:

[Begin recording of KA Kochetov, identified by screen caption as USSR first deputy minister of defense] You know that the Council of Ministers has passed decision No. 305. This decision is based on our Soviet Constitution. The constitutional duty of every citizen, the duty of performing military service, will be rigorously implemented. We will do everything to ensure that the call-up of our young people, including those in Lithuania, takes place in an organized manner and that it stimulates, so to speak, the fulfilment of those tasks which face our Armed Forces. I do not think there is any doubt that we will carry out this task. [end recording]

Lithuanian Journalists' Work Conditions Described

LD0704215690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian
1200 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Interview with Gedrius Cekuolis, first secretary of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry Press Department, by unidentified correspondent; place, date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Under what conditions are foreign journalists working here in Lithuania? Gedrius Cekuolis, first secretary of the press department at the Lithuanian Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

[Cekuolis] Of course, the situation has changed greatly in the space of just a few weeks. While some 200 foreign journalists used to work freely and quietly in Lithuania, now there are around 20 or 30. That figure is more or less stable. The journalists change around, but about 30

remain. Why? Well, of course, the USSR Foreign Ministry's call for foreign journalists accredited in Moscow, as well as all others, to leave the republic immediately has had very negative consequences. Most of the journalists who were here are accredited in Moscow. Of course, they know Russian and have based their whole career on the Soviet Union, so disobedience could be simply disastrous for them. Nevertheless, there are several correspondents from U.S., British, and other newspapers who are continuing to work in Lithuania and who intend to remain for as long as necessary. We extend their visas and do all we can to ease their stay in the Republic of Lithuania. We help them set up official meetings, meetings with various parties of quite diverse views. In other words, in this difficult climate we are trying to construct a democratic climate, in which normal journalism is possible.

[Correspondent] Last week, a visa was issued by the Republic of Lithuania to a foreign journalist. Have there been any other such instances?

[Cekuolis] No, there have been no more instances of a Lithuanian Republic visa being issued because, as we know, certain harsh restrictions already have been imposed on the Lithuanian-Polish border which, like all the republic's other borders, are guarded by troops of the Soviet Union, KGB border troops. This, of course, complicates the situation. When a delegation from the International Red Cross flew into the republic on Tuesday, representatives of the Republic's Foreign Ministry were even prevented from meeting the members of the delegation at Vilnius airport and from completing the necessary formalities, that is, granting visas. One might say that these border troops overstepped their powers because visa matters are the sole responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania.

[Correspondent] How are the journalists managing to work here in the present climate? The atmosphere is calm, but periodically helicopters fly overhead and the odd tank passes by.

[Cekuolis] You can judge how they are managing to work from the articles that eventually appear on the pages of foreign publications. For instance, the most popular description of what is going on between Vilnius and Moscow is a war of nerves. It colors the whole situation, which outwardly does indeed appear calm and normal. All the same, you can sense a tension, a nervous, emotional tension. The journalists also can sense this. We are of service not just to those journalists we used to call foreign, but also to journalists from the Soviet Union, who only recently became foreigners. We accredited them, too. Only recently we accredited a correspondent from SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. We make no exceptions. They present their credentials, their documents, and on a democratic principle we give each of them their accreditation. Of course, our department does not work only with foreign correspondents. Another element of our work is to give out our own information on events,

official information on events, but we distribute the government point of view on whatever subject. So we keep a close eye on the session of the Supreme Council of Lithuania. We give several telephone interviews a day. We get phone calls from London, and even go on the air live, speaking a foreign language. In answering questions, we convey the point of view of the Lithuanian Government on this or that event.

I hope—for I am optimistic—that when everything settles down, when Lithuania is totally and genuinely independent, when it exercises control over its own borders, and when it pursues a foreign policy that must be something akin to neutrality because of our geography.... [changes thought] One must take a realistic view of Lithuania's place on the general stage of international affairs and, you know, once this difficult situation comes to an end, I do not think there will be a particularly great or constant interest on the part of hundreds of foreign journalists because ours is a small country. So if the situation turns out normally, then, well, you know, the mass media always focus their attention on the hot spots.

Vilnius Revises Radio, TV Broadcasting Schedule

LD0804200690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1145 GMT 8 Apr 90

[Summary] "Last Thursday—3 April—after stormy debate, the country's parliament confirmed the Board of Lithuanian Radio and Television. The board consists of 17 people, including representatives of artistic and public organizations, as well as of radio and television. The board will operate on a public footing. Within the next month it must elect a director general, and also draw up the draft statutes for Lithuanian radio and television and put them before the Supreme Council for approval. The director general will be in charge of the work of the board. He need not be one of the board members already confirmed. If he is not, then he will automatically become the 18th member of the board. The candidacy of director general is also subject to confirmation by the Supreme Council."

As of 12 March, Lithuanian Radio has doubled its broadcasting in Polish. Polish broadcasts now go out between 1830 and 1930 on Second Program frequencies. Outside Lithuania, the broadcasts can be picked up on medium wave at 11097 kHz or on short wave at 6100 kHz, although the latter frequency will only be available after 1900—that is, in the middle of the program.

The following are Lithuanian Radio broadcasts at 1130:

- on the first Saturday of the month in the Tatar language;
- on the second and fourth Saturdays of the month in Belorussian;
- on the third Saturday of the month in Ukraine;
- on the first Sunday of the month in Yiddish.

All of these last 30 minutes, apart from the Yiddish language bulletin, which lasts 40 minutes.

On the television: By decision of the country's Supreme Council, as of 1 April Leningrad Television is no longer being transmitted in Vilnius. Instead, people in and around the city can watch the First Program of Polish Television on Channel 38.

Vilnius Doctors Urged To Not Aid Military Draft

LD0704085290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Juozas Olekas, the new Lithuanian minister of health, has appealed to all Lithuanian physicians to not participate in medical commissions for army recruits. The minister says he has information that military men have been recruiting physicians with the promise of big rewards. Of course, I cannot forbid them, but I can and have the right to appeal to the conscience of every physician, stated Juozas Olekas. The minister confirmed his firm stand toward this problem to high-ranking medical officials from Moscow who paid him a visit a few days ago.

Sajudis, Belorussian Group Issue Joint Statement

LD1004091590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0730 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] Yesterday, a joint political statement was adopted by a group of Sajudis [Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring] deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Council and a delegation from Odrazeniye, the Belorussian People's Front, which reads:

Attempts to block the implementation of self-determination of nations are directed against the rights and vital interests of all nations of the USSR. Presenting territorial claims can cause serious harm to the stability of political processes in central Europe.

Both the communist leadership of the former Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Belorussian SSR not only failed to solve specific ethnic, language, social, economic, and other problems in the Vilnius region—they also aggravated these problems.

The historic perspective of Lithuanian and Belorussian nations on these Lithuanian and Belorussian territories should be guaranteed by law on both sides. Such guarantees could only be granted in full by sovereign and democratic states of Lithuania and Belorussia.

It is expedient to envisage a system of guarantees for nationality groups on both sides which should include: schools, press, radio and television programs, and setting up and supporting national culture centers and societies. Joint commissions of experts should be set up for this purpose. Lithuanian-Belorussian and Belorussian-Lithuanian societies of culture, and joint periodical publications should be set up.

Both sides should ensure that the new political situation and the position of the Belorussian leadership inflict no harm on the economic, cultural, and political relations

between the Lithuanian and Belorussian nations, and that new possibilities are fully utilized for the benefit of both nations.

Shipping Official on Lithuanian Fleet Ownership

LD1004083690 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0650 GMT 10 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Kleshkov]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Apr—The demand by some current Lithuanian leaders to hand over to Lithuania the enterprises of the USSR Maritime Fleet, which are situated on its territory—the Lithuanian Sea Shipping Line, the port of Klaipeda and the Klaipeda ship repair yard—has no legal or economic grounds, Gennadiy Gerasimchuk, USSR deputy minister of the maritime fleet, thinks.

In a conversation with a TASS correspondent, he said that the Lithuanian Shipping Line, which was set up in 1969, was given ships from the Baltic, Northern, and Murmansk Shipping Lines, and specialists from all over the country were sent there. Henceforth, too, the establishments of the USSR Maritime Fleet situated in Lithuania have been developed with a view to the national economic tasks of the whole union, and have been financed from its state budget. Over 20 years, the Lithuanian shipping line as a developing organization has received from the union budget 139 million rubles more than it has contributed to the budget.

The loss of the Klaipeda port, the ship repair yard, and 43 ships, to which Lithuania, according to Gennadiy Gerasimchuk, "has not contributed a kopeck", would mean additional expenses for the USSR. The thing is that Lithuania itself does not need such a large-scale fleet. Of the 7.5 million tons of cargo that the Lithuanian Shipping Line carries now, no more than 5-6 thousand tons are for Lithuania itself. So, Gerasimchuk thinks, one ship would be enough to satisfy the republic's needs.

In the case whereby Lithuania secedes from the USSR, Gennadiy Gerasimchuk reckons that the Soviet ships currently registered with the Lithuanian Sea Shipping Line are likely to be transferred to other USSR ports. Speaking about the Klaipeda port, the republic will have to buy back its main assets at market prices in freely convertible currency, because all its equipment was purchased abroad. The facilities of the Lithuanian Shipping Line are valued at 340 million [currency not specified], those of the port at 134 million, and those of the ship-repair yard at 20 million foreign currency rubles. The Lithuanian Republic will also have to take find jobs for the 5.5 thousand people who work for the shipping line. Lithuanians account for about a half of them, concluded the deputy minister.

European Reaction to Baltic Events Noted

LD1004111190 Moscow International Service
in Finnish 1530 GMT 9 Apr 90

["Lithuania in the Spotlight of Opinion": Oleg Vokulovskiy commentary—announcer read]

[Text] I hope I am not mistaken when I say that in recent days the news about Lithuania has taken on a more factual and unbiased character, writes Vokulovskiy. Tension clearly is decreasing. This, of course, does not mean that the problems have been solved, but a fact is a fact. In ever more public statements, announcements, and commentaries, the words dialogue and negotiations are appearing. True, the matter has not been finally resolved. HELSINGIN SANOMAT comments on the current situation in one of its leading articles as follows:

People were able to breathe a sigh of relief in the Baltic republics when the news came of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting this summer. It means that the struggle in the Baltic republics will continue mainly at the level of psychological pressure and a war of words, but it also shows the possibility of starting objective negotiations.

At the same time, Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, said to Polish journalists that in the negotiations with Moscow, all issues may be discussed except that of Lithuanian independence. Let us recall that these negotiations can be started only when the Lithuanian parliament rescinds its declaration of independence, as a consequence of which the war of nerves between Moscow and Vilnius began in the first place.

Replying to a question relating to events in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, Finnish Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio stated that the government sees no reason to review the policy it pursues because Finland is a neighbor of the Soviet Union and has access to the Baltic. Finland has cause to show prudence and restraint in the situation that has developed, said Paasio, but the Government of Malta apparently has decided to act differently. It has announced officially that it regards the Lithuanian parliament's statute of independence as an expression of the will of the Lithuanian people.

I do not want to comment on the Maltese decision, but I would point out that no referendum was held on the matter in Lithuania before the parliament's decision on independence, Vokulovskiy writes. At the moment, Moscow is demanding the holding of a referendum and Landsbergis regards that as useless. If some observers claim to see a certain stabilization in the psychological atmosphere surrounding the Lithuanian situation, then some speeches apparently have been aimed at provoking Russia and maintaining the climate of fear. For example, Lithuania Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas replied to one Italian newspaper's question about military intervention in Lithuania as follows: It is more possible today than ever before.

The Vatican could act as a mediator between Moscow and Lithuania; this was announced in Rome by Francesco Coluasuonno who recently was appointed Vatican ambassador to the Soviet Union. At the same time, he urged both sides toward dialogue in order to find a just solution.

Finally, I would like to bring up one more factor [word indistinct]. Members of the European Parliament are urging the EC member-countries to support unequivocally the strivings of the Lithuanian people for independence. Once again it must be said that every unequivocal statement about the complex situation will hardly help matters. The world is getting more complicated; this should be borne in mind, states Oleg Vokulovskiy in conclusion.

Estonian Reply to Gorbachev Expected 11 Apr

LD1004093190 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
0900 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Summary] Ulo Nugis, speaker of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, says that this afternoon's plenary session is expected to endorse some if not all ministerial candidates, and that tomorrow the Army service draft will be entered for its second reading, and that an address to Gorbachev will hopefully be adopted.

Estonian Supreme Soviet Resumes Work

LD0904201990 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
1400 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Today at 1100 the first session of the 12th convocation of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet resumed its work. It continued from where it left off at the last plenary session; with military service [words indistinct]. Rein Tamme, head of the state defense commission, provided a survey of the event which had taken place after the last session [visit by Kochetov]. He spoke briefly about the visit in Estonia of Army General Konstantin Kochetov, first deputy USSR defense minister. Rein Tamme emphasized that the Army general refused talks and did not even accept the written proposal of the state defense commission. Rein Tamme made the proposal that today the state defense, as well as the legal, commission should continue work on the draft law.

Thereafter the law on temporary administration of Estonia was discussed. The floor was given on this issue to one of the authors of the draft, Arvo Juntti. An accompanying report on the matter was presented by Endel Lippmaa. [passage omitted]

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet met during the lunch break. The prime minister proposed nine cabinet ministers, among them Endel Lippmaa, without portfolio, for negotiations with Moscow.

Estonian Opposition Leader on Independence

AU1004080590 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
9 Apr 90 pp 171-80

[Unattributed interview with Estonian opposition leader Tune Kelam, chairman of the Estonian "National Independence Party" and of the "Estonian Committee"; place and date not given: "The Empire Cannot Be Saved"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Lithuania has declared its sovereignty, and Estonia wants to follow this example. Are the Baltic republics not doing everything to endanger Mikhail Gorbachev's position and perestroika?

[Kelam] The Baltic republics endanger neither perestroika nor Gorbachev nor Russia. What they are doing is to fight for their survival.

[DER SPIEGEL] In what way?

[Kelam] We are faced with an unprecedented national catastrophe, an ecological disaster caused by Soviet industrialization, and an exacerbating economic crisis. Given the current conditions, we cannot cope with these problems all by ourselves. Still, the Baltic republics will contribute to Gorbachev's success and the success of perestroika, because only independent Baltic states can promote the development of true democracy as well as economic and social progress in Russia.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you not exaggerating a little?

[Kelam] Just think of Finland. There can be no doubt that the independent and neutral state of Finland has been more advantageous for Russia than a Soviet Republic of Finland could have been.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, for the time being, the secessionist tendencies in the Baltic republics strengthen conservative forces in Moscow.

[Kelam] These conservative forces have always existed. Their current reaction, however, is a sign of considerable weakness and of the severe crisis of the Soviet system.

[DER SPIEGEL] These conservative forces are trying to slow down perestroika.

[Kelam] Perestroika was not initiated by a single man, not by Gorbachev alone. And it is not exclusively to Gorbachev's merit that we are enjoying more democracy and more freedom now. Above all, it was the fundamental crisis of the Soviet system that allowed men like Gorbachev to rise to power, who were even pushed to power, and this crisis forced people—at a very late stage—to do something to save the empire....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...something that you want to prevent.

[Kelam] Of course, our goals have always been different from Gorbachev's goals. So far, he has always been trying to maintain the leading role of the Communist

Party and the Soviet empire. The different ethnic groups, however, want to exercise their right to self-determination.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the Balts' view, what is wrong with perestroika?

[Kelam] What was wrong in Namibia? What was wrong in South Africa? As a matter of fact, one can by all means compare the Soviet republics with Bantustans. The South African Government always claimed that they enjoy a certain degree of independence and sovereignty. Pretoria never understood why the blacks wanted more freedom and more rights.

[DER SPIEGEL] This seems to be a very daring comparison.

[Kelam] We lived under the worst pressure and brutal dictatorship for half a century. One-fourth of our population was exterminated or deported during the years of Soviet occupation. Therefore, I think it is quite understandable that we want to take the first opportunity that presents itself to restore our independent democratic state. An independent state is the most natural form of existence for every nation—I repeat, for every nation. We are not primarily striving for a secession from the Soviet Union because we never joined the Soviet Union. What we want above all is withdrawal of the Soviet occupation troops from Estonia. They have no right to be there.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do you want to convince Moscow of that?

[Kelam] Two preconditions must be met: First of all, there must be insight. Moscow is in a crisis which is rapidly deteriorating. There is considerable confusion in Moscow. In addition, the Soviet Union is facing enormous problems in the southern part of its territory. There must be a few clever people in Moscow who realize that the restoration of the independence of the Western provinces would be advantageous for Moscow.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you thinking of the Finnish model?

[Kelam] Yes, in the long run, having four friendly and neutral Finlands along its Western border instead of one Finland and three Baltic provinces that are constantly complaining must be in Moscow's own interest. In addition, democratic and legitimate representations are needed that can put forward the demands of the Balts. We have established such an institution in Estonia, the Estonian People's Congress, which has the task and is authorized to formulate all complaints and claims of the Estonians.

[DER SPIEGEL] What do the Soviets think?

[Kelam] The Soviet empire cannot be saved anyway. Moscow will have to decide sooner or later whether it is going to use military force, which would have disastrous consequences for Moscow itself, or whether it seeks a

path without hatred and violence, a peaceful and democratic path as has been successfully pursued so far.

[DER SPIEGEL] In view of the pressure that Moscow is exerting on Lithuania, are there signs that Moscow would accept an independent Estonia? Do you not think that the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan would call for independence as well?

[Kelam] This is quite possible. For this reason, we constantly point out our legal position. In moral and political terms, every nation within the Soviet Union has the same right to independence. In political terms, however, the Baltic republics are special cases because they were internationally recognized states before World War II...

[DER SPIEGEL] ...which were occupied.

[Kelam] Yes, they were occupied. They never joined the Soviet Union. This fact and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the secret supplementary protocol may represent an opportunity for Moscow to point out the following to the other republics: Look, the Baltic republics are special cases. They were occupied by Stalin under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This would give the Soviets the opportunity of making up for Stalin's crimes in the sphere of foreign policy.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, Moscow can simply reject talks, let alone negotiations. How do you want to prevent this?

[Kelam] We are still in the first phase of contacts during which a war of nerves is usually waged—with enormous claims to the other side. After U.S.-Soviet talks at the end of June last year, we learned from U.S. and other sources of hints that the Soviet Union does not rule out independence for the Baltic republics. In a certain way, Moscow showed some accommodation by confirming that it does not intend to use force to crush the freedom movement in the Baltic republics. Thus, negotiations are the only way to arrive at a solution.

[DER SPIEGEL] What will happen with the non-Estonians, the Russians that are living in Estonia?

[Kelam] They can decide what they want to do. An estimated 600,000 non-Estonians are currently living in Estonia illegally because they are citizens of another state. About 200,000 of them are soldiers or other members of the Soviet Army and their families. It is quite clear that they must go because they are members of an occupation army. About 100,000 are already Estonian citizens without knowing this because their parents or grandparents lived in Estonia before the war. These Russians have a right to live here, provided that they want to live here.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where should the remaining 300,000 Russians go?

[Kelam] Many of them were instruments of Soviet imperialism. One must never forget that the colonialization of the Baltic provinces used to be Moscow's strategic goal. Moscow wanted to create a Russian majority in order to make the occupation permanent. Thousands of Russians were sent to this region, for which they received substantive privileges.

[DER SPIEGEL] What privileges?

[Kelam] They were allowed to use their own language and to ignore local customs. They were given apartments by the state and acted as the bearers of culture. Numerous retired army officers and KGB officers made use of their right to set up residence in a Baltic state. These people are of course opposed to an independent Estonia in which they would lose their privileges.

[DER SPIEGEL] I asked you what will happen with them.

[Kelam] They do not have any roots here, only privileges. I think they will leave Estonia together with the Army and the KGB apparatus.

[DER SPIEGEL] Voluntarily?

[Kelam] Yes, of course. I do not know a single ethnic national group that plans to use bayonets against the Russians. We are all in agreement that the Russians, even if they came to this republic illegally, cannot be deported by a democratic Estonia.

[DER SPIEGEL] They are not allowed to stay but will not be deported either. What will happen to them?

[Kelam] We suggested to the Russians that they should apply for Estonian citizenship. Over 50,000 have so far made use of this offer, despite massive intimidation and propaganda against the Congress of Estonia. Many Russians have overcome their fear. If they see that we are not seeking revenge, that their future and their children's future is secure, most of them will be probably be willing to support demands for Estonia's independence.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, the majority of the Russian minority does not want to know anything about an independent Estonia.

[Kelam] The Russians are divided over this issue. There is even a dissident group among the "Interfront." Its spokesman has stated that new spheres of interest have emerged in Eastern Europe, and that the Baltic republics are entitled to a new place. Thus, he suggested establishing a roundtable for the Russians living in Estonia to discuss their future.

[DER SPIEGEL] Did he not express reservations or fears?

[Kelam] He was only concerned about the leadership of the Estonian Popular Front which is too nationalistic in

his view and too hostile toward the Russians. Thus, he hoped for more sensible interlocutors on the Estonian side, he stressed.

[DER SPIEGEL] In Estonian usage, the Russians are still described as migrants, a term that is quite offensive.

[Kelam] As I already pointed out, these people were instruments of the imperialist Russian policy. The whole empire was based on one principle: Divide and rule! It is not surprising that thousands of Russians, Uzbeks, and also Estonians went to other parts of the Soviet Union because they hoped for better living conditions and higher wages there: Estonia's problem is the enormous number of immigrants—over one-half million as compared with a population of 1.6 million.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why are you concerned about this?

[Kelam] They threaten to plunder our economy and to devastate our country. We can no longer control them. They only came to reap, but they are not ready to sow and take root.

[DER SPIEGEL] So you want to tell the Russians to go home?

[Kelam] No, they can stay, but without privileges and under the conditions that prevail for all Estonians. By the way, the Balts have always been discriminated against to a considerable extent in their own country. The West never mentioned that. Now that the Balts are struggling for their freedom, the West is very concerned about the rights of the Russians living in Estonia. Who was ever concerned about the rights of the Germans who settled in France after 1940 because the German Wehrmacht was there?

[DER SPIEGEL] In Moscow's view, the Baltic states are a bulwark of security for the Soviet Union. What security guarantees can you offer Moscow in return?

[Kelam] Our neutrality. There is agreement that the Baltic states must be neutral. The strategic situation in Europe has changed fundamentally. The Baltic states will no longer play such an important role for Moscow's security and defense.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you think that this will be sufficient for Moscow?

[Kelam] One certainly does not start talks or negotiations with the announcement that one is ready to make compromises. However, if the Russians insist on maintaining a few bases and radar stations for their security, such a claim can become the topic of negotiations.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Soviet Union does not have a few but a large number of naval and air bases in the Baltic republics. Do you think that most of them should be closed down?

[Kelam] Most of the bases have long lost their significance. It is not important for Leningrad's defense

whether sophisticated anti-aircraft or antimissile weapons are deployed in the Baltic republics.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, I am sure that you would like to take over the industrial enterprises that belong to the Moscow ministry.

[Kelam] To tell you the truth, it does not make any difference to us. They can pack up their machines, we are not interested in them. Most of the enterprises are useless anyway.

Estonia's Nugis Discusses Army Service

LD0704203390 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
1700 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Report on Kochetov visit—monitored in progress]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted; reporter gives general impression of Estonian Supreme Soviet work so far, ending with general description of Wednesday's first reading of the Army service law] At present, it is clearly felt—and what is taking place in Lithuania confirms this—that Moscow has begun to operate rigidly within the USSR Constitution and the laws founded upon it. On a matter such as Army service, this may create a dangerous situation. At this point, I will hand the conversation over to my colleague, Feliks Kaasik, who will continue on this subject for a few minutes:

[Kaasik] Today, Army General Konstantin Kochetov, USSR first deputy minister of defense, was on a visit to Tallinn. At noon, the army general was with Arnold Ryuytel, chairman of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. Participating in the conversation were Julo Nugis, speaker of the Supreme Soviet; Edgar Savisaar, leader of the republican government, and members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Unfortunately, General Kochetov did not find the time or the opportunity to answer journalists' questions. We were informed of what was discussed at the meeting by Rein Tamme, chairman of the State Defense Commission of the Supreme Soviet.

[Begin Tamme recording] [passage omitted] It was quite clear that Kochetov did not arrive here for talks, but to acquaint himself with the situation in the Baltic Military District, and according to his own words, to meet military commissars in order to see in what kind of shape this call-up is in. The result was such that no talks took place, which of course, did not surprise us, but we had prepared ourselves to make clear to him—he being a top USSR military leader—our clear and firm stance, which is known anyway, but which had to be repeated once again. This indeed is how our meeting passed. [passage omitted] Unnecessarily, documents had been prepared by the Estonians which now will be sent to Moscow. Kochetov was firm that the Army call-up will take place in the spring both in Lithuania and Estonia.

We asked an additional question: How does he visualize it possible to carry out the call-up. Will the Soviet power

for this purpose use the force of the Soviet Army and military means? He said: Definitely not. Then, to our question as to how, a solution could be visualized, the answer came to this effect, that veterans will be used, the situation will be explained within families, and as a result of this, a result is attempted so that the young men do join the army. That is the position.

What is essential for us is that definite word was given once again to the effect that force will not be used. [end recording]

[Kaasik] We are, of course, sorry that we can bring the meeting of the deputy minister to you only through other people. We possess what amounts to practically zero as far as immediate impressions are concerned, for drawing conclusions. To enrich the picture, I asked Julo Nugis, speaker of the Supreme Soviet, for his impressions from this meeting:

[Begin Nugis recording] The most uncomfortable impression for me was created by the beginning of the conversation, which boiled down to the fact that the esteemed guest began to decide for himself who on our side could participate in the conversation at all. Practically something like pointing his finger to say: He can stay and another can go away. The conversation was not pleasant. The way the USSR first deputy minister of defense behaved is indeed how the top brass of an army of occupation might behave.

As far as the content of the conversation is concerned and the possible result (?that was being pursued), I was indeed left with the impression that he had received corresponding orders that consisted of the following: He must not become tied to any agreement or compromise; Moscow's positions must be rigidly retained, which must contain the fact of not forgetting that Estonia is still a composite part of the Soviet Union. A call-up of conscripts is being carried out on this territory as it always has been.

I must say that this was the first time I have dealt with such a high official, who is not at all a diplomat; he had no diplomatic approach, whatsoever. Indeed, he behaved exactly like a soldier or, let us say, like an officer in an army of occupation. On several occasions, he interrupted Arnold Ryuytel's explanations, attempted to break in with assessments, and well, along the lines of: I will kind of show you your place. For our part, however, we were firm in our positions. We knew what we wanted and how we would behave and we conceded on nothing even in word, and we clearly set out our position in that way.

In the present real conditions, as Estonia is in a transition period toward a republic of Estonia, we on the Estonian side will not undertake any obligation of any kind to assist or organize the forced call-up of conscripts [nekrut—a derogatory term], if one may speak so. With this knowledge, the first deputy minister departed, having allowed himself some ironical remarks of this

kind: I thank you for the warm and heart-felt welcome. (?We thanked him in return). [end recording]

[Kaasik] Thus, even after the meeting, it remained unclear how our conscripts should behave this spring. Julo Nugis opined the following about the situation:

[Begin Nugis recording] Evidently at present one must indeed behave in such a way as the laws that already have been adopted allow. Those who intend to join the alternative labor service must behave correspondingly and hand in their applications. On our part, it is necessary to conclude matters in this respect so that there should be corresponding commissions set up at Narva, Sillamae, and Kohtla-Jarve [where local councils have decided not to set up alternative service commissions], but I assume that next week, in the course of the Supreme Soviet session, when we submit the law on service in the Soviet Army for its second reading, even more specific positions and more precise tips as to how behave may take shape. During this interview today there is as yet no final position. [end recording]

TASS Profiles First Secretary Rubiks

LD1004104390 Moscow TASS in English 1031 GMT
10 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaitsev]

[Text] Riga April 10 TASS—The first working day of Alfred Rubiks, the new leader of the Latvian Communist Party, was taken up by numerous meetings and talks.

From the outset, Rubiks rejected the privileges that previous Central Committee secretaries enjoyed—an "official" car and special canteen. The first people he talked to were war veterans.

Rubiks, 55, had long held Komsomol and party posts. He headed Latvian Ministry of Local Industry and was chairman of the Riga City Council for six years. He is a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Rubiks was elected first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee two days ago at the 25th Latvian Party Congress. Almost one-third of Congress delegates, supporters of the "independent" Communist party, left the forum.

Asked about the split, Rubiks said: "it is not a split so far. It is just a disagreement. If another communist party is created, it will be a split then."

Supporters of the "Independent" party have scheduled their congress for April 14. Rubiks believes that the disagreement is one of principle and a compromise is out of the question. "We call for the development of Latvian statehood within the framework of the Soviet Union and for the development of our party on the principles of socialism," he said. According to Rubiks, the "independents" use the word "communist" only as camouflage, but their goals are different.

He forecasts that the separated part will be "a national (ethnic Latvian) Social Democratic Party, which will not be viable in the multi-national republic."

Rubiks plans to drastically change the structure and functions of the Latvian Central Committee apparatus and elaborate a programme of action under conditions of a multi-party system.

The Central Committee Secretariat will be completely replaced, as well as nearly 100 per cent of the Central Committee. Rubiks counts on his supporters and is optimistic.

Rubiks Discusses Communist Party Split

LD0904184390 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Interview with Alfred Petrovich Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, by unidentified correspondent, in Riga; date not given—live or recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] We have already reported that Alfred Petrovich Rubiks has been elected first secretary of the Central Committee at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia. The leader of the communists is 55 years old. Here is his first interview for the Vremya program:

[Correspondent] I would like to ask you for your assessment of the situation and for your program of action.

[Rubiks] The majority of the congress, of the delegates, determined that we are developing together with the Soviet Union, as a sovereign republic in a renewed Federation; and the second question—it is intertwined with this—is what kind of party is it to be, either completely independent, or is it to be an independent Communist Party of Latvia of a kind that, having inherited all that is best from its past history, is going to work confidently in a single alliance with the CPSU.

In so far as opinions here were divided, those who don't agree and those who are in favor of immediate secession from the Soviet Union and for the setting up of a so-called independent Communist Party of Latvia, well, that section of delegates left the hall. Yes, in this connection we adopted a decision not to consider this their final step. We for our own part proposed that a commission for compromise [soglashtelskaya kommissiya], as we called it, should be set up with a view to conducting talks with those delegates who left the hall.

We regret the fact that among them there was a large part of the delegates representing rural rayons and our Latvian population—that we regret very much. A special resolution and appeal was adopted in this connection at the congress to the comrades who had left the hall and to all those who are in favor of setting up an independent Communist Party of Latvia. The dialogue must be continued. How long? Evidently until the congress of the independent Communist Party of Latvia, which has

been scheduled for 14 April. If an organizational split is indeed made there, then we will find ourselves in a situation in which Latvia will have—I don't know what name they will choose—but, as things are defined at present, Latvia will have two communist parties. Today a majority of communists remain with us, with the Communist Party of Latvia. I dream indeed of the day when we are all in our labor collectives and in our party relations with other public organizations and between parties, when we are all amicable and see our ultimate goal in one thing, in not splitting, in not breaking off relations, but in all being together, understanding that processes of integration are gaining the upper hand in the world today; and in working toward a single aim, that everyone in his work collective, in the street, and in public transport should feel at peace and confident in the future, and should not fear what is going to happen the day after tomorrow.

Further on Party Split, Recess

LD0904131290 Moscow TASS in English 1248 GMT
9 Apr 90

[Text] Riga April 9 TASS—By TASS correspondent:

A split occurred at the 25th congress of the Latvian Communist Party (LCP) at the end of last week. More than 250 delegates left the congress after disagreeing with decisions taken by the majority.

"The division occurred over these major issues: Whether the LCP should be within the Soviet Communist Party or outside it, and whether Latvia should remain within the Soviet Union or be outside it," Sergey Domanis, a delegate to the congress, told TASS.

"A compromise, as you can see, was ruled out. The Republican Communist Party thus reflected the contradictory processes taking place in Latvian society.

"Some people offer a simple way out for the Lettish population: Gaining independence," Domanis said. "Those who left the congress believe that regarding this issue they 'should be together with the people'. But the point is that the people are not so much 'reaching out' to independence as they are being 'led' to such a decision."

Among the group of delegates that left the congress are officials who are inclined to opportunism, as is known, and intellectuals, who followed the mandate of the Popular Front.

Domanis believes that "now it is difficult to predict how events will develop. The conduct of those who left the congress was due largely to a lack of responsibility. But there is also the example of Lithuania.

"Over there, upon fulfilling the political mandate of Sajudis [Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring], the members of the breakaway Communist Party lost their goal. They do not need it any longer either for themselves or others. In short, the party is breaking up.

"At the same time, the ranks of the pro-union Lithuanian Communist Party are swelling, since it is being viewed as a defender against the undemocratic arbitrariness of the new leadership."

Alfred Rubiks, a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who was the chairman of the Riga City Executive Committee for many years, was elected the new first secretary of the LCP Central Committee at the 25th congress on an alternative basis. The number of delegates who voted for his candidacy was 414 out of 518.

The congress passed resolutions supporting Communists from Lithuania and Estonia who adhere to the platform of the CPSU, expressed its attitude toward the Soviet Armed Forces, and also adopted a resolution on the media.

The delegates instructed the newly elected Central Committee to work out a programme to take the republic out of the crisis and then to submit it to the congress for consideration.

The programme should be developed on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee's platform for the CPSU's 28th congress, with due regard for the discussion of documents and delegates' suggestions at the LCP Congress.

With this end in view it was decided to announce a recess in the work of the 25th congress of the LCP until the end of the 28th congress of the CPSU, and to extend the delegates' credentials for this period.

Reasons for Party Split Noted

LD0904165390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] We have reported the difficult and, perhaps, dramatic atmosphere in which the 25th republican congress opened in Latvia. The fact is that some communists see Latvia only as an independent state, whereas others see the future republic only as part of the USSR. We recall that on Saturday evening, the independents, having quit the session, gathered in another building. They adopted as a foundation a draft program and charter which was rejected by the majority, and reached an agreement to continue preparations for their own congress arranged for 14 April. Two-thirds of the delegates continued to work. As is known, Alfreds Rubiks was elected first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee by a straight, secret ballot. The work of the previous Central Committee and bureau was declared to be "unsatisfactory." Not one of the previous Central Committee secretaries was elected to the new composition. The congress decided to announce a recess and to discuss the charter and program documents in primary organizations and to reconvene after the 28th party congress.

A reply to the main political question of the republic—whether it should be within the USSR or outside it—was

given in the appeal of the Latvian Communist Party congress to all the working people. It says that the Latvian Communist Party comes out in favor of restoring the true sovereignty of the republic in the USSR, on the basis of a new Union treaty, and for sovereignty in tackling questions of state construction.

This week will see the plenum of the new Central Committee, at which the election of secretaries will take place.

Latvian Party Congress, Pugo Speech Reported

LD0704203190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1815 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] Riga, 7 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondents Galina Kuchina and Valeriy Zaytsev report:

The situation in the Latvian Communist Party [LCP] was assessed as a crisis by many delegates at its congress, which continued today. There was sharp criticism of the leadership of the CPL Central Committee for the vagueness of its position and for its lack of resoluteness. It was noted that protracted political drift has led to loss of the party's prestige.

The threat of a split hanging over the party was felt in every speech. A division arose between the adherents of an independent Communist Party and those who seek to preserve organizational links with the CPSU. In order to avert a demarcation [razmezhevaniye] and bring the positions closer together, a compromise solution was embodied in the drafts of the program and of the charter. But the nebulous formulations in these documents suited neither side. Each side wanted to have a clear answer to two main questions—concerning the party's attitude to Latvian statehood, and concerning the status of the organization itself.

The congress was addressed by Boris Pugo, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU, Central Committee and chairman of the Party Control Commission of the CPSU Central Committee who stressed that the practical task facing communists is to revive the Leninist understanding of the self-determination of nations. This must take into account the objective trends toward internationalization of all spheres of public life. The CPSU sees the solution to this in a transition to a multi-level system of treaty relations and to the establishing of equivalent economic links among all the union republics. Secession of a republic from membership of the union is a highly complex and very painful process, leading to the severing of the thousands of invisible threads which connect each union republic to the whole country. There is therefore a need for prudence and true party and state wisdom. It is easy enough just to "slam the door shut" or crush a minority by taking a vote. It is more difficult to show patience and an attitude of respect for the opinion of others. For this, it is necessary to assimilate one of the most important rules of the new political thinking: Never refuse dialogue or the quest for points of contact and reasonable compromise.

The congress passed a decision declaring the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia unsatisfactory. The draft program of the Communist Party of Latvia was not adopted.

One of the founders of the independent Communist Party, Alfred Cepanis, deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, recalled his statement, the gist of which was that the adherents of the independent party would refrain from holding their congress on 14 April if the present forum were to recognize that the party's objective is to create a just, democratic society in a free and independent Latvian state. But the party itself must become independent and reject subordination to any political organization. Yesterday he asked for this question to be put to the vote. In view of the fact that the congress had rejected the draft program, the adherents of the independent party (more than 200 delegates) considered themselves unable to participate further in the work of this congress.

The congress adjourned.

More on Pugo Speech

LD0604190990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 6 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [begin recording] [video shows woman holding a microphone for man in suit; screen caption reads "B.K. Pugo, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Party Control Committee attached to the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Pugo] I think it is a good thing that communists are now taking a far more exacting attitude in the debate and assessment of the results of their work. It is also a fact that we probably need to gather more confidence in the correctness of our cause. The foundations for such confidence exist. This is because the documents which the party now has, including those which I managed to acquaint myself with after I arrived here, the documents which the Latvian communist party prepared for its 25th congress, give one reason to think that a lot can be achieved. The lessons can be drawn from what has been lost. In this way we can prevent the republic's communist party becoming some kind of secondary force and ensure that it continues to play an important role in society, the role which it is called upon to play. [end recording]

Latvian Party Congress Delegates Interviewed

LD0604182190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia began its work today in Riga. Our correspondent Ninel Meshkun reports:

[Meshkun] Almost 800 delegates to the 25th congress, representing the 170,000 Communists of Latvia, already

at the entrance to the House of Political Enlightenment, where the forum is taking place, were confronted with slogans. As has already become usual, pickets are presenting their movements and responding accordingly. The beginning of the congress, too, was marked by ardent emotions. In fact, the questions of time-limits, the agenda, and the membership of the working bodies of the congress were discussed for literally two hours. Even when a break is announced, discussions go on outside the conference hall, with the pickets at the entrance to the building. Tough decisions and hard work are in store. Renewal, democratization, and independence are the main demands of the Latvian Communists, which are written on a huge poster in two languages in the conference hall. During a break I asked:

[Begin recording] [Meshkun] What hopes do you place in the congress?

[Unidentified delegate] Well, I place very great hopes in the congress: First, consolidation of forces on a sound internationalist basis and, correspondingly, pursuing an economic and political course along these lines. I think the questions will be solved.

[Meshkun] Guna Arnesovna Luss, minister of social security of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic:

[Luss] I am optimistic and still (?think) that everything will be alright and we shall all leave through the same door. One wishes this very much.

[Meshkun] That is, that a split will not take place?

[Luss]...and we shall not lose the link with the CPSU.

[Meshkun] Ivars Yanovich Kezbers, secretary of the communist party of Latvia Central Committee:

[Kezbers] I would like very much that those suggestions which have been expressed in our collectives and the suggestions that have just been expressed at the meeting in Moscow by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, that one should in any case dissociate oneself from all extremist viewpoints and not allow a clash between these extremist viewpoints, be listened to. There is hope that the documents that have been published and worked out can become fundamental and ready to be adopted. [end recoding]

[Meshkun] Boris Karlovich Pugo, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Party Control Commission of the CPSU Central Committee, is participating in the work of the congress. The congress is continuing its work.

Commander Kuzmin Addresses Latvian Party Congress

LD0904134190 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian
0708 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Speech by Lieutenant General Fedor Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District, at the Latvian

Communist Party congress in the House of Political Education in Riga—live, in Russian]

[Text] Esteemed comrade communists, first I must say that, as a member of the Latvian Communist Party Bureau, I carry the full weight of responsibility for the crisis situation that has been created here. On several occasions, I have asked myself whether it was possible to avoid it. But we could not avoid it because the republican party organization began restructuring while already in an unhealthy condition.

Consequently, the only pertinent matter was the restoration of its authority, organization, and unity in the conditions of the new political situation in Latvia. In this context, in the context of restoring its vanguard role in society, there can only be one answer; it could have, but has not restored it.

What prevented it from doing this? It is tiresome to recognize that this is happening in a republic which possesses glorious revolutionary traditions and where there are significantly more healthy forces in the party and in society as a whole. I see the following reasons for the situation that has come about:

First, an underestimation of the cultural, the intellectual potential of the party. In essence it has ceded the intelligentsia to the People's Front without a fight and has ceased to be the leading generator of the ideas of perestroika. The People's Front leadership has seized the initiative and has not relinquished it for almost two years.

A second reason is the inconsistency and fuzziness of our Central Committee's positions in the absence of a clearly defined plan of action for extracting the republican party organizations from the crisis situation and in the absence of a unity of views on the development of a strategic line and action tactics among party organization secretaries.

Third, the Latvian Communist Party leadership long ago reconciled itself to defeat in the struggle for political power. In essence, communists and all the republic's healthy forces standing on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union platform are for a Latvia within the CPSU... the Soviet state has been left out on its own.

And fourth, the Latvian Communist Party leadership has simply not made any serious attempts to cleanse the party ranks and disassociate itself from unhealthy forces in the party. The party is being detonated [as heard] from within in a planned and purposeful manner.

Any brief experience with the work among the ranks of the Central Committee Bureau suggests that primarily there is a gap between word and deed. Calls for the revolutionary renewal of society have not been consolidated by the actual renewal of the republican party organization or its forms and methods of work among the masses.

I think I will not be mistaken if I say that today as never before, the Central Committee is divorced from rank-and-file communists and working people. The main misfortune, in the final analysis, is not the crisis. The experience of our own and foreign political life demonstrates that few manage to avoid it. It is precisely here that vitality is manifest in the ability to find a solution to the crisis as quickly as possible. We have not been able to do this because the central apparatus has begun to accept the disease of crisis as a normal state. The effect of acclimatisation has set in. The apparatus has adapted itself to working in this disease. Restructuring in the republican party organization has been impossible with this apparatus.

There is something else that I would like to emphasize. The bitter experience of the Lithuanian Communist Party has convincingly demonstrated that it is impossible to simultaneously restore the combat ability of a republican party organization and breach one's links with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I am profoundly convinced that secession from the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union offers no prospect.

On top of the ruins of the former party remain communists on the CPSU platform, isolated from the indigenous population, and a political organization of the indigenous population which is isolated from the Russian-speaking part of society and its important productive force.

The result is the party's loss of power. For us there is no better way of drawing a lesson from the experience of the Lithuanian events than by preventing disillusion in the work of the Latvian Party Central Committee from manifesting itself in a mass hemorrhage of healthy forces from our ranks. This is all the more important, since rupture with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union precedes secession from the USSR with all the onerous consequences proceeding from this.

Finally, I would like to dwell on an issue which is of concern to me as commander, as a communist, and simply as a citizen. I will mention the attitude in the republic toward troops stationed on its territory. It was Engels who said that from the time that every healthy man passes through the ranks of an Army, this Army begins increasingly to reflect the mood and thoughts of the people. In the past, we were proud that this was taking place. Now, candidly, we are apprehensive. Publications on the armed defenders of the fatherland which they are defending [as heard] contain raging anti-Sovietism and an attempt to present the USSR in the role of a state inimical to the indigenous population and the Army in the role of an Army of occupation.

You must agree that on the ideas, on these ideas, it is not only difficult but simply impossible to form patriotic feelings of a common motherland of the USSR. It is high time that these publications, which are considered inadmissible in any civilized state, were reliably blocked.

We are alarmed by the consequences of the adoption of a law on alternative labor service. There had also been talk before on more than one occasion on the dangerous propagation of pacifist inclinations. Now they have been underpinned with a legal foundation. We also support the observance of human rights. But one must not forget that everyone is obliged to defend the main human right, the right to life.

As it is, the party and government are undertaking enormous efforts in order to win the west over to a reciprocal military defense policy based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency. Hence, there is no more important task than assisting us to maintain a modern Army, the minimum necessary, but highly professionally trained, based on a new qualitative parameters, and to avert the demoralization of youth, and not to dupe them that the Baltic can supposedly remain on the sidelines in the event of an armed conflict breaking out between the USSR and the NATO bloc, but to bring them up in the spirit of the importance and necessity of the military profession. For today not only your and my life, but also the lives of future generations depends on the man with a weapon in his hands.

I, as a commander, am very alarmed by the atmosphere that has arisen around the spring call-up to the Army. Calling things by their proper names, one cannot describe the People's Front Duma's appeal to youth to refuse military service as anything other than provocation. I am surprised. Why is there no urgent fitting reaction on the part of Comrade Gorbunov, communist and chairman of the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and the Supreme Soviet itself?

Refusal of military service will primarily turn out to be a misfortune for the youths and their parents. The laws of the Soviet state and the USSR Constitution are valid over the whole territory of the USSR, including the whole Baltic territory. The discharge of servicemen, whose terms of duty run out this spring, to the reserve, which was recently declared by a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers, will be implemented as a direct function of the call-up of youths to the Army. The interests of troops' combat readiness demand this.

We servicemen are acutely experiencing increasing activity to neutralize the district's troops and the isolation of servicemen from the sociopolitical life of the republic. Now it has been transferred to the plane of active legislation encroaching on the political and social rights of servicemen and the legal position of military units. The already complex social and everyday conditions of the life of officers, warrant officers, and the members of their families are being artificially complicated.

Judge for yourselves. Today we have several thousand officers and warrant officers in the republic without accommodation. And in these conditions, in the teeth of the well-known decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, a decision is

being adopted at the latest session of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet which deprives servicemen discharged to the reserve of the right to receive accommodation if they were not called up from Latvia.

Local party and state bodies are adopting decisions not to allocate accommodation to servicemen and are wrecking our construction plans by delaying deliveries of building materials and refusing to make plots of land available for building. It is extremely difficult to resolve questions of registering families without which it is impossible to find a job, find the children a school, or acquire vitally necessary goods in short supply.

This cannot but give rise to a feeling of unpleasantness and protests in our military milieu. Our repeated applications on these questions to the Supreme Soviet and the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee have, unfortunately, not met with due understanding and support.

I would like to hope that attempts to exacerbate relations between the Army and society will not develop further and that the unity of Army and people will gain its true content. Our efforts in this direction will have the legal support of the republic's Supreme Soviet and the party, we hope, in the form of the newly elected Central Committee.

In conclusion, I consider it necessary for the draft program and rules examined here to be in the form of a proposal directed at the 28th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. [applause]

RSFSR

Leningrad Rally Urges Nonuse of Force

TV Chief's Dismissal

LD0804204190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 8 April in its "Vremya" newscast carries a two and one-half minute video report from a correspondent in Palace Square, Leningrad, on a public meeting held there today.

The subject of the meeting was the nonuse of force in resolving civil and political conflicts. Over video of large numbers of people in the square, some of whom are waving flags and banners, one of which says "The tragedy of Tbilisi must not be repeated!", and holding candles, as various speakers address them from a platform, the correspondent notes that the meeting, sanctioned by the city soviet executive committee, is unusual in two respects: The initiators of the meeting were people's deputies of the recently elected Leningrad Soviet, and Palace Square has become the venue for a meeting for the first time in many decades.

The correspondent continues: "Various opinions were voiced, and at times they were extremely sharp, in

particular about the incident the day before yesterday, when a group of deputies from the Leningrad Soviet came to the television center in the evening and, blockading its management, insisted on the broadcasting of a program in which USSR People's Deputy Ivanov was taking part. This was done after the leadership of the television and radio committee had refused to carry out the decision of the city and oblast soviets on showing the program, referring to the relevant recommendations of the commission on deputies' ethics of the country's Supreme Soviet and the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. However you assess this case, one thing is clear: The hierarchical muddle created in the country during the heyday of the administrative-command system is even today able to generate the sort of conflict situations whose consequences can be extremely dramatic." The correspondent's report ends with video of Deputy Sobchak addressing the meeting.

The report is followed by a five-and-half-minute studio commentary by the writer Genrikh Borovik, chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee. He says: "I agree with the correspondent who has just commented on the meeting in Leningrad, that, of course, the situation is muddled. The point is that the chairman of Leningrad Television is subordinate to three organizations: The Leningrad Soviet, the Oblast Soviet and Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting], and his appointment, transfer or dismissal depends, of course, on the consent of all three of these organizations. The situation, it can't be denied, is quite unique. In the course of 30 minutes the director of Leningrad Television was dismissed, and a program was broadcast on which the Leningrad Soviet had insisted. In the case in question I am not concerned about the contents of the program, I think it is more important here to wait for the decision of the Supreme Soviet commission on this matter, but in principle—I have observed quite a lot of television in the countries which we now call civilized—and I can't recall such an event. It seems to me that this is quite an extraordinary affair, and I am surprised that no one has yet expressed his official attitude to this—including the management of Gosteleradio."

Borovik goes on to elaborate on the role of the media in a democracy, the balance that has to be struck between preserving democracy and preventing a decline into license, and the need for the law to be observed.

Interethnic Conflict Incited

PM0904203390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 10 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Own correspondent A. Molokov report under the rubric "Afterword to Sunday Rally in Leningrad": "Grimaces of Democracy"]

[Text] Leningrad—"Democracy" in Leningrad has secured another convincing victory: For the first time since the beginning of perestroika, a rally organized on the initiative of the "Democratic Union" has been held in the very heart of the city, in the historical Palace

Square. Thus, on the fourth day of work of the new city soviet session, deputies annulled the decision of the old Leningrad City Soviet stipulating the places where city-wide events of this nature may be held.

Palace Square has seen much in its lifetime. So it was hardly likely to have been surprised by the speeches which echoed across it last Sunday and rapidly became hysterical. Especially as the speakers neither suggested nor said anything new. Over the past year of turbulent demonstrations and political spectacles, the people of Leningrad have heard plenty of everything, and the endless repetition of the same old labels, appeals, entreaties, and oaths of loyalty to the people has even left a bitter taste in the mouths of some.

The rally's agenda was wide-ranging: "To express sympathy to the Georgian people in connection with the anniversary of the tragic events in Tbilisi, to express support for the Lithuanian people in connection with their struggle for national liberation from the yoke of the Soviet empire, to express our negative attitude toward the use of military force in the resolution of national political conflicts...." However, those who gathered for the rally broadened the framework of the agreed agenda further still: "To demand that power be transferred to local soviets," to destroy "the obscurantist ideology of Marxism," to struggle "against imperial thinking," and to smash "the partocratic mafia."

"Gorbachev, why do you need the Baltic?" "Hands off Lithuania!" "No to a repetition of 9 April 1989".... Some placards had clearly provocative overtones: "Tbilisi-89, Vilnius-90?" and "Down with the Soviet empire!"

However, most of the slogans on display urged: "Hands off Ivanov!" (and Gdlyan, too). They threatened strike action in response to the hearing of Ivanov's "case" in the Supreme Soviet.

The crowd responded indifferently to the speeches by functionaries from "people's," "national," and democratic fronts and parties from a number of republics and to the greetings messages from representatives of "Sajudis" and the Baltic communities in Leningrad, but they livened up when N.V. Ivanov, "the mafia's most terrible enemy and the most courageous fighter against it," appeared on the improvised rostrum. Smart old ladies, ecstatic women, and slender young girls chanted "Vivat!" and "tossed their caps in the air," while the people's deputy thanked them for their trust and promised to continue to uncompromisingly stand his ground.

All this looked like a well-rehearsed performance, in which every devotee knew his role and his allotted place and did what he was supposed to do. Some stirred up the public from the rostrum while others goaded the crowd from within: They organized the applause, collected signatures for petitions, handed out leaflets, and sold their newspapers. However, maybe because it was rather chilly or maybe because no one really took what was happening seriously, it was hard to get the rally warmed up.

But the most alarming aspect was this: Some people very much wanted to damage the president's authority and to impose their image of the USSR as a jail of nations.

It is deplorable that the Leningrad City Soviet—more than half of whose deputies are CPSU members, if party membership cards are anything to go by—allowed such a spectacle to be staged in the city center. Essentially, one speaker after another incited interethnic conflict.

So did this small but vociferous rally reflect the opinion and stance of the people of Leningrad? Naturally, those who did not share its objectives were not allowed near the microphone. Who benefits from this whipping up of anticommunist hysteria?

Rostov Obkom Plenum Elects First Secretary

PM0904115490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Correspondent M. Kryukov report under general heading "Plenums Held"]

[Text] Rostov-na-Donu, 5 Apr—A plenum of Rostov CPSU Obkom [oblast committee] was held to examine an organizational question. In connection with B.M. Volodin's appointment as first deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, he was released from his duties as first secretary of the party obkom. V.T. Suslin, formerly deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadre Work Department, was elected first secretary of Rostov Party Obkom. The election took place on a contested basis.

Arkhangelsk Party Official Announces Resignation

LD0904123190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] Guskov, first secretary of the Arkhangelsk oblast party committee, elected from a choice of candidates to the post of chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, has announced categorically his intention to resign his post as leader of the oblast party organization and concentrate on his work in the bodies of people's power. The oblast soviet, with its new membership, is being formed with glasnost and openness. Local television is broadcasting the sittings of the first session live. The body of the Arkhangelsk deputies is 80 percent new. The new soviet has received an unenviable inheritance. The Arkhangelsk Oblast Soviet and its executive organs are facing a huge amount of work in the social reorientation of the economy in order to satisfy peoples' needs.

Kazan City Chairman Relinquishes Gorkom Post

PM1004081790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Alyans Sabirov report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "You Cannot Hold Two Posts"]

[Text] Kazan—Deputies have voted against a soviet chairman also holding the post of party committee first secretary.

An unusual situation developed at an organizational session of Kazan Gorkom [city party committee] with regard to the election of the soviet chairman. G. Zertsalov, party gorkom first secretary, was elected to this post by a majority vote on a contested basis. But at the same time the session decided: "The chairman of Kazan Gorkom cannot hold another salaried post." What is to be done in this situation? G. Zertsalov answered this question bluntly: "I ask communists to relieve me of my post as first secretary." Candidate of Juridical Sciences N. Rybushkin, a senior teacher at the state university and an informal who was supported in the election by the "Initsiativa" voters' club, was elected deputy chairman of the city soviet.

Voronezh Oblast Crime Ring Neutralized

PM0404102890 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "They're Here...."]

[Text] The USSR KGB Administration for Voronezh Oblast, in conjunction with the oblast prosecutor's office and Voronezh Oblast Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Administration, has neutralized a large group of criminals who were engaging in robbery, extortion, swindling, and speculation in cars—including foreign makes. In all, more than 20 crimes committed by this group in the towns of Voronezh, Lipetsk, Zadonsk, and Staryy Oskol were uncovered by the law enforcement agencies.

As a result of the operation that was carried out, 10 people were arrested, and a number of other persons are under investigation. Several firearms were confiscated, along with cylinders of poisonous gas, knives, smoke bombs, drugs, and foreign currency.

The investigation is being conducted by an operational and investigative unit made up of workers of the prosecutor's office and the oblast administrations of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and KGB.

New Maritime Kray Official Chairman Elected

LD0804222190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1400 GMT 8 Apr 90

[Text] (Vladimir Sergeyevich Kuznetsov), a 36-year-old scientist from Vladivostok, has been elected chairman of the Maritime Kray Soviet Executive Committee. It was the first time a people's deputy was elected to this post on a basis of more than one candidates at the session of the Kray Soviet. The overwhelming majority of the deputies of the Kray Soviet liked the program proposed by Kuznetsov, which didn't consist of mere slogans, and the fact that he did not promise wonders, but sincerely wished to create as favourable as possible conditions for the work and life of the people of the Maritime Kray.

'Ecological Tragedy' in Ufa Reported

LD0804212490 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 8 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Unfortunately, this day of rest does not have good humor at its disposal. You probably know from news reports about the ecological conversation in Ufa, excuse me, about the ecological tragedy in Ufa. Our own correspondent in Bashkiriya, Madril Gafarov, came into our editorial office two hours ago. I have never seen him so moved. Today, he was a participant in a large, thousands-strong meeting. So, here is the report from my colleague. [video shows a large crowd of people holding various flags and banners, then correspondent speaking to camera]

[Begin recording] [Gafarov] Today, more than 60,000 people of Ufa have had no drinking water for nine days. On 30 March the water supply was found to have a significant phenol content. The Khimprom Production Association, the waste products of which entered the little river Shugurovka and hence into the river Ufa and into the southern water supply of the city, is the culprit.

Today a meeting, several-thousand-strong is taking place. [video shows unidentified woman being interviewed]

[Woman] I came to the meeting with my son. My son suffers from an allergy. It has started to get worse now. And so I have come to this meeting to demand first and foremost clean water for our children.

[Second woman] Even when the public hygiene unit learned that the water had been poisoned, even then they were unable to reassure us. Next to our factory there is a bakery; we can see it from above. Not once did they stop baking bread. And it was only the following week that tankers with clean water started to arrive, not on Friday or Saturday, but on Monday and Tuesday. And for all these days we were eating the same bread. [video shows woman standing in crowd. One banner reads "Phenol means death"; another says "Ufa—the second Chernobyl"]

[Third woman] At work we have a woman who washed her face with this water and got burns, burns on her eyes.

[Gafarov] People are demanding the closure of Khimprom and other harmful factories in Ufa. The other day there was also a meeting of voters from the stricken part of the city and of people's deputies. More than 900 people have signed an appeal to the president of the country, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Comrade Ryzhkov. [video shows interview of Yu.K. Sharipov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet]

[Sharipov] This large document says the city of Ufa is a hostage of the Ministry of the Petrochemical Industry.

The people of this city and their lives have no guarantees, and so we are asking that the city of Ufa be declared an ecological disaster zone. Tomorrow morning I am taking the first flight to the session of the Supreme Soviet and I am taking these documents with me and hope that I will hand them over to them on Tuesday. [end recording]

[Announcer] You know, "Moloch" by Kuprin comes to mind. Sometimes one gets the feeling that in many regions of the country our fellow citizens are hostages of this "Moloch." In Ufa it has its own name, the Ministry of the Petrochemical Industry. And it even seems as if the leadership of the republic has given up, powerless, before its pressure. How else can its inactivity be defined. It is after all, truly criminal.

Kuybyshev Oblast Experiences Oil Pipeline Leakage

LD0604145790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1130 GMT 6 Apr 90

[From the "television news service" program]

[Excerpts] And now about yet another ecological danger—the Druzhba pipeline accident. The danger is posed, of course, not by the pipeline itself, of which we shall speak, but by the irresponsible way in which it has been operated. (The accident) at the Druzhba pipeline took place here, near Syzran. It could have happened anywhere else. A gigantic, underground transport artery cuts Kuybyshev Oblast in half. The total length of the pipeline is 14,000 km. Due to spring soil movements, a ring weld on the pipe burst. A black stream of the oily fluid filled up all the places below and began to flow in the direction of the town and the Volga. Someone telephoned the oil pumping station in Syzran. There, too, they noticed: the pressure fell and automatic equipment took over. But no less than 4,000 tonnes of oil managed to seep out before the pumping was halted.

Accident emergency services from Syzran and Kuybyshev which were alerted began to work. As specialists from the State Nature Committee told us, 300 hectare of fine Volga black soil area has been lost—even though the official commission has a figure of 198 hectare Meadowland, gardens, dachas, and buildings in the village of Sormovskiy have been flooded. [passage omitted on doctor's advice to evacuate children from the zone]

Recultivation is now underway. The topmost layer of the soil is to be taken off and transported to be buried. But, judging by all, there is no hurry to have it removed. Subsoil waters are becoming polluted. And, with the onset of warm weather, harmful vapors pose a danger to people who live here. [video shows pipeline weld, pools of oil, helicopter hovering overhead, earthmoving machinery at work, old pool draining into subsoil]

Second Major Accident

PM0904100190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Zhigalov: "Accident at Oil Pipeline"]

[Text] Kuybyshev—One of the lines of the "Druzhba" oil pipeline burst near Syzran. The oil gushed along a ravine toward the Volga and flowed toward the suburban settlement of Sormovo....

A black oil gusher several meters high struck from below ground. It was noticed by people driving by on the Moscow-Kuybyshev road. The automatic emergency equipment worked irreproachably and the pumps delivering the oil were turned off. But even with this emergency switching off an oil flood spread over hundreds of hectares. The oil flowed along the settlement street and into yards and kitchen gardens. One spark would have been enough and the oil sea of 5,000-7,000 could have exploded. There was no tragedy thanks to the resolute and precise actions of the authorities of Syzran City. The electricity supply was rapidly switched off, the nearest highway was closed, and the inhabitants of oil-heated houses were evacuated. It was also suggested that all inhabitants leave the settlement. Temporary housing was prepared for them. Free catering was laid on. But the majority refused to leave their homes despite the danger. But the children were evacuated from the settlement.

An earth embankment stopped the flow of oil to the Volga. Civil defense subunits, servicemen from the local garrison, and students at the helicopter school are taking part in eliminating the consequences of the accident. The oil is being collected into earth reservoirs and pumped off....

For the second time in recent months we are reporting a major accident on the product pipelines passing through Kuybyshev Oblast. The bursting of a gas pipeline on the river bed close to a railroad station threatened a repetition of the Bashkir tragedy. But to this day the oblast authorities have lacked any legal or effective levers for influencing the product pipelines' feckless owners—the union ministries.

Caucasus

Georgia Mourns 'Sad Anniversary' of Tbilisi

PM0904155790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Apr 90 First Edition p 8

[Own correspondent G. Lebanidze report: "Tbilisi Grieves"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 9 Apr—Georgia has been marking the sad anniversary of the bloody events of 9 April 1989. That day brought pain not only to the Georgian people but to the entire country.

Yesterday, in churches throughout the republic, requiems were held for those who died, and when the

clock on the city soviet building struck midnight thousands of people moved in the direction of the square in front of Government House, which is where the tragedy took place.

Today, which has been declared a day of mourning by the republic's Council of Ministers, state flags were at half mast and all entertainments canceled.

The words of the message from USSR President M.S. Gorbachev to the Georgian Supreme Soviet, all of the republic's working people, and the families of the dead has been received with great satisfaction: "At this hour I would once again like to express my respect for Georgia and its industrious people, distinguished by their glorious traditions, distinctive culture, and friendliness. I am sure that all difficulties and problems connected with perestroika in Georgia will be overcome...."

30,000 Hold Rally 9 Apr

AU0904160390 Paris AFP in English 1525 GMT
9 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Tbilisi, Georgia, April 9 (AFP)—About 30,000 people took to the streets here Monday in support of Georgian independence and to commemorate the killing of 20 demonstrators last year by Soviet troops. More than 100,000 people had held a similar all-night rally in the Georgian capital, remembering the protesters, 16 of them women, who died when troops broke up a nationalist rally on the night of April 8-9 last year.

Monday's crowd, led by Georgian independence party chief, Irakli Tsereteli, gathered outside the main government offices before marching on the Soviet Army general quarters for the Caucasus region.

Men, women and children chanted "Long live free Georgia" and waved the Georgian republic's flag, the former royal banner and the flag of Lithuania, the Baltic state which declared independence March 11. One banner read "Out" in Russian, and depicted a soldier wearing a gas mask and holding a spade—a grim reminder of last year's protest where victims were gassed or cut down by spade-wielding troops.

The crowd stopped outside the Institute of Marxist-Leninism, where a bas-relief of a socialist worker was defaced overnight and a pot of white paint thrown over one of Stalin. Members of nationalist groups, including pro-monarchists, who had forcibly installed themselves in the building last month, emerged to join the marchers on their five-kilometre (three-mile) trek in the bright sunshine.

The marchers stopped a second time next to a bust of Ilya Chavchavadze, a writer murdered by the Bolsheviks at the turn of the century. A Greek Orthodox priest, who along with two men in traditional Georgian costume had been accompanying Mr. Tsereteli, stopped to bless the bust, amid applause, slogans and raised fists.

As they arrived at the Army headquarters, demonstrators shouted "Occupiers, occupiers" and whistled when soldiers appeared on a nearby hill.

Demonstrators told AFP that General Yegor Rodionov, held by Moscow to be responsible for the massacre, was still inside the building "in the shadows". Soldiers who appeared on rooftops and behind windows were also jeered. Mr. Tsereteli told the crowd that as long as Soviet troops were stationed on Georgian soil, the republic could never hope for independence and stressed the need for nationalists to press for a withdrawal of the Red Army. [passage omitted]

2,000 Armenians Gather at Azerbaijan Border

AU0904160990 Paris AFP in English 1528 GMT
9 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 9 (AFP)—Nearly 2,000 armed "Armenian militants" have massed at the Armenian border near the Azerbaijan republic, according to the Soviet military commander of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region who wants a state of emergency imposed on the region.

General Vladislav Safonov, quoted by the Radio Moscow publication INTERFAX, said the militants were "well armed and well organized" near the border towns of Goris and Kafan [spellings as received]. He said their action follows one week after the Soviet Army dismantled an Armenian militants' headquarters near Goris, which lies in eastern Armenia some 40 kilometers (25 miles) from Nagorno-Karabakh.

INTERFAX said Gen. Safonov has asked for a state of emergency in the region, like that imposed last January on the Azeri side of the border after violent clashes between the two ethnic groups. The state of emergency is still in effect in the Azeri capital of Baku and in Nagorno-Karabakh, whose Armenian majority has opposed the extension of Azeri rule over the autonomous province.

Unrest between the two communities, along with clashes with security forces sent in to restore order, have cost more than a hundred lives so far this year.

Shatalin on Border Situation

LD0904174190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1645 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] Baku, 9 April. (TASS)—"Subunits of the USSR Interior Ministry troops, interacting with Internal Affairs bodies, are creating a reliable system to safeguard the security of the population in the border areas." This was pointed out in an interview with a TASS correspondent by Colonel General Yuriy Shatalin, commander of the interior troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, speaking about the situation which has developed of late in the Azerbaijani regions bordering Armenia, where attacks on individual populated areas have been carried out by armed groups of Armenian guerillas. "In order to disarm the guerillas," he said,

"additional subunits of interior troops and militia have been sent there. The stabilization process is moving, albeit with difficulty."

Instances of the seizure of state motor vehicle transport and trucks, fitted out to transport guerillas, which have become frequent in Armenia, are causing alarm, Shatalin said. We have already succeeded in recovering some of the vehicles and have returned them to their owners. But, the guerillas are acquiring armored military equipment, in particular tractors, even through clearly official channels, through sales by defense industry enterprises.

Assessing the actions of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry troops in this difficult situation, Shatalin said that "the internal troop servicemen, by exercising restraint and tact in a difficult situation, are acting resolutely and professionally, with a sense of great responsibility for executing a set task to stabilize the situation in the Transcaucasian region."

'Gradual' Normalization of Situation in NKAO

PM0904185990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[AZERINFORM-TASS report: "Nagorno-Karabakh: There Are Changes"]

[Text] Stepanakert, 7 Apr—An AZERINFORM correspondent was briefed on the gradual normalization of the situation in population centers in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] by Colonel V. Ovchinnikov, chief of staff of the commandant's office responsible for the state-of-emergency region in the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and regions of the republic adjacent to it.

According to him, the situation is improving as a whole, although there are destructive forces preventing peace and calm from prevailing in the ancient land of Nagorno-Karabakh.

After a two-month break due to strike action, industrial enterprises have resumed work, building sites have come to life, and the construction of residential buildings in Stepanakert has begun. There are particularly significant changes at the local railroad station, which is still, unfortunately, the only enterprise in the city where representatives of the Azeri and Armenian population are working together. It is not confrontation but a common interest in contributing to the defusing of tension that has helped them to overcome their alienation and ensure that food, fuel, building materials and structures, and other vitally important freight are unloaded. The AZERINFORM correspondent was told in the republic organizational committee that the first cars carrying industrial enterprises' output were dispatched from the station today.

Seized Arms, Combat Equipment Destroyed

NC0904102290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1730 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] Arms and combat equipment seized by the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry troops and Soviet military servicemen during the operations they carried out in a number of residential areas in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] in the past few weeks will no longer be able to harm live targets or obstruct peaceful work. These arms and combat equipment have been destroyed. (?Asivnikov), head of the state of emergency rayon headquarters, which is responsible for the NKAO and a number of Azerbaijani rayons which border that oblast, has told this to an AZERINFORM correspondent. According to him, the situation in that part of the republic is gradually normalizing. However, a number of disruptive forces are obstructing the efforts to establish peace and security in the historic NKAO territory.

Taking this into consideration, the staff of the state of emergency rayon is further strengthening its work. It is using various tactical methods to obstruct violations of law and strictly controlling adherence to the passport regime. The military command headquarters is closely cooperating with the republic's NKAO Organization Committee to normalize the situation under conditions of openness. The people are being kept informed by the military command headquarters through local press organs. Meanwhile, representatives of military servicemen, leading officials of the republic's ministries and administrations, and elders are meeting with representatives of the collectives of the oblast's industrial and transportation establishments, construction organizations, and agricultural establishments. The work is producing results.

Azeris Urge Russians To Return to Baku

90US0750A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY
in Russian 18 Mar 90 p 5

[Article by AZERINFORM special correspondent S. Krasnova: "Long Way Home"]

[Text] A group of high-ranking officials from the soviet organs, leaders of industries and enterprises, and public figures left for Moscow on a noble mission. They want to meet the Russian-speaking former residents of Baku who left the city after the January events. They want to tell those people the truth about the current situation in the city and in the republic, to help restore them to their previous status in life and work, to instill some hope and trust in the future in the hearts of those who have lost all faith.

Accompanied by RSFSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor] Chairman A.P. Blokhin, they went to visit the boarding houses near Moscow that became temporary homes for the Russian-speaking refugees from Baku. On every occasion the dialogue started with a crossfire of questions, heated with excitement and emotions. But

after a while the ice of prejudice would start to melt. The people began to sense that the visitors from Baku sent by the city workers had just one wish—to help them return home, to their work places. Many of those living in the boarding houses did not really know about the appeal made by the people, leaders, and intelligentsia of Azerbaijan to the Russians among them. In the appeal they were asked not to abandon their native land, and were also offered some concrete proposals on how to restore the previous atmosphere of mutual trust, friendship, and traditional internationalism so characteristic of all the ethnic groups of Azerbaijan. For these people it was quite unexpected news to hear that somebody was waiting for them and holding their work places for them.

In this respect we can address quite a few justified reproaches to the mass media: careless words in print, an idiosyncratic and sometimes ambiguous interpretation of events are not conducive to stabilizing the situation and exposing the evil.

We found proof of this at one of the meetings. The head of the city education administration, A.B. Dzhangirov, spoke to disprove the alleged facts of discrimination on the part of children in one of the Baku schools. He said, by the way, that he was going to see the editors of UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA and talk to its correspondent Afanasyev, who published several articles distorting the real facts. I must note that Asif Bakhyshovich succeeded more than others in his mission of returning the refugees home. He talked personally to each of over a dozen teachers who intend to go back to Baku in the near future.

But not everyone reacted to the offer in the same way. Some people were only interested in what RSFSR Goskomtrud Chairman A.P. Blokhin had to say to them. But he did not have much to console them with. There is no possibility of finding housing for the people in Moscow, Moscow Oblast, or Leningrad. Even in cities of the oblast level they can provide only family dormitories. There are no such problems in agricultural areas—the nonchernozem zone, Siberia, and Far East. But for most of these people going to such places would not help, as almost all of them are third- or fourth-generation city dwellers. Besides, soon it will become impossible for them to stay in the boarding houses and young pioneers' camps near Moscow. Summer is coming and many Muscovites are planning on their legitimate rest in those places, as guaranteed to them and their children.

All this made some people think very hard. Here are some short interviews:

Tatyana Novikova, a computer operator from the Kaspar computer center: "We left because, to some extent, we gave in to the atmosphere of panic and fear surrounding the departure of military dependents. I feel uprooted as never before and I want very much to go back. I am just worried whether I am going to get my job back."

Irina Fedorova, a homemaker: "We are ready to go back to Baku, our favorite city, any minute. Trust me, this bread here is free but it is also quite bitter."

Gennadiy Oreshin, a mechanic from trucking fleet No. 2708: "I must say that many of us are seriously considering going back."

At the meetings the people described the various reasons why they had left their homes. The primary reason was to guarantee personal safety; another was their concern about the changeover to Azeri as the official language. The people are also concerned about strikes which might result in forced leave and financial difficulties.

It is difficult to say if everybody is going to return home after these meetings. But everybody will be thinking about it. A headquarters has been set up at the permanent representation of the Azerbaijan SSR to help those who want to go back. Every person who finds himself in difficult circumstances gets a pre-paid airline ticket.

"In this way we have helped several dozen people," an Azerinform correspondent was told by S.G. Ibragimov, permanent representative of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers to the USSR Council of Ministers. "But the main thing is our desire to maintain a permanent dialogue with the refugees and to try to persuade them of the necessity to return home as soon as possible. In this respect such peaceful 'special forces' are essential and very important. They help the people to hear the call of their native land, to take a sober approach to the situation, and to make a well-balanced and unemotional evaluation of the state of things. They help them feel that somebody is waiting for them back home."

The road that people choose in life may be hard and even far from straight, but the main thing is that it leads home.

Central Asia

Lizichev, Turkmen Military Officials Meet

LD0704175990 Ashkhabad Domestic Service in Russian
1430 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] A meeting took place today in the Ashkhabad officers' garrison house between Army General Lizichev, chief of the main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the command of the Turkestan Military District, the Red Banner Central Asian Border District, the command and political personnel of the Ashkhabad garrison, and the leaders of party and local soviet bodies, republican ministries and departments, military commissariats, the All-Union Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF], and the civil defense of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR].

Addressing those gathered, Comrade Lizichev said that restructuring processes are gathering strength in the Armed Forces today, just as throughout the entire

country. Their aims have been formulated precisely and clearly: Making our Army modern, strong, and reliable. The main path followed by perestroika in the Army is a path of qualitative parameters, above all raising the quality of combat equipment and armaments, developing our military science and technology, and improving the training of the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy. The resolution of these tasks depends to a great extent on the quality of the new recruits who come to serve in our Armed Forces.

The problem of preparing young people for service in the Army and Navy must be tackled most resolutely. To this end, substantial permanent assistance to the Armed Forces on the part of party, local soviet, and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] bodies, and by ministries and departments and public entities is necessary. In your republic, quite a lot is being done to prepare young people for military service. In particular, an active search is on for new, more effective forms and methods of military-patriotic education. However, now it is very important to understand better, to see better the unresolved problems in work with young men who are about to be or have been called up.

Comrade Lizichev dwelled on the tasks of the republic's military commissariats in preparing and carrying through call-ups of young people in to the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces and replied to the questions of participants in the conference.

Taking part in the conference were: Comrade Nesterenko, second secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee, and Comrade Amangeldyyeva, deputy chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers.

On the same day, a conversation took place between Comrade Niyazov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR and first secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee, and Army General Lizichev. It was attended by Nesterenko and by Chairman Akhmedov of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers.

Lizichev Meets With Uzbek Officials

*LD0704172190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1300 GMT 7 Apr 90*

[Text] In connection with the spring call-up of youth for military service, which has begun, a meeting of generals and officers of the USSR Minister of Defense with officials of the republic's military commissariats, the leaders of the republican ministries and departments, and representatives of the public has taken place in Tashkent. Listen to an interview our correspondent, Enay Davshan, had after the meeting's conclusion with Army General Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy:

[Begin Lizichev recording] Today, the Army must be, first, a modern Army; second, a strong Army; and third, a reliable Army. This means that technology and the material basis is being improved all the time. Naturally, trained people are needed.

What is of most concern? I would put the health of recruits in the first place. Well, here is a simple example: We are forced to return hundreds of people from every oblast who have been called up and are unfit for army service. Second, the number of people who are of limited fitness is increasing.

The second aspect: More young people are starting to come to us with religious convictions. This also means that here, evidently...[changes thought] This is a factor that should be taken into account.

Also, I cannot fail to mention this thing: Of the number of those called-up in the fall of 1989, almost 11 percent do not speak the Russian language, or speak it only poorly. However, you see, all commands in the Army are in the Russian language. We are not going to give every soldier an interpreter! Therefore, we have to spend the first six months teaching people a knowledge of the Russian language.

There is one more thing I cannot fail to mention. Without question, there is an energetic politicization of the people going on, and naturally, a politicization of young people. In this whirlpool of pluralism, confrontation, and struggle of opinions, we are starting to talk too much about the fact that no one threatens us now: Today, the Army does not even have to exist. Why go and serve in the Army?

In connection with the fact that at present the state of interethnic relations is of great concern to us. You enter the Army with certain moods, and unfortunately, nationalistic forces are at work in this respect. People come to us who are infected with this. We not only have to teach, but to reteach, not only educate in the spirit of nationalism, but even re-educate, sometimes, people with nationalistic inclinations so that they understand how to live as one family in our single union, so that our fortress is unity, and so that we have a single cause. [end recording]

Interviewed on Recruitment Problems

*LD0704174590 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1430 GMT 7 Apr 90*

[From the "Vramya" newscast: correspondent M. Ganiyev report and interview with A.D. Lizichev, head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, in Tashkent; date not given—recorded; speakers identified by screen caption]

[Text] [Presenter Igor Kudrin] It is not just farmers who have concerns and preoccupations in the spring. Thousands of young men in our country are preparing for the spring call-up into the Army. The democratic processes under way in our society also have exposed quite a few

problems in the Armed Forces. Serious discussions were held in Tashkent on 6 April at a meeting attended by a group of generals and officers belonging to the USSR Ministry of Defense. Special attention was paid to the problems of calling-up young people into the Army.

[Ganiyev] Desertion and refusal to carry out military service are terrible phenomena which, in our Constitution, are regarded as tantamount to betrayal of the motherland. Cases of this are happening today, for example, in Lithuania, the Transcaucasus, and other regions. There are forces in society that are trying to drive a wedge between the Army and the people. Today, all these problems are the subject of important discussions, which are being attended by Military Commissariat officials, leaders of a number of ministries and departments in Uzbekistan, and officers belonging to the Turkestan Military District.

A group from the Ministry of Defense has visited the Central Asian republics. This area of high birth rates now provides more draftees than any other. What did our tour of inspection reveal? [video shows colonnaded entrance to building with Army officers gathered outside; camera pans over audience, mostly uniformed men of Central Asian appearance]

[Lizichev] We are obliged to return hundreds of conscripts from every oblast who turn out to be unsuitable for service in the Army. The fact that the number of people suffering from nervous and psychological disorders has increased now is just typical. This is an especially telling problem. After all, our business is to handle weapons. We have to make absolutely sure that we get healthy people joining the Army.

[Ganiyev] Why have there been these attacks on the Army lately?

[Lizichev] Perestroika and glasnost have revealed a number of shortcomings, some of which are to be found in the Armed Forces themselves. There are quite a few of them. The second thing is that some of our people in the country are deliberately trying to sever the ties between the people and the Army and to set them against each other, above all by telling lies, making petty criticisms, and slandering and attacking the party, the Army, and organs of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In reality, there are no major contradictions. We all are working toward the same objective. Our principal vocation is to serve the fatherland and to safeguard the country's security. [video shows officers being addressed by speaker on rostrum, with Lizichev seated to the speaker's right; correspondent interviewing Lizichev]

Lizichev Attends Dushanbe Conference

PM0604104190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Lebedev report: "Worthy Reinforcements for the Army"]

[Text] The problems of training young people for military service and organizing the spring draft were discussed 4 April at a conference at the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee. Taking part in it were K. Makhkamov, first secretary of the republic Communist Party Central Committee; Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; party and soviet workers; representatives of Tajikistan's ministries, departments, military commissariats, and VUZ's [higher educational institutions]; and commanders and political workers from units of the Dushanbe Garrison.

After the conference Army General A. Lizichev and G. Veselkov, second secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, met with the personnel at Unit X, and answered numerous questions from servicemen connected with the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress and the provisions of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the congress.

Privileges for Returning Tajikistan Refugees

LD0904185790 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1030 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] Dushanbe, 9 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondent Nina Merezchnikova reports:

Soviet Tajikistan has introduced privileges for refugees who left the republic following the tragic events in Dushanbe on 12-14 February.

"We are trying to do everything possible to encourage the citizens who left Tajikistan after those events to return home," said Murodali Salikhov, the republic's trade union leader. "Those returning to their home town now that the state of emergency has been lifted will be given their former jobs. Their period of service will be considered unbroken, thereby providing them with certain social privileges. Places in higher and secondary education will be kept open for students."

The events of February led hundreds of Russian speakers to leave the republic in fear. According to the Tajik Trade Union Committee, refugees are now returning to the republic.

Kirghiz Party Congress To Convene 14 June

LD0904195990 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT
9 Apr 90

[Text] Frunze April 9 TASS—A plenary meeting of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee was held here today. It discussed the action programme of the republican party organisation for the forthcoming five-year period.

The plenum considered a date for the convocation of the 19th Kirghiz Party Congress, the quota of representation and order for the election of delegates to the 19th Kirghiz Party Congress and the 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

Kirghiz Communist Party leader Absamat Masaliyev in his report and other speakers stressed at the plenum that the programme and the entire work of the party organisation focuses on the Kirghiz people, their interests and concerns.

This necessitates the priority development of industries producing food and consumer goods. This also prompts the accelerated construction of housing, schools, kindergartens, as well as radical improvement in medical services and the environmental control.

The plenum decided to move up the date of the 19th party congress. It will be convened on June 14, 1990.

Delegates to the 28th CPSU congress will be elected at the 19th republican party congress from among candidates nominated on an alternative basis by primary party organisations and supported by district, city and regional party conferences.

The plenum also discussed questions submitted for the first session of the Kirghiz Supreme Soviet to open on April 10.

Kirghiz Central Committee Plenum Reported

LD0904163690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1300 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] A plenum of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee took place today in Frunze. Those attending discussed the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress and the new draft CPSU rules. Also, the issues of convening the 19th Kirghiz Communist Party Congress and a procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress were examined. The plenum, examined candidates for chairman of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet and his deputies, which would be recommended at the first session of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet, to open in Frunze tomorrow.

Masaliyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, made a report at the plenum.

Lizichev Discusses Draft With Kazakh Premier

PM0604120190 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Own correspondent Colonel A. Ladin report: "Meetings in Alma-Ata"]

[Text] A meeting was held in Alma-Ata 3 April between Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and U. Karamanov, chairman of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers. They discussed questions concerning the next draft of citizens for active military service.

On the same day Army Gen. A. Lizichev addressed political department chiefs of Turkestan Military District formations and the leading personnel of republic

military commissariats. Topical questions concerning the preparation of young people for army service and also the conduct of the pre-congress report and election campaign in Army party organizations were comprehensively examined.

Nazarbayev on Political Life in Kazakhstan

LD0804034790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1750 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Interview with N.A. Nazarbayev, chairman of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, by unidentified interviewer; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Interviewer] Nursultan Abishevich, as the secretary are you satisfied with the results of the preliminary elections?

[Nazarbayev] Overall I can definitely say I am satisfied because of the rivalry of views. First, the population of Kazakhstan learned many new names, new platforms, and new opinions during the election campaign. My satisfaction lies in the fact that almost all candidates for deputy supported the line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, the republic's leadership, the Supreme Soviet, and the government of our republic on the main aspects of economic policy, political activity, and issues of interethnic relations. The main positions were all supported by almost all candidates for deputy. [passage omitted: Nazarbayev is asked to outline the work the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is doing to prepare for the 28th CPSU Congress. He answers that preparations so far have centered on a meeting of secretaries of primary party organizations, part of a drive toward greater internal democracy. Constituencies are to be retained in the elections to that congress and for the 17th congress of the Kazakhstan Communist Party. He believes the rank and file party member can now make his voice heard far better than in the past to elect leaders committed to restructuring.]

[Interviewer] Nursultan Abishevich, your name has recently become fairly widely known throughout the country. Everyone looks forward to your appearances. You are aware of that. What, please, as a person, a communist, as a man, has it cost you to step over the mark? After all, you did work during the times of stagnation, let us put it like that. To step over that mark and to start suddenly introducing perestroika?

[Nazarbayev] Well, to answer that question, it has to be said that our party itself, our whole party, the CPSU, worked in the times of stagnation and that while it may sound somewhat banal now, the initiator of perestroika actually was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Central Committee and leadership of our party. Therefore, it was the times themselves, and you know and I know, that that period of work evoked not only displeasure but bewilderment in everyone, in every communist. Why did a vast country with such riches and resources fall so far behind in economic development

that it could not meet people's basic needs? This matured in the heart of each person, of each real communist.

I therefore believe if we are talking about me, that my own assessment of activities and analysis of the events of those days began before perestroyka. A real fight took place in me. Because a revolution is a revolution, it does not only take place from below but from above as well. I do not want to dwell on these matters now. The fight took place within me and here right at the start of restructuring and was at its height when the forces then at work did not understand the essence of perestroyka or what we were heading for and waited for changes and a return to the past.

I am therefore a convinced supporter, with all my awareness and being, of restructuring because I have been convinced once and for all that there is no alternative to restructuring. We only have forward movement. There is no movement back now, with this politicization of the masses and when we have taken a bold step forward in matters of democratization and glasnost. We are working to make people more political and to raise their activity so that each individual is free, for the peasant to be master on the land and the worker the master at the enterprise and factory. All this is now in people's blood and cannot be turned back. We have to go forward and get economic reform especially moving more quickly. [passage omitted]